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Introduction: Neuropsychiatry of
hallucinations
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Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is one of the most severe psychiatric disorders. Generally, it
profoundly affects an individual’s ability to think clearly, distinguish reality from
fantasy, react in an emotionally appropriate way, and interact with others. One of
the most tragical features of the disorder is the early appearance of the
symptoms, usually between ages 20 to 35, with devastating effects on social
relationships, education, and starting a professional career, thereby ruining all
promises of early adulthood. Approximately 15% of patients with schizophrenia
commits suicide. The general population lifetime prevalence of schizophrenia is
1.0 – 1.5 %, and the annual incidence rate is between 0.16 and 0.42/1000 persons
at risk (Jablensky, 1995). Although text-books state that schizophrenia affects
men and women equally (e.g., Kaplan, Sadock & Grebb, 1994), evidence is
accumulating that men are at higher risk for schizophrenia (Iacono & Beiser,
1992; Goldacre et al., 1994; Schelin et al., 2000).
Phenomenology
Symptoms of schizophrenia include delusions, hallucinations, disorganized
speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, affective flattening, alogia,
and avolition. None of these symptoms is pathognomonic for schizophrenia.
Table 1 lists the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia from the DSM-IV
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), the currently most widely used
psychiatric classification system. Symptoms of schizophrenia have been
characterized to be “waxing and waning”, referring to the acute and chronic
nature of different symptoms. Acute symptoms are usually so-called “positive”
symptoms (which are present in schizophrenia but not in healthy individuals),
such as delusions and hallucinations. On the other hand, negative symptoms (the
absence of functions that are present in healthy individuals), such as affective
flattening and avolition, are more persistent and are probably of more serious
prognostic importance (Andreasen, 1990; Murray, 1997).
Surprisingly, although a hallmark of schizophrenia, cognitive dysfunction
is not listed among the symptoms of schizophrenia in DSM-IV (it is expected
that the next revision of the DSM will correct for this omission). Numerous
neuropsychological investigations have established that patients with
schizophrenia suffer from significant deficits in attention, memory, executive
functioning and general intellectual abilities (Randolph et al., 1993; Heinrichs &
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Table 1. Diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia (DSM-IV).
A Characteristic symptoms: Two (or more) of the following, each present for a
significant portion of time during a 1-month period (or less if successfully treated):
(1) delusions
(2) hallucinations
(3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)
(4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior
(5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia or avolition
B Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of time since the onset of
the disturbance, one or more areas of functioning, such as work, interpersonal
relations, or self-care are markedly below the level achieved prior to onset (or when
the onset is in childhood or adolescence, failure to achieve expected level of
interpersonal, academic, or occupational achievement)
C Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least six months. This 6-
month period must include at least 1 month of symptoms (or less if successfully
treated) that meet criterion A (i.e., active phase symptoms) and may include periods
of prodromal or residual symptoms. During these prodromal or residual symptoms,
the signs of the disturbance may be manifested by only negative symptoms or two or
more symptoms listed in criterion A present in attenuated form (e.g., odd beliefs,
unusual perceptual experiences)
D Schizoaffective and Mood Disorder exclusion: Schizoaffective Disorder and Mood
Disorder with Psychotic features have been ruled out because either (1) no Major
Depressive, Manic, or Mixed Episodes have occurred during active-phase
symptoms; or (2) if mood episodes have occurred during active phase symptoms,
their total duration has been brief relative to the active or residual periods.
E Substance/general medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not due to the
direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a
general medical condition.
F Relationship to a Pervasive Developmental Disorder: If there is a history of Autistic
Disorder or another Pervasive Developmental Disorder, the additional diagnosis of
Schizophrenia is made only if prominent delusions or hallucinations are also present
for at least a month (or less if succesfully treated).
Zakzanis, 1998; Bilder et al., 2000; Weickert et al., 2000). Moreover, such
cognitive dysfunction has been shown to relate to outcome, e.g. verbal memory
predicts social and vocational outcome in schizophrenia (Green, 1996). Again, it
is important to note that a minority of patients does not show
neuropsychological dysfunction (Palmer et al., 1997; Weickert et al., 2000).
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Etiology
The precise cause of schizophrenia is not known. Despite decades of huge
research efforts, schizophrenia remains a poorly understood disorder. This is not
to say, however, that there is no information on the pathophysiology implicated
in  schizophrenia. From 1976, when the first study appeared in which enlarged
cerebral ventricles were demonstrated in schizophrenia (Johnstone et al., 1976), a
large number of studies have reported structural and functional brain
abnormalities in schizophrenia (cf. Cannon, 1996; Deakin, 1996; Lawrie &
Abukmail, 1998; Harrison, 1999; Liddle, 1996; Nelson et al., 1998; Sommer et al.,
2001; Staal et al., 1999; Zakzanis & Heinrichs,1999). The most consistent
neuroanatomical changes are the enlargement of the lateral and third ventricles
(Raz & Raz, 1990), and a decrease in volume of the temporal lobe and certain
temporal structures (Nelson et al., 1998; but see Zakzanis et al. [2000] for a
critical review). In addition, volume decrements have been reported for the
thalamus (Andreasen et al., 1994; Staal et al., 1998), and cortical grey matter
(Lawrie & Abukmail, 1998). It is not clear to which extent such changes may be
progressive. Neuroimaging studies of patients during their first episodes of the
illness show similar abnormalities, and most studies do not find evidence of
progression when patients are followed up for longer periods (Harrison, 1999).
This suggests that the abnormalities reflect a static lesion present at or before the
onset of psychosis, and that the abnormalities are not artefacts of treatment or
chronicity. On the other hand, recent studies have reported evidence of a
progressive decline (Hulshoff Pol et al., submitted; McCarley et al. 1999), and
effects of antipsychotic treatment (Scheepers et al., 2001). At the neuropil level,
abnormalities have also been reported. For example, a recent study by Kalus et al.
(2000) observed a marked decrease in the lenght of the basilar dendrites of
pyramidal cells in layer 3 of the prefrontal cortex, coupled to a decrease in the
number of their distal segments (the findings were based on a classic Golgi stain
analyzed with modern imaging techniques).
It is well established that schizophrenia has a hereditary component
(Gottesman, 1991). For example, identical twins show average concordance rates
of 50%. This does not only imply an important genetic contribution (dizygotic
twins have an average concordance rate of 17%) but also points to a substantial
environmental contribution. No genes have been positively and definitively
identified as “schizophrenia genes”, although some suggestive evidence has been
reported for candidates at a number of chromosomal loci (Faraone et al., 1998).
Very recently, Brzustowicz et al. (2000) conducted a genome-wide scan for
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schizophrenia susceptibility loci in 22 extended families with high rates of
schizophrenia, which provided highly significant evidence of linkage to
chromosome 1 (1q21-q22). The authors interpret their finding as strong evidence
for genetic predisposition to schizophrenia.
Some environmental risk factors have been established: seasonality of
birth (Torrey et al., 1997), urban birth (Marcelis et al., 1998), prenatal or perinatal
viral infection of the nervous system (Jones & Cannon, 1998), and complications
during pregnancy and delivery (specifically preeclampsia in the mother, resulting
in fetal hypoxia; Cannon, 1996). Psychosocial factors, such as dysfunctional
family environment, may also act as adverse environmental factors (Wahlberg et
al., 1997).
An important hypothesis with regard to the etiology of schizophrenia is
the neurodevelopmental hypothesis (Lewis & Murray, 1987; Weinberger, 1987), which
has gained increasing popularity in recent years. This hypothesis states that a
disturbance in the orderly development of the brain, decades before the
symptomatic phase of the illness, may ultimately lead to the expression of
schizophrenia. This disturbance in orderly development would include alterations
in neuronal size and synaptic and dendritic organization, and additional or
alternative abnormalities regarding cell adhesion, myelination and synaptic
pruning (cf. Akbarian et al., 1996; McGlashan & Hoffman, 2000; Weinberger,
1996). Although the principle remains largely unchallenged, the
neurodevelopmental model (like all other models) has problems in explaining the
onset (typically during adolescence), relapsing and remitting course, and outcome
of schizophrenia (Harrison, 1999).
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
The cognitive neuropsychiatry approach (David, 1993) concerns research in
psychiatry using cognitive neuropsychological methods (Shallice, 1988). The aim
is to uncover dysfunctions in cognitive mechanisms that may account for clinical
phenomena. From this perspective, investigators do not concentrate on
syndromes, such as “Alzheimer’s Disease”, “epilepsy”, or “stroke”, but on
psychological constructs such as “phonological dyslexia”, or “prosopagnosia”
(e.g., De Haan et al., 1991).This approach converges largely with the “symptom-
oriented” approach to psychiatric research (Persons, 1986; Bentall, 1990;
Costello, 1992). The symptom-oriented perspective argues that, in order to
understand the nature of psychological processes underlying such psychologic
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phenomena as formal thought disorder, delusions and hallucinations, research
concentrating directly on such individual phenomena will be more succesful than
studying diagnostic categories (e.g., “schizophrenia”). The following advantages
of studying symptoms rather than syndromes have been advanced in the
literature (cf. Persons, 1986; Mojlabai & Rieder, 1998): 1) the symptom approach
permits the isolation of single elements of pathology for study; 2) the symptom
approach is less vulnerable to the lack of adequate reliability and validity of
diagnostic categories; 3) the symptom approach avoids misclassification and
confouding associated with diagnostic categories; 4) symptom-oriented theories
are clearer, easier to test, and more likely to lead to an explanation of
psychopathology; 5) the symptom approach recognizes the continuity of clinical
phenomena and mechanisms with normal phenomena and mechanisms.
Another characteristic of the cognitive neuropsychiatry approach is the
use of case-studies. Shallice et al. (1991) and David (1993) have advocated the
rationale of this methodology and list several advantages of the case-study
approach (cf. Caramazza, 1986). An important issue regards the heterogeneity of
schizophrenia and the consequences for interpretation of cognitive performance
results. In studies of large groups of patients, the heterogeneity of schizophrenia
will lead to group means which may not reflect the behavior of any individual. In
the case-study approach, multiple tests are administered to a few selected patients
(on the basis of a priori criteria), where the within-subject comparison of
differential test performance may reveal specific domains of dysfunction
characteristic to the condition studied.
Nevertheless, the cognitive neuropsychiatry approach, with its emphasis
on symptom-oriented research and case-studies, has its limitations (which were
allready recognized by David, 1993). With regard to the symptom-oriented
approach, such limitations have recently been critically reviewed by Mojlabai &
Rieder (1998). These problems mainly concern whether and to which extent the
findings can be generalized, and whether the results have implications for
etiology. Moreover, the symptom-approach cannot explain why some cognitive
deficits remain present in asymptomatic episodes.
Given the advantages of the cognitive neuropsychiatry approach
described above, a substantial part of this thesis takes the cognitive
neuropsychiatry, symptom-oriented approach. However, because of its
limitations, a number of chapters (specifically, chapter 2 and 3) are primary based
on a syndrome-oriented, classical neuropsychological approach. In this way, we
have intended to work towards a balanced scientific analysis. We will combine
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the cognitive neuropsychiatry approach with the “levels of explanation”
approach to schizophrenia, described by Mortimer & McKenna (1994). This
approach assumes that the cognitive level is intermediate between symptoms and
neuropathology, and that the neuropsychology of schizophrenia may thus have
the capability to connect neuroscience with phenomenology.
Outline and aims of the studies
Hallucinations are a characteristic feature of schizophrenia. Little is known about
the mechanisms that give rise to hallucinations. In this thesis, research is reported
on the cognitive and neuroanatomical basis of hallucinatory experiences. To set
the stage for the more specific cognitive neuropsychiatric investigations, the
cognitive sequelae of schizophrenia are explored first. The substantial body of
evidence that exists in this area has been brought together and quantitatively
analysed using meta-analytical procedures. Subsequently, the studies are aimed
specifically at the neuropsychological and neuroanatomical basis of hallucinatory
experiences in the normal population and in patients with schizophrenia.
Although a number of cognitive functions will be examined, we will mainly
concentrate on mental imagery and its possible role in hallucinatory experiences.
Of the cognitive processes that have been hypothesized to be implicated in
hallucinations (inner speech, speech perception, verbal self-monitoring, reality
monitoring, mental imagery), least is known about the role of mental imagery, as
very few studies have applied adequate behavioral measures. In the present
thesis, such methods are developed, and a range of studies is carried out in order
to elucidate the relation between mental imagery and hallucinations, and their
neural basis.
A number of controversies surround cognitive research in schizophrenia,
with regard to methodological and conceptual issues. At the end of each section
of this thesis, we illustrate this by including a critical evaluation of a controversial
issue, relevant to the subject of the section.
Cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia
Before focusing on a particular symptom and its associations with cognitive
function, it is important to have clear insight into the cognitive deficits associated
with schizophrenia. A wide range of cognitive deficits have been suggested, but
few attempts have been made at quantitative integration of the research findings.
A notable exception is the meta-analysis reported by Heinrichs & Zakzanis
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(1998), who statistically combined the results of a large number of studies, in
which schizophrenia versus control differences were indexed on multiple
measures of memory, attention, intelligence, executive function, language, and
motor performance. The results indicated that schizophrenia is characterized by a
broad range of cognitive impairments, with varying degrees of severity in the
different ability domains. Of these domains, the most pronounced deficits were
observed for memory tasks. In chapter 2, we report more detailed meta-analyses in
which the performance of patients with schizophrenia versus normal controls
was contrasted on multiple tasks of memory performance.
In the late eighties, Liddle (1987) proposed a three-factor model of
symptoms of schizophrenia , as a refinement of the classical positive/negative
dichotomy. The three factors were based on the solution of factor-analyses:
besides negative symptoms the subdivision of positive symptomatology into
symptoms of disorganisation and reality distortion was suggested. Indeed, it has
been suggested that these symptom-dimensions are differentially related to
neurocognitive dysfunction (Green, 1998), and would provide a more
parsimonious explanation of the cognitive basis of schizophrenia than the
examination of individual symptoms. The aim of the study reported in chapter 3
was to examine whether there would be a differential  relation between these
three symptom dimensions and executive and attentional function. This was
investigated by meta-analyses of the published literature on performance on the
Wisconsin Card Sorting and the Continuous Performance Test in schizophrenia.
Hallucinatory experiences and mental imagery in non-psychiatric individuals
An important advantage of studying hallucinatory experiences and their cognitive
basis in non-psychiatric individuals is that it avoids the confounding factors
associated with psychopathology. Indeed, hallucinatory experiences have been
reported in non-psychiatric subjects from the normal population. Most research
in normal subjects uses the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS) as a
measure of hallucinatory predisposition. In chapter 5 we report the factor structure
of the LSHS in a normal sample, in order to provide insight into the nature of
hallucinatory predisposition.
The aim of chapter 6 is to investigate whether, in a group of non-selected
college students (N=74), subjects with relative high LSHS scores will show more
vivid mental imagery than low scoring subjects. Mental imagery vividness was
measured with an introspective questionnaire and with a behavioral measure.
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Chapter 7 concerns a more thorough investigation of this hypothesis.
From a large group of college students who completed the LSHS, two groups
were selected, the first from the highest and lowest quartiles. The hallucination-
prone group was then contrasted with the comparison group on multiple
measures of auditory and visual imagery and perception. The prediction on the
basis of the vivid-imagery hypothesis of hallucinations was that hallucination-
prone individuals would show smaller imagery-perception differences which may
be indicative of increased perceptual characteristics of mental images.
Mental imagery, hallucinations, and the brain
Data regarding the neuroanatomical basis of mental imagery and hallucinations
may either support or refute the plausibility of the imagery hypothesis of
hallucinations. The aim of chapter 9 is to provide indirect evidence that auditory
mental imagery may share brain structures with auditory perception, by focusing
on the relation between music processing and auditory imagery. (Studies
regarding brain areas involved in hallucinations will subsequently be discussed in
more detail in chapter 13).
Chapter 10 is a thorough investigation of the neuroanatomy of visual
imagery, in which the role of sensory visual areas is contrasted with parietal
association cortex, using two state-of-the-art neuroimaging techniques, functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), and repetitive TMS (rTMS). Finally, the
study reported in chapter 11 was intended as an exploratory investigation of the
effect of rTMS over the left auditory cortex on hallucinations and neurocognition
in schizophrenia. Besides having implications for understanding the functional
neuroanatomy of hallucinations, such a study may also have clinical relevance
with regard to treatment of auditory hallucinations.
Cognitive basis of hallucinations in schizophrenia
In chapter 13 an overview is given of theory and findings regarding hallucinations
in schizophrenia. Besides providing a general introduction to hallucinations in
schizophrenia, the aim of this chapter is to critically discuss neurocognitive
theories that have been proposed in recent years. To this end, behavioral and
neuroimaging evidence is extensively reviewed. Subsequently, applying the
cognitive neuropsychiatric approach, chapter 14 investigates whether a distorted
balance between imagery and perception could underlie hallucinations. A
continuously hallucinating patient is contrasted with five non-hallucinating
Chapter 1
18
patients on multiple behavioral measures of imagery and perception. As an
extension of this design, chapter 15 reports a group study in which patients with
and without hallucinations are compared on measures of imagery/perception and
reality monitoring. Specifically, the aim of this study is to replicate the finding of
reality monitoring errors in relation to hallucinations, and, more importantly, to
investigate whether differences in imagery vividness underlie such errors.
Finally, chapter 17 provides a summary and discussion of the findings reported in
this thesis.
In sum, this work starts from the assumption that hallucinations can be studied
in isolation using a cognitive neuropsychiatric approach. The main hypothesis
that is investigated states that hallucinations form a continuum from subjective
experiences that are common in the normal population to those reported by
patients with schizophrenia (and other patients), and are, at least partly,
secondary to cognitive distortions that are common in such patients. In addition,
these cognitive alterations can be related to certain brain areas that may be
compromised in schizophrenia. More specifically, the hypothesis is tested that
abnormal mental imagery may be crucial in the false attribution of internally
generated messages or other types of information as coming from the outside.
Introduction
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Chapter 2
Memory impairment in schizophrenia
Summary
We present meta-analyses of the published literature on recall and recognition memory
performance in patients with schizophrenia compared with normal controls. Tests of
categorical models were used in analyses of potential moderators (clinical variables and
study characteristics). Our findings (integrating the results of 70 studies)  reveal a
significant and stable association between schizophrenia and memory impairment . The
composite effect size for recall performance was large, d=1.21. Recognition showed less,
but still significant, impairment, d=0.64. The magnitude of memory impairment was
not affected by age, medication, duration of illness, patient status, severity of
psychopathology or positive symptoms.  Negative symptoms showed a small, but
significant relation with memory impairment. In conclusion, this meta-analysis
documents significant memory impairment in schizophrenia. The impairment is stable,
wide ranging and not substantially affected by potential moderating factors such as
severity of psychopathology and duration of illness.
Aleman, A., Hijman, R., De Haan, E.H.F., & Kahn, R.S. (1999). Memory impairment in
schizophrenia: a meta-analysis. American Journal of Psychiatry, 156, 1358-1366.
During the last decades, evidence has accumulated that schizophrenia is associated with
significant impairment in cognitive functioning. Specifically, deficits in attention,
memory and executive functions have been consistently reported in patients with
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schizophrenia (1-3). In contrast, formal assessment of perceptual processes and basic
language functions does not show gross impairment (3). Memory has been regarded
as one of the major areas of cognitive deficit in schizophrenia  (4). Although the
pioneers of schizophrenia research, Kraepelin  (5) and Bleuler (6), considered memory
functions to be relatively preserved in schizophrenia, numerous studies conducted in
the second half of this century have shown patients with schizophrenia to perform
poorly on a wide range of memory tasks (3, 7, 8). Recent studies indicate memory
impairment in schizophrenia to be common and disproportionate to the overall level
of intellectual impairment (9, 10). McKenna and colleagues (11) have even suggested
the existence of a “schizophrenic amnesia”.
However, other authors consider the memory impairment to be relatively small in
magnitude, or secondary to attentional dysfunction (12-15). In addition, the specificity
of memory impairment in schizophrenia is unclear. It has been suggested that, in
schizophrenia, some aspects of memory may be affected to a greater extent than
others. This would be the case, for example, for active retrieval (free recall) of
declarative information from long-term memory, which would be significantly more
impaired in schizophrenics than retrieval from short-term memory, e.g. digit span  (16).
Also, some authors have proposed that encoding of information may be more affected
than memory processes such as retrieval and recognition (17, 18). In contrast, other
studies report that the memory deficit in schizophrenia encompasses a broad range of
memory processes, as evidenced by poor scores in multiple task paradigms (7, 10, 19,
20). Other important issues regarding schizophrenia and memory performance which
remain unclear are whether memory functioning in schizophrenia is stable over time,
whether chronic patients exhibit greater memory impairment than acutely ill
schizophrenics, and whether effects of medication may account for a significant
portion of the observed memory impairment.
Meta-analysis represents a type of reviewing that applies a quantitative approach
with statistical standards comparable to primary data analysis. A meta-analytical
approach has several advantages above traditional narrative ways of reviewing. By
quantitatively combining the results of a number of studies, the power of the statistical
test is increased substantially. Also, studies are differentially weighted with varying
sample size. Finally, by extracting information quantitatively from existing studies,
meta-analysis allows one to examine more precisely the influence of potential
moderators of effect size.
The aim of the present study was twofold. First, to determine the magnitude, extent
and pattern of the memory impairment in schizophrenia by meta-analytically
synthesizing the data from existing studies published during the past two decades. The
second purpose was to examine the effect of potential moderator variables like clinical
variables (e.g. age, patient status, medication) and study characteristics (e.g., matching
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of controls, year of publication) on  the association between schizophrenia and
memory impairment.
Method
Literature search
Articles for consideration were identified through an extensive literature search in
PsycLIT and Medline, from 1975 through july 1998. Key words were ‘memory’ and
‘schizophrenia’. The search produced over 750 unique studies. Titles and abstracts of
the articles were examined for possible inclusion in our analysis. Additional titles were
obtained from the bibliographies of the obtained articles and a journal-by-journal
search for all months of 1997 and the first half of 1998 of journals that to our
perception most frequently publish articles in the targeted domain. This strategy was
adopted in order to minimize the possibility of overlooking studies that may not yet
have been included in the computerized databases. The journals included  American
Journal of Psychiatry, Archives of General Psychiatry, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Psychological
Medicine, Schizophrenia Bulletin, and Schizophrenia Research.
The identified studies had to meet the following inclusion criteria. First, each study
had to include valid measures of explicit memory performance. We included the
following paradigms: digit span (forward and backward), cued and free list recall and
word list recognition, paired-associate recall, prose recall, and nonverbal (visual pattern)
recall and recognition. Second, studies had to compare performance of a healthy
normal control group with performance of patients with schizophrenia. Studies with
a control group consisting of nonpsychotic subjects with a higher risk for schizophrenia
(e.g. first degree relatives or subjects with schizotypal traits) were not included in the
analyses. Finally, studies had to include sufficient data for the computation of a d
value, which implies that means and SDs, exact p values,  t values or exact F values
and relevant means should be reported. We obtained 70 studies (refs. 21-84) that met
the criteria for inclusion in our meta-analysis.
Data collection and analysis
By comparing measures of free recall, cued recall and recognition, we examined the
effect of retrieval support on memory performance in schizophrenic patients
compared to normal controls. In free recall measures, retention is measured in the
absence of any cues, while in cued recall tests a portion of the encoding context is
presented at the time of retrieval. In recognition, the target material is presented along
with distracters, and the subject is required to differentiate between target material and
distracters. The learning curve refers to the increase in recall of information with
different learning trials. Furthermore, we investigated the influence of the nature of
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the stimuli used in the memory tasks (verbal vs. nonverbal). Finally, we evaluated the
role of retention interval, which could be immediately after presentation of the to-be-
learned material, or after a delay.
From the data reported in each study, we calculated effect sizes for the difference
in memory performance between schizophrenic patients and normals. The effect size
estimate used was Hedges g (85), the difference between the mean of the schizophrenic
group and the mean of the control group, divided by the pooled standard deviation.
From these g’s an unbiased estimation, d, was calculated, to correct for upwardly
biased estimation of the effect in small sample sizes (85, 86). The direction of effect
size was positive if the performance of schizophrenic patients on memory measures
was worse than that of controls.
The combined d value is an indication of the magnitude of associations across all
studies. In addition to d, we calculated another statistic, Stouffer’s Z weighted by
sample size, with a corresponding probability level (86). This statistic provides an
indication of the significance of the difference between memory performance in the
schizophrenic and the control group, and thus indicated whether the results could have
arisen by chance. We also calculated a chi-square statistic, Q, indicating the
homogeneity of results across studies (87). Significance of  the Q-statistic points to
heterogeneity of the set of studies, in which case a further search of moderator
variables is needed. In the moderator analyses, QW denotes heterogeneity of studies
within categories. The QB-statistic refers to a test of differences between categories.
This between-group homogeneity statistic is analogous to the F statistic. All analyses
were performed with the statistical package META (88).
When more than one dependent measure was used as an indication of memory
performance, a pooled effect size was computed in order to prevent data from one
study from dominating the outcome of the overall meta-analysis. For example, in
studies reporting data on free and cued recall of verbal and nonverbal stimuli, for each
study a combined d was calculated for inclusion in the overall analysis. However, in
subsequent analyses, we only included the data pertaining to the specific category of
our aim. Thus, for example, in the meta-analysis of differences between schizophrenic
patients and controls in cued recall performance,  only data of cued recall measures
were included in the analysis. In a similar way, when a study reported data for
subgroups like first-episode versus chronic schizophrenic patients, in the overall
analysis the d’s were pooled, but in the moderator analysis of duration of illness the d’s
were included separately in the analysis.
In the case of twin studies (e.g. Goldberg et al. [44]) the patients were compared with
normal control twins. Thus, the unaffected siblings of identical twins discordant for
schizophrenia were not included in the analyses. Furthermore, in studies wherein data
were reported for different subgroups (e.g., male/female, paranoid/nonparanoid), data
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were pooled across subgroups, which were then compared as one group with
performance of the control group. 
When we encountered different studies in which data were reported concerning the
same sample of subjects, only one of the studies was included in the analysis, in order
to avoid the problem of dependent data (i.e. to prevent one sample from dominating
the outcome). For example, in the study by Goldberg et al. (89) the same subjects were
included as in Goldberg et al. (44). We only included Goldberg et al. (44) in the analysis,
because the sample in this study contained more subjects than the sample in Goldberg
et al. (89).
Publication bias
In order to examine the possibility of publication bias, we computed a fail-safe N (90,
86). Publication bias implies that studies with no effect may not get published and
remain in file drawers, and may pose a threat to the stability of the obtained effect size.
The fail-safe N statistic indicates the number of studies with null effects that must
reside in file drawers before the results of the obtained effect sizes are reduced to a
negligible level (which we set at 0.2). Publication bias can also be inspected graphically
in a funnel plot (91). The total sample size of each study is plotted with its effect size.
As larger studies will more influence the population effect size, small studies should be
randomly scattered about the central effect size of the larger studies. Thus, scatter will
increase when study size decreases, which gives rise to an inverted funnel appearance.
When the portion of the funnel near effect size 0 is not present, this may be an
indication of publication bias due to studies with nonsignificant effects and small
samples not being published.
Moderator variables
The literature suggests a number of variables that may affect memory performance
of schizophrenic patients. We evaluated the potential influence on effect size of several
such factors using categorical models. The moderator variables we studied can be
divided in two groups: clinical variables and study characteristics. The clinical variables
included age of subjects, patient status (inpatient or outpatient), medication status,
duration of illness, severity of psychopathology and the influence of positive and
negative symptoms. For the analysis of  severity of psychopathology we only included
studies reporting Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) scores. Other psychopathology
measures such as the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) were not
included because of a lack of studies. For positive and negative symptoms the scales
included in the analysis were the Scale for Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS)
and the Scale for Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS), respectively.  The
groups were divided by means of a median split.
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Study characteristics were year of publication (before and after 1986, the median
of the period covered in the literature search), sample size,  and whether schizophrenic
and control groups were matched for age and level of education. Unfortunately, sex
differences, differential performance of diagnostic subgroups (e.g.,
paranoid/nonparanoid), task difficulty and reliability, and moderating effects of
attentional dysfunction could not be studied, due to the very small number or total lack
of studies reporting exact results for these parameters.
Results
Table 1 displays the results of meta-analyses on schizophrenia/control differences in
performance on several memory measures: verbal and nonverbal, cued and free recall,
delayed and immediate; verbal and nonverbal recognition; short-term memory (digit
span) and encoding (learning curve).
Combined schizophrenia-memory effect sizes
As can be seen in table 1, memory is significantly impaired in schizophrenia. All
analyses yielded highly significant Z-values for the difference in memory performance
between patients with schizophrenia and controls. The magnitude of the overall effect
size of the composite long-term recall measures was large, d=1.21. In this overall
analysis, 60 studies were included with a total sample size of 3315 (with study sample
ranging from N=16 to N=254). Effect sizes ranged from 0.44 to 3.10. The
homogeneity statistic showed significant heterogeneity among studies. The funnel plot
(figure) demonstrates the characteristic inverted funnel. However, the lower left
portion of the funnel is less pronounced than the right part, suggesting some bias in not
publishing small studies with no effect. The fail-safe N, at a critical d of 0.20,  was 303.
This implies that 303 unpublished null-effect studies are necessary to reduce our
effects to a size of 0.20. Fail-safe N’s for the other analyses were also large enough to
lend credence to our findings.
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Figure. Funnel plot for the meta-analysis on composite recall measures. Each point represents the
position of a single study. The vertical line indicates the mean weighted effect size.
Analyses of short-term memory (digit span) and encoding also revealed significant
memory impairment, although to a considerable lesser degree than for recall measures.
The difference between forward (d=0.71) and backward (d=0.82) digit span was not
significant (QB=0.6, df=1, p>0.10).
Effects of task characteristics
Level of retrieval support . Schizophrenic patients show significantly better memory
performance when retrieval cues are provided, as evidenced by the d of 1.20 in
delayed free recall versus a d of 0.78 in cued recall (QB=11.6, df=1, p<0.001).
However, the difference in performance on cued recall measures between normals and
schizophrenics remains considerable. Recognition also showed significant less
impairment than recall (QB=58.1, df=1, p<0.0001), but the difference with control
performance remains substantial (d=0.64). As can be seen in table 1, the QW statistics
indicate homogeneous within group d values.
Stimulus type. Verbal and nonverbal recall both show significant d values (p<0.0001).
Although impairment for verbal material in the delayed recall condition (d=1.20)
seemed larger than for nonverbal material (d=1.09), this difference was not significant.
This was also the case for the immediate condition. For the recognition measures, the
reverse pattern was observed: retrieval of verbal material (d=0.61) appeared to be less
impaired than retrieval of nonverbal material (d=0.73), but again the difference did not
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reach significance.
Retention interval. The length of the retention interval did not affect the magnitude
of d values. The difference between delayed (d=1.20) and immediate (d=1.22) verbal
recall was not significant.
Table 1. Results of meta-analyses of schizophrenia/control differences in memory performance
k N d   Za 95%CI QWb   Fail Safe-N
                                                                                                                                 
Total recall 60 3315 1.21 20.5 1.09-1.33 101.6d   303
verbal
delayed 35 1910 1.20 17.5 1.06-1.33 61.4d 175
free 33 1740 1.20 18.9 1.08-1.33 42.2c 165
cued 7 342 0.78  5.7 0.51-1.05 9.25c  0
immediate 33 1734 1.22 11.7 1.01-1.42 79.8d 168
free 31 1666 1.27 11.3 1.05-1.48 81.5d 165
cued 11 722 0.95 10.4   0.77-1.12 10.4c 1
nonverbal
delayed 11 800 1.09 7.8 0.82-1.37 21.0d 49
immediate 7 294 1.00 5.3 0.62-1.36 8.9c 28
Total recognitionf 17 1024 0.64 9.6 0.51-0.77 15.7c 37
verbal
Hit rate 12 771 0.61 7.8 0.45-0.76 13.4c 24
False alarm 3 381 0.58 5.3 0.36-0.80 2.5c    6
Discriminability 5 436 0.72 7.0 0.52-0.93 2.8c 13
nonverbal
Hit rate 8 347 0.73  5.1 0.45-1.00 5.8c 21
Digit Span
forward 18 881 0.71  9.2 0.56-0.86 17.8c 46
backward 7 306 0.82  4.8 0.49-1.16 11.8c 22
Learning curve 4 399 0.60  3.3 0.24-0.94 9.43c 8
k=number of studies; N=total number of subjects; d=mean weighted effect size; Z=Stouffer’s Z for
significance of effect size; 95%CI=95% confidence interval; QW=within category homogeneity
statistic; Fail-safe N=the number of unrecovered studies with null results that would be required to
reduce d to 0.20.  aAll Z values are  significant, p<0.0001. bdf=k-1. cNot significant. dSignificant,
p<0.01. fVerbal + nonverbal, hit-rate only.
Potential moderators of effect size
Clinical variables . Table 2 shows the influence of potential moderator variables. The QB
statistic only reveals a significant effect of negative symptoms, QB=4.1, df=1, p<0.05.
Negative symptoms affected memory performance negatively. Age was not associated
with memory impairment in schizophrenia in the categorical analysis. We also examined
the exact correlation between age and d values, which was nonsignificant, r=0.14,
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N=57, p>0.10. Although in the categorical analyses the two groups differed
significantly in age (p<0.001), the range of the group as a whole was rather restricted
(mean=32.4 years, SD=5; range from 15.7 to 42.8).
Table 2. Analyses of potential moderators of effect size, clinical variables
k N d Z 95% CI QW QB
Age (yrs)
<30 18 1040 1.13 10.1 0.91-1.35 30.7d 1.6d
30 39 2264 1.23 16.9 1.09-1.38 96.1e
Medication
Yes 50 2629 1.19 18.4 1.06-1.32 77.2e 1.3d
No 6 467 1.32 7.5 0.98-1.67 10.6d
Duration of illness
2 yrs 15 792 1.17 11.5 0.97-1.37 21.3d 0.1d
>2 yrs 36 2093 1.19 16.0 1.04-1.33 50.4d
Patient status
Inpatient 37 1755 1.27 15.4 1.11-1.43 61.3e 2.2d
Outpatient 8 508 1.11 10.5 0.90-1.32 8.3d
Severity of psychopathology
BPRS35 6 536 1.30 7.8 0.97-1.63 13.3d 0.8d
BPRS>35 8 534 1.18 7.8 0.88-1.47 10.1d
Positive symtomps
SAPS7 5 539 1.11 7.3 0.81-1.40 6.4d 0.1d
SAPS>7 6 576 1.16 13.7 1.16-1.55 5.9d
Negative symptoms
    SANS12.5 6 707 1.11 9.02 0.87-1.34 6.8d 4.1f
    SANS>12.5 7 507 1.37 13.5 1.17-1.57 5.9d
k=number of studies; N=total number of subjects;  d=mean weighted effect size; Z=Stouffer’s Z for
significance of effect size; 95%CI=95% confidence interval; QW=within homogeneity statistic,
QB=between homogeneity statistic. aAll Z values are  significant, p<0.0001. bdf=k-1. cdf=1. dNot
significant. eSignificant, p<0.01. fp=0.04.
Medication status, duration of illness, severity of psychopathology and positive
symptoms were not associated with memory impairment. For duration of illness it was
not possible to calculate a correlation coefficient because a great number of studies did
not report exact values, and studies differed in their definition of disease onset. For the
other parameters, the number of studies was to small in order to interpret meaningfully
the r value.
Study characteristics. Studies that did not match controls for age and education
showed a greater association between schizophrenia and poor memory performance
than matched-control studies, QB=5.7, df=1, p=0.02. Notwithstanding, the d for
Chapter 2
32
matched-control studies remained considerable, d=1.17. For the other study
characteristics, number of subjects and year of publication, no relation was found with
d values (table 3).
Table 3. Analyses of potential moderators of effect size, study characteristics
k N d Z 95% CI QW QB
Matched controls
Yes 38 2290 1.17 19.2 1.05-1.29 51.6d 5.7f
No 16 780 1.39 9.4 1.10-1.86 36.2d
Number of subjects
N50 33 1132 1.21 13.1 1.03-1.40 45.2d 0.1
N>50 20 1846 1.24 14.1 1.06-1.41 50.1e
Year of publication
    1985 14 485 1.31 7.0 0.94-1.68 28.9e 0.99
    >1985 45 2829 1.18 70.4 1.08-1.28 70.4e
k=number of studies; N=total number of subjects;  d=mean weighted effect size; Z=Stouffer’s Z for
significance of effect size; 95%CI=95% confidence interval; QW=within homogeneity statistic,
QB=between homogeneity statistic. aAll Z values are  significant, p<0.0001. bdf=k-1. cdf=1. dNot
significant. eSignificant, p<0.01. fp=0.02.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether and to what extent schizophrenia
is associated with memory impairment and whether this association is influenced by
potential moderator variables. The results of the meta-analysis indicate that
schizophrenia and memory dysfunction are significantly associated, as evidenced by
moderate to large effect sizes.
Our meta-analysis corroborates and extends the findings of a recent meta-analysis
(92) in which performance on multiple measures of neurocognitive function was
contrasted between schizophrenic patients and normal controls. With regard to
differences in memory performance, Heinrichs and Zakzanis (92) also report
moderate to large effect sizes for the memory variables they studied, which included
verbal and nonverbal long-term memory.
The d for recall was 1.21, which indicates a large effect size according to the
nomenclature of Cohen (93). Thus, performance of schizophrenic patients is more
than 1 SD lower than that of normal controls on tasks of recall memory. A recent
meta-analysis on memory impairment in depression (94) revealed a d of 0.56 (54
studies) for recall performance of depressive patients compared with normal controls.
When comparing these results with our present analysis, the memory deficit in
schizophrenia appears to be substantially greater than in depression. The d for
recognition was 0.64, which can be considered a moderate effect size (93). The
Memory impairment in schizophrenia
33
difference in recall versus recognition performance may point to a retrieval deficit, in
addition to less effective consolidation of material.
Alternatively, the recall-recognition difference may be an artifact of the differences
in difficulty between recall and recognition tests. However, studies in which tasks were
matched for difficulty level also report greater impairment in recall than recognition
(33, 34). The finding of a considerable memory deficit in schizophrenia supports the
view that memory belongs to the cognitive domains which show major impairment in
schizophrenia  (3, 4). However, the lack of difference between immediate and delayed
recall does not appear to be in accordance with schizophrenia as an “amnestic
syndrome” (11). Measures of short-term memory performance showed significant
impairment. This result appears to contradict the assertion by Clare et al. (40) that
short-term memory is preserved in schizophrenia. The divergence may result from the
fact that Clare et al. base their conclusion on one study only, while the present study
concerns a quantitative integration of multiple studies. Furthermore, our meta-analysis
provides evidence that the learning curve (which reflects explicit encoding of
information) is significantly affected in schizophrenia. The large difference between
recall of information after a delay (composite delayed recall, d=1.20) and learning
curve (d=0.60) suggests that the memory dysfunction in schziophrenia is not entirely
due to deficient learning processes (as has been argued by Heaton et al.[17]), but that
retrieval processes may also be affected. However, caution is needed in interpreting
this finding, considering that digit span and learning curve indices may not reflect all
“encoding” processes.
The results failed to reveal a difference in memory impairment for verbal and
nonverbal (visual pattern) stimuli. Thus, the memory impairment in schizophrenia does
not appear to be modality specific.
The present meta-analysis indicates memory impairment in schizophrenia to be
wide ranging and consistent across task variables such as level of retrieval support (free
recall, cued recall or recognition), stimulus type (verbal vs. nonverbal) and retention
interval (immediate vs. delayed). The extent of the memory impairment may appear
to be in accordance with a pattern of generalized dysfunction rather than a differential
deficit (95). However, our study was restricted to memory functions, whereas
conclusions regarding the generalized versus differential nature of neurocognitive
dysfunction in schizophrenia must also include evaluation of functioning in other
cognitive domains. Indeed, the recent meta-analysis by Heinrichs and Zakzanis (92) in
which schizophrenia versus control differences were indexed on multiple measures of
memory, attention, intelligence, executive function, language, and motor performance
indicated that schizophrenia is characterized by a broadly based cognitive impairment,
with varying degrees of deficit in the different ability domains.
On the basis of our results, it is not possible to establish the cause or underlying
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mechanism of the memory impairment in schizophrenia. For example, we were not
able to examine moderating effects of attentional dysfunction. However, given the
magnitude and extent of the memory impairment revealed by the meta-analysis, the
possibility that the memory impairment may be secondary to attentional dysfunction
does not seem very plausible. Moreover, in case of an important attentional
contribution to the memory impairment, one would expect performance on the
backward digit span test to show a significant greater impairment than the forward digit
span test. This was not the case, however. Our findings are in agreement with the study
by Kenny and Meltzer (55), who controlled for the influence of attention by analysis
of covariance.  Controlling for attention had very little effect on the differences in
performance on long-term memory recall between schizophrenic patients and controls.
Although the meta-analysis did not address the relation between memory
impairment and brain pathology in schizophrenia, the pattern of impairment may be
indicative of specific brain dysfunction. Impairments in encoding  and consolidation
have been associated with hippocampal and temporal lobe dysfunction (96, 97). Brain
imaging studies have provided evidence for pathology or reduced volume of these
structures in schizophrenia  (98). In addition,  frontal lobe systems, which may also be
affected in schizophrenia, have been shown to be involved in active retrieval of
declarative memories (99, 100). More research into the relation between brain
dysfunction and memory impairment in schizophrenia is needed before firm
conclusions can be drawn on this issue.
Of the potential moderator variables, only negative symptoms affected the
schizophrenia-memory association. Although this effect was rather small, it is consistent
with previous research examining the relation between negative symptoms and
cognitive function in schizophrenia  (101, 102). Specifically, negative symptoms have
been associated with more pronounced frontal lobe dysfunction, which may account
for larger retrieval deficits (102). No relation was found between age and the
magnitude of memory impairment. Unfortunately, as all subjects included in the
analyses were less than 45 years old, no conclusions can be made regarding the relation
between cognitive aging and memory in schizophrenia.
Clinical variables such as medication, duration of illness, patient status, severity of
psychopathology and positive symptoms did not appear to influence the magnitude of
memory impairment. Thus, the memory impairment in schizophrenia is of a
considerable robustness and is not readily moderated by variables that may seem
relevant. This is an important finding, as a number of authors have emphasized the
role of medication, symptom severity, and chronicity in memory performance of
schizophrenic patients (8, 26). Frith (103) even suggested that medication may
principally account for the memory deficits observed in schizophrenia. It is instructive
to note that our meta-analysis does not address the relation between medication and
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memory performance directly, but compares performance of  unmedicated samples
with medicated samples. Differences in medication status may be due to unspecified
differences in clinical factors. Our results are consistent, however, with studies
examining this relation directly by experimentally controlling for medication (104, 105).
It must be emphasized that medication in the studies in our analysis consisted of
conventional neuroleptics. Evidence is emerging that novel antipsychotics may have
beneficial effects on memory function (106).
As the present meta-analysis demonstrates, there is no evidence of progressive
decline associated with age or duration of illness in schizophrenia. Our failure to find
an effect of chronicity on memory impairment is in accordance with the view of
cognitive deficits in schizophrenia as a “static encephalopathy” (107). The fact that
schizophrenic patients with a long duration of illness do not perform worse than more
acutely ill patients on memory tasks implies that the concept of  “dementia praecox”
(5) may not be accurate in the sense of progressive deterioration during the long-term
course of the illness. On the other hand, considering the substantial memory deficit in
schizophrenia revealed by our analysis, the term dementia praecox may  be even more
appropriate than Kraepelin himself may have anticipated.
The findings of our meta-analysis have important clinical implications. The
substantial memory deficit in schizophrenia is likely to have repercussions on therapy
and rehabilitation. A thorough understanding of the cognitive deficits in schizophrenia
may prevent future treatment failures (108). For example, insight-related or other
therapies that require advanced learning and memory functions are almost certain to
turn out ineffective.
The extent and stability of the association between schizophrenia and memory
impairment suggest that the memory dysfunction may be a trait rather than a state
characteristic. Hypothetically, some degree of memory dysfunction may already be
present in subjects at risk for schizophrenia. Future research must concentrate on this
issue in order to explore the possible implications with regard to prescreening for
schizophrenia.
There is evidence that verbal memory is a rather strong predictor of functional
outcome in schizophrenia  (109). Improving memory may result beneficial for every
day functioning. Therefore, given the considerable memory impairment revealed by
our meta-analysis, research focusing on pharmacological treatment and rehabilitation
strategies in order to improve memory functioning in patients with schizophrenia is
necessary.
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Chapter 3
Schizophrenia syndromes in
relation to executive and
attentional function
Summary
In this article, we quantitatively review the published literature on the relationships
between symptom dimensions in schizophrenia and performance on the two
most widely applied tests of executive functioning and sustained attention, the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the Continuous Performance Test. Results of
meta-analyses showed statistically  significant relationships of negative symptoms
with worse performance on the WCST (perseverations) and the CPT.
Disorganisation symptoms correlated with persevations on the WCST, but not
with CPT performance. In contrast, reality distortion symptoms and general
scores for all positive symptoms did not correlate with either measure. However,
the observed associations between psychiatric symptoms and cognitive
performance were typically weak, suggesting relative independence of these
disease processes.
Nieuwenstein, M.R., Aleman, A., De Haan, E.H.F. (in revision). Relationship between
schizophrenia syndromes and neurocognitive functioning: a meta-analysis of CPT and WCST
studies.
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Introduction
Deficits in executive functioning and vigilance are considered core
neurocognitive abnormalities in schizophrenia (Randolph et al., 1993; Green,
1998). Impaired performance on the most widely applied neuropsychological
tests of executive functioning and vigilance, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and
the Continuous Performance Test, respectively, has been associated with
psychosis-proneness (Franke et al., 1992; Nelson et al., 1998) and worse
functional outcome (Green and Nuechterlein, 1999; Harvey et al., 1999).
Although patients with schizophrenia have often been reported to perform worse
than normal controls on these tests a recent quantitative review indicated that
these differences may be attributed to a subgroup of patients (Heinrichs and
Zakzanis, 1998). Since performance on both tests has been associated with
deficits of prefrontal functioning, these findings suggest the existence of a
subtype of schizophrenia in which pathology of the neural networks involving
the frontal lobes is most pronounced (Zakzanis and Heinrichs, 1999). Following
Crow's two syndrome hypothesis (Crow, 1980), many researchers have adopted a
symptom-based approach in attempting to identify the dimensions along which
these patients may be discerned from others (eg. Liddle, 1987).
Executive functions involve such abilities as abstract reasoning, concept
formation, decision making and planning of behavior. Based on a rule learning
paradigm which invokes these abilities the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST;
Milner, 1963) has been one of the most widely applied neuropsychological
measures of executive functioning (Heaton, 1993). Although schizophrenic
patients have consistenty been shown to perform worse than normal controls on
the WCST (Heinrichs and Zakzanis, 1998), research relating WCST performance
to symptom dimensions has produced inconsistent results. Some authors
reported findings indicating that predominantly negative symptoms are related to
poor performance (Addington et al., 1991; Berman et al., 1997; Perry and Braff,
1998; Rosse et al., 1993). Others, however, have failed to replicate this finding
(Cuesta et al., 1995; Himelhoch et al., 1996; Ragland et al., 1996). The relation of
WCST performance to positive symptomatology is even less clear, with findings
indicating relations varying from better (e.g. Hammer et al., 1995) to worse (e.g.
Perry and Braff, 1998) performance on the WCST. However, the positive
dimension of schizophrenia symptomatology has been shown to be
heterogeneous, with accumulating findings suggesting the subdivision of positive
symptomatology into symptoms of disorganisation and reality distortion (Liddle,
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1987; Andreasen et al., 1994). It has been argued that disorganisation symptoms
may be strongly related to multiple cognitive deficits, whereas reality distortion
symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions have been associated with
relatively intact cognitive functioning (Green, 1998).
The CPT is a well-known measure of vigilance, which refers to
sustaining attention on a stimulus or a certain dimension of that stimulus over a
period of time (Nuechterlein et al., 1994). The typical variable measured is the
decrement in signal/noise discrimination within the vigilance period, termed
sensitivity. Poor performance on the CPT has been identified as a vulnerability
marker to schizophrenia (Nuechterlein et al., 1994), thereby suggesting
performance to be independent of clinical state. Nuechterlein’s contention has
been supported by Cornblatt et al.’s failure to find significant relations between
CPT performance and either positive or negative symptoms (Cornblatt et al.,
1997). Others, however, have suggested an important role of impaired attention
in the genesis of positive symptoms and psychosis in general (Nelson et al., 1998;
Berman et al., 1997; Addington et al., 1997). Finally, findings have also been
reported that CPT impairment is related to negative symptoms (Strauss, 1993).
There are two factors that may have contributed to the inconsistencies in
reported associations between symptom dimensions and neuropsychological test
performance. First, the studies that report these relations differ with respect to
the clinical state of the studied patients. Specifically, some studies concern acute
schizophrenic patients (eg. Addington et al., 1991), whereas other studies
included only chronic patients (eg. Liddle et al., 1991). Baxter and Liddle (1998)
have suggested that associations between symptoms dimensions and
performance on neuropsychological tests may differ for patients in different
phases of the illness. Second, methodological differences may contribute to the
inconsistencies in reported associations. Specifically, the use of different
symptom scales such as the BPRS, SANS and PANSS may result in different
correlations between cognitive deficits and clusters of symptoms that were
derived from these scales through factor-analysis.
The aim of the present study was to provide a quantitative review of the
literature on symptom dimensions and performance on the WCST and CPT. By
performing a meta-analysis on all studies in this domain, we investigated the
validity of claims about differential relations between symtpom dimensions and
cognitive deficits (Crow, 1980; Green, 1998). In addition, the use of meta-analysis
enables an evaluation of the role of between-study differences in sample
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characteristics and symptom scales in accounting for the inconsistencies in
reported associations.
Method
Literature search Articles for consideration were identified through an extensive
literature search in the Psychlit and Medline databases, from 1980 through
december 1999. The key words were: “schizophrenia and  executive functions”,
“schizophrenia and Wisconsin*”, “schizophrenia and WCST”, “schizophrenia
and sustained attention”, “schizophrenia and continuous*” and “schizophrenia
and CPT”. In order to minimize the possibility of overlooking studies due to the
limited purview of computer databases we paged through the volumes of
relevant journals published in 1999. The selection of journals was based on the
frequency of the publication of relevant articles. The journals included American
Journal of Psychiatry, Biological Psychiatry, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,
Psychiatry Research, Schizophrenia Bulletin and Schizophrenia Research. The search
produced over 250 unique studies from which titles and abstracts were examined
for possible inclusion in our analysis.
Criteria for inclusion The identified studies were included if they met the following
criteria. First, the study had to include patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia
(based on DSM, ICD or RDC criteria). Studies that also included patients with
schizoaffective or schizotypical disorders were excluded if the data on
schizophrenic patients were not reported separately.
Second, each study had to include valid measures of symptomatology. Measures
included were: Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS:
Andreasen, 1983), the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS;
Andreasen, 1984), the positive and negative component scales of the Positive and
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al., 1987) and the positive and
negative component scales of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Overall
and Gorham, 1962). In addition, we included studies that computed scores for
clusters of symptoms based on factor-analyses of the SANS, SAPS, PANSS and
BPRS scales. These studies often included descriptive statistics for measures of
reality distortion and disorganisation subsyndromes, thereby enabling meta-
analysis of the relation with WCST and CPT performance. From studies
reporting correlations for separate symptoms we computed scores for the
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disorganisation, negative, positive and reality distortion dimensions by averaging
the scores for symptoms constituting these dimensions. Third, the studies had to
report valid measures of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Heaton et al., 1993)
or the Continuous Performance Task (Nuechterlein and Dawson, 1984). We
included perseverative errors, perseverative responses and the number of
categories completed as WCST performance measures. Factor-analytical findings
indicate that these variables load on a factor termed perseveration (PE) which has
been reported to differentiate well between schizophrenic patients and normals
(Cuesta et al., 1995; Koren et al., 1998). When a study reported separate
correlations between symptom dimensions and multiple WCST variables we
computed the pooled effect size. The measure of the Continuous Performance
Task included for meta-analysis was the measure of sensitivity, d’. If selected
studies presented measures for different experimental conditions (e.g. neuroleptic
naive versus neuroleptic free) we computed a pooled effect size. Fourth, the
studies had to report correlational statistics, which are suitable for meta-analysis
by providing direct measures of the relation between scores on scales of
symptomatology and neuropsychological test performance. Finally, the
population samples from the studies included had to be independent.
For the WCST meta-analysis 16 studies that met the criteria could be included,
whereas 6 studies were included in the CPT meta-analysis (studies included in the
analyses are marked with an asterisk in the reference list). Tables 1 and 2 list
sample and study characteristics of the studies included in the WCST and CPT
meta-analyses, respectively.
Data collection and analysis We performed meta-analyses on the correlational data
reported in the selected  studies. Analyses were performed on relations of
negative, positive, disorganisation and reality distortion symptomatology with the
CPT measure of sensitivity, d’, and WCST-PE. From studies reporting measures
of multiple versions of the CPT we selected results for the versions that most
resembled the CPT paradigm developed by Nuechterlein and Dawson
(Nuechterlein and Dawson, 1984).
For computation of population effect sizes we used mean r-values
weighted for sample size (Hunter, Schmidt, & Jackson, 1982;  Hunter & Smidt,
1990). The combined r-value is an indication of the strength of associations
across all selected studies. The corresponding z-value and significance level
provide an indication of the significance of the association.
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For WCST-PE, a positive correlation indicated an association between
symptomatology and worse performance, whereas for the CPT variable d’,
positive correlations indicated that more symptoms were associated with better
performance. In addition we calculated a c² statistic for an indication of the
heterogeneity of results across studies in a single category (Hunter et al., 1982;
Rosenthal, 1991). A significant c² statistic indicates that the observed variance in
study effect sizes is significantly greater than would be expected by chance if all
studies shared a common population effect size. Thus, if homogeneity is rejected,
the mean weighted r-value should not be interpreted as an estimate of a single
effect parameter that gave rise to the sample observations, but rather simply as
describing a mean of observed effect sizes, which of course limits a reliable
interpretation and generalization.  If there is significant heterogeneity, categorical
moderator analyses may be performed by grouping studies into appropriate
categories until homogeneity is not rejected within those categories. In the
present context, heterogeneity would signify the role of possible confounding
factors such as phase of illness.
Analyses were performed using the statistical software package META
(Schwarzer, 1988).
Results
As can be seen in table 3, negative and disorganisation symptoms correlated
significantly with WCST-PE (r=0.27 and r=0.25, respectively, both p's <0.01).
The magnitude of the correlations is small to modest, in the nomenclature of
Cohen (1988). Composite scores for all positive symptoms and the cluster of
reality distortion symptoms did not correlate with WCST-PE. Vigilance
performance measured with CPT-d' only correlated with negative symptoms, r=-
0.31, p<0.01. Associations of total positive symptoms on one hand, or
disorganisation and reality distortion on the other hand, with either WCST or
CPT performance were not significant. As can be seen in table 3, there was no
significant heterogeneity of effect sizes within the analyses. Although the results
failed to indicate significant heterogeneity, we performed additional analyses
using the sample and study characteristics listed in Tables 1 and 2 as moderator
variables. None of these analyses reached significance.
                              Symptom dimensions and cognition
51
Table 3. Results of meta-analyses on all studies for WCST-perseveration and CPT-d'
Variable Dimension N k r Z 95% Cl c²
WCST Negative 699 15 0.27 7.23* 0.13 – 0.40 18.9
Positive 487 9 0.06 1.24 -0.15 – 0.27 13.3
Disorganisation 273 6 0.25 4.22* 0.24 – 0.26 6.0
Reality distortion 194 4 0.04 0.60 -0.22 – 0.30 7.4
CPT Negative 250 6 -0.31 -4.94* -0.41 - -0.21 6.8
Positive 188 4 -0.01 -0.10 -0.10 – 0.09 4.5
Disorganisation 98 2 -0.06 -0.54 -0.04 - -0.08 1.1
Reality distortion 98 2 0.04 0.39 0.02 – 0.06 0.0
* p<0.01; k=number of studies; N=total number of subjects; r=mean weighted correlation;
Z=Stouffer’s Z for significance of effect size; 95%CI=95% confidence interval; c²=heterogeneity
between studies
Discussion
The goal of the present study was to provide a quantitative review of the
relations between dimensions of schizophrenia symptoms and performance on
neuropsychological tests of executive functioning and vigilance. Negative
symptoms were significantly associated with impairments in both domains of
cognitive functioning. In contrast, general scores for all positive symptoms and
separate scores for reality distortion symptoms were not associated with either
WCST or CPT performance. Disorganisation symptoms showed a significant
correlation with worse WCST performance, but not with CPT performance. The
observed significant correlations were in the small to modest range. In addition,
these relations were shown to be stable across studies that differed in sample and
study characteristics.
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The present results confirm the existence of differential, albeit weak, relations
between the symptom dimensions of schizophrenia and deficits in executive
functioning and vigilance (Baxter and Liddle, 1998; Liddle, 1996; Strauss, 1993).
These differential syndrome-cognition relations can be linked to evidence
showing that different anatomical structures are associated with the negative,
positive and reality distortion syndromes of schizophrenia. Results from brain
imaging studies have demonstrated that negative symptoms are associated with
abnormalities of the frontal cortex (Andreasen et al. 1998; Schröder et al. 1996).
Our observation of significant relationships between negative symptoms and
impaired performance on neuropsychological tests that have been associated with
frontal lobe functioning is in accordance with these neuroanatomical findings.
Disorganisation symptoms have been shown to have similar relations with with
frontal lobe functioning (Crider, 1997; Liddle et al., 1992). In contrast, reality
distortion symptoms have been associated with abnormalities of the temporal
lobes (Liddle et al., 1992; Kaplan et al., 1993; Wright et al., 1995).
The present findings adress two important issues regarding the use of
syndrome-based approaches in the study of cognition in schizophrenia. First, the
fact that disorganisation and reality distortion showed differential relations with
neurocognitive performance supports the notion that positive symptoms do not
form a homogeneous syndrome (Liddle, 1987). Indeed the fact reality distortion
symptoms did not correlate with WCST nor CPT performance, whereas
disorganisation did correlate with WCST performance, is in agreement with
findings from several factor-analytical studies of schizophrenia symptoms which
have shown that these symptoms constitute a distinct dimension of
schizophrenia symptoms (see Grube et al., 1998, for a meta-analysis). Taken
together, these findings favor a three syndrome model over the two syndrome
model as proposed by Crow (1980).
A second issue concerns the degree to which these syndromes can
account for heterogeneity in performance on neuropsychological tests. Although
we found significant associations between some symptom dimensions and
performance on the WCST and the CPT, the magnitude of the weighted mean
correlations indicated that these dimensions account for less than 10% of the
variance in performance on these tests. Taken together with the observed
differential nature of the correlations, this suggests that, although symptom
dimensions and their neurocognitive correlates may be remotely related to a
common pathophysiological alteration, they do not necessarily co-occur across
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the time-course of schizophrenia. This interpretation is in agreement with the
model of schizophrenia recently proposed by Green and Nuechterlein (1999).
According to this model, neurocognitive deficits are central to the chronic
disabilities of patients with schizophrenia and relatively independent of
symptomatic expressions of schizophrenia. Indeed, neurocognitive deficits have
been shown to be more closely related to the schizophrenia genotype than
symptomatic expressions, with several findings indicating the presence of
cognitive deficits both before the onset and throughout the course of
schizophrenia (Goldberg et al., 1993; Green and Nuechterlein, 1999), as well as
in schizotypic relatives of schizophrenic patients (Franke et al., 1992; Nelson et
al., 1998). Conversely, symptomatic expressions fluctuate considerably across the
time-course of schizophrenia (Carpenter et al., 1988; Murray, 1997), with
negative symptoms constituting relatively enduring traitlike characteristics (Arndt
et al., 1995). Cognitive deficits and negative symptoms may thus both reflect a
trait-like pathophysiology in schizophrenia.
In conclusion, the present study provides some evidence for the
hypothesis that dimensions of schizophrenia symptoms may be distinctly related
to neurocognitive function. Negative symptoms and disorganisation symptoms
show associations with impaired performance on neuropsychological tests
sensitive to frontal functioning, whereas reality distortion symptoms do not. By
obtaining differential correlations between symptom dimensions and
neurocognitive performance, to a certain extent our meta-analysis can be taken to
support the external validity of the symptom-dimensions model. However, the
association between symptoms and neurocognition must not be overstated. The
present findings of relatively weak correlations seem to favor a model of
schizophrenia in which symptom dimensions and performance on classical
neuropsychological tests are relatively independent (Green & Nuechterlein,
1999). This is not to say that cognitive functioning may not act as intermediate
level between phenomenology (symptoms) and neurobiology, as has been
proposed by Mortimer & McKenna (1994). However, fine-grained studies with
experimental tasks aimed at specific cognitive processes in relation to individual
symptoms may have more explanatory power than relating syndromes to classical
neuropsychological tests (which are typically involve more than one cognitive
process). Without doubt, however, the understanding of the heterogeneous
features of schizophrenia is likely to benefit importantly from further elaboration
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of the neurocognitive basis of distinct clinical phenomena characteristic of this
disabling condition.
                              Symptom dimensions and cognition
55
References
(Studies included in meta-analysis are indicated with an asterisk )
Aleman A, Hijman R, De Haan EHF, Kahn RS. Memory impairment in schizophrenia: a
meta-analysis. Am J Psychiat  1999;156:1358-1366.
*Addington J, Addington D, Maticka-Tyndale E. Cognitive functioning and positive and negative
symptoms in schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 1991;5:123-134.
*Addington J, Addington D. Attentional vulnerability indicators in schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder. Schizophr Res 1997;23:197-204.
Andreasen NC. Scale for the assessment of negative symptoms (SANS). The university of Iowa,
Iowa City, 1983.
Andreasen NC.Scale for the assessment of positive symptoms (SAPS). The university of Iowa,
Iowa City, 1984.
Andreasen NC, Nopoulos P, Schultz S, Miller D, Gupta S, Swayze V, Flaum M. Positive and
negative symptoms: Past, present, and future. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 1994;90 (suppl
384):51-59.
Andreasen NC, Paradiso S, O’Leary DS. “Cognitive dysmetria” as an integrative theory of
schizophrenia: A dysfunction in the cortical-subcortical-cerebellar circuitry? Schizophr Bull
1998;24:203-218.
Arndt S, Andreasen NC, Flaum M, Miller D, Nopoulos P. A longitudinal study of
      symptom dimensions in schizophrenia: prediction and patterns of change. Arch Gen
      Psychiatry 1995;52, 352-360.
*Basso MR, Nasrallah HA, Olson SC, Bornstein RA. Neuropsychological correlates of
negative, disorganized and psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 1998;31:99-111.
Baxter RD, Liddle PF. Neuropsychological deficits associated with schizophrenic syndromes.
Schizophr Res 1998;30:239-249.
*Berman I, Viegner B, Merson A, Allan E, Pappas D, Geen AI. Differential relationships
between positive and negative symptoms and neuropsychological deficits in schizophrenia.
Schizophr Res 1997;25:1-10.
*Braff DL, Heaton R, Kuck J, Cullum M, Moranville J, Grant I, Zisook S. The generalized pattern
of neuropsychological deficits in outpatients with chronic schizophrenia with heterogeneous
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test results. Arch Gen Psychiat 1991;48:891-898.
Brébion G, Amador X, Smith MJ, Malaspina D, Sharif Z, Gorman JC. Opposite links of positive
and negative symptomatology with memory errors in schizophrenia. Psychiat Res 1999;88:15-
24.
Cardo AG, Holmans PA, Harvey I, Williams MB, Owen MJ, McGuffin P. Factor-derived
subsyndromes of schizophrenia and familial morbid risks. Schizophr Res 1997;23:231-238.
Carpenter WT Jr, Heinrichs DW, Wagman AMI. Deficit and nondeficit forms of
schizophrenia: the concept. Am J Psychiatry 1988;145, 578-583.
Cohen J. Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum, 1988.
*Cohen RM, Nordahl TE, Semple WE, Andreason P, Pickar D. Abnormalities in the distributed
network of sustained attention predict neuroleptic treatment respons in schizophrenia.
Neuropsychopharmacology 1998;19:36-47.
*Collins AA, Remington GJ, Coulter K, Birkett K. Insight, neurocognitive function and symptom
clusters in chronic schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 1997;27:37-44.
Cornblatt BA, Obuchowski M, Schnur DB, O’Brien JD. Attention and clinical symptoms in
schizophrenia. Psychiatric Quarterly 1997;68:343-359.
Chapter 3
56
Crider A. Perseveration in schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull 1997;23:63-73.
Crow TJ. Molecular pathology of schizophrenia: More than one disease process? British Medical
Journal 1980;280:66-68.
Cuesta MJ, Peralta V. Cognitive disorders in the positive, negative nad disorganisation
syndromes of schizophrenia. Psychiat Res 1995;58:227-235.
*Cuesta MJ, Peralta V, Caro F, De Leon J. Schizophrenic syndrome and Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test card dimensions. Psychiat Res 1995;58:45-51.
*Franke P, Maier W, Hain C, Klinger T. Wisconsin Card Sorting Task: An indicator of
vulnerability to schizophrenia? Schizophr Res 1992;6:243-249.
Franke P, Maier W, Hardt J, Hain C, Cornblatt BA. Attentional abilities and measures of
schizotypy: Their variation and covariation in schizophrenic patients, their siblings, and normal
control subjects. Psychiat Res 1994;54:259-272.
Frith, CD. The cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia. Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992.
Gold JM, Harvey PD. Cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. Psychiatric Clinics of North America
1993;16:295-312.
Green MF. Schizophrenia from a neurocognitive perspective; Probing the impenetrable darkness.
Allyn & Bacon, 1998. p. 83-103.
Green MF, Nuechterlein KH. Should schizophrenia be treated as a neurocognitive disorder?
Schizophr Bull 1999;25:309-319.
Grube, BS, Bilder, RM, Goldman, RSTI. Meta-analysis of symptom factors in schizophrenia.
Schizophr Res 1998;25:113-20.
*Hain C, Maier W, Klingler T, Franke P. Positive/negative symptomatology and experimental
measures of attention in schizophrenic patients. Psychopathology 1993;26:62-68.
*Hammer MA, Katsanis J, Iacono WG. The relationship between negative symptoms and
neuropsychological performance. Biol Psychiat 1995;37:828-830.
Harvey PD, Parrella M, White L, Mohs RC, Davidson M, Davis KL. Convergence of cognitive and
adaptive decline in late-life schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 1999;35:77-84.
Heaton RK, Chelune GJ, Kay KK, Curtiss G. Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Manual: Revised and
expanded. Los Angeles. CA: Western Psychological Services, 1993.
Hemsley DR. Schizophrenia: A cognitive model and its implications for psychological intervention.
Behavior Modification 1996;20:139-169.
Heinrichs RW, Zakzanis KK. Neurocognitive deficit in schizophrenia: A quantitative review
of the evidence. Neuropsychology 1998;12:426-445.
*Himelhoch S, Taylor SF, Goldman RS, Tandon R. Frontal lobe tasks, antipsychotic medication,
and schizophrenia syndromes. Biol Psychiat 1996;39:227-229.
Hunter JE, Schmidt FL,  Jackson GB. Meta-analysis. Cumulating research findings across studies.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982.
Hunter JE, Smidt FL. Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error and bias in research findings.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990.
*Ito M, Kanno M, Mori Y, Shin-ichi Niwa. Attention deficits assessed by Continuous Performance
Test and Span of Apprehension test in japanese schizophrenic patients. Schizophr Res
1997;23:205-211.
Keefe RSE, Arnold MC, Bayen UJ, Harvey PD. Source monitoring deficits in patients with
schizophrenia; a multinomial modelling analysis. Psychol Med 1999;29:903-914.
Kay SR, Opler LA, Fiszbein A. The positive and negative syndrome scale (PANSS) for
schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull 1987;13:261-276.
Koren D, Harrison RH, Kremen WS, Goldstein JM, Faraone SV, Seidman LJ, Lyons MJ, Caplan B,
Tsuang MT. Factor structure of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test: Dimensions of deficit in
                              Symptom dimensions and cognition
57
schizophrenia. Neuropsychology 1998;12:289-302.
*Lees-Roitman S, Keefe RSE, Harvey PD, Siever LJ, Mohs RC. Attentional and eye-tracking
deficits correlate with negative symptoms in schizophrenia. Schizophr Res 1997;26:139-145.
Liddle PF. The symptoms of chronic schizophrenia: A re-examination of the positive-negative
dichotomy. Br J Psychiatry 1987;151:145-151.
*Liddle PF, Morris DA. Schizophrenic syndromes and frontal lobe performance. Br J Psychiatry
1991;158:340-345.
Liddle, PF, Friston, KJ, & Frith, CD. Patterns of cerebral blood flow in schizophrenia. Br J
Psychiatry 1992;160, 179-186.
Liddle PF. Syndromes in schizophrenia and their neuropsychological and neuroanatomical
correlates; In C. Pantelis, H.E. Nelson, T.R.E. Barnes, Schizophrenia: a neuro-psychological
perspective. Chicester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996. p299-316.
Milner B. Effects of different brain lesions on card sorting. Arch Neurol 1963; 9:100-110.
Mortimer, A.M. & McKenna, P.J. (1994). Levels of explanation – symptoms, neuropsychological
deficit and morphological abnormalities in schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 24, 541-545.
Murray RM. Schizophrenia. In R. Murray, P. Mill & P. McGuffin (Eds.), The essentials of postgraduate
psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (pp. 281-309), 1997.
Nelson EB, Sax KW, Strakowski MS. Attentional performance in patients with psychotic and
nonpsychotic major depression and schizophrenia. Am J Psychiat 1998;155:137-139.
Nuechterlein KH, Dawson ME. Information processing and and attentional functioning in the
developmental course of schizophrenics disorders. Schizophr Bull 1984;10:160-203.
*Nuechterlein KH, Edell WS, Norris M, Dawson ME. Attentional vulnerability indicators, thought
disorder, and negative symptoms. Schizophr Bull 1986;12:408-424.
Nuechterlein KH, Buchsbaum MS, Dawson ME. Neuropsychological vulnerability to
schizophrenia. In: David A.S., Cutting J.C. The neuropsychology of schizophrenia. Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates Ltd, 1994. p53-73.
Overall JE, Gorham DR. The brief psychiatric rating scale. Psychol Rep 1962;10:799-812.
Peralta V, Cuesta MJ. Dimensional structure of psychotic symptoms: an item-level analysis of SAPS
and SANS symptoms in psychotic disorders. Schizophr Res 1999;38:13-26.
*Perry W, Braff DL. A multimethod approach to assessing perseverations in schizophrenic
patients. Schizophr Res 1998;33:69-77.
*Ragland JD, Censits DM, Gur RC, Glahn DC, Gallacher F, Gur RE. Assessing declarative
memory in schizophrenia using Wisconsin Card Sorting Test stimuli: The paired associate
recognition test. Psychiat Res 1996;60:135-145.
Randolph C, Goldberg TE, Weinerger DR. The neuropsychology of schizophrenia. In K.M.
Heilman, E. Valenstein, Clinical Neuropsychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
p499-522
Rosenthal R. Meta-analytic procedures for social research. London: Sage, 1991.
*Rosse RB, Schwartz BL, Kim SY, Deutsch SI. Correlation between antisaccade and Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task performance in schizophrenia. Am J Psychiat 1993;150:333-335.
*Rossi A, Mancini F, Stratta P, Mattei P, Gismondi R, Pozzi F, Casacchia M. Rispiridone. Negative
symptoms and cognitive deficit in schizophrenia: an open study. Acta Psychiatrica Scand
1997;95:40-43.
*Rowe EW, Shean G. Card-sort performance and syndromes of schizophrenia. Genetic Soc Gen
Psychological Monograms 1997;123(3):197-209.
Schröder J, Buchsbaum MS, Siegel BV, Geider FJ, Lohr J, Tang C, Wu J, Potkin SG. Cerebral
metabolic activity correlates of subsyndromes in chronic schizophrenia. Schizophr Res
1996;19:41-53.
Chapter 3
58
Schwarzer R. Meta-analysis programs. Behav Res, Methods, Instr & Computers 1988; 20:338.
Strauss ME. Relations of symptoms to cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull
1993;19:215-231.
*Strauss ME, Buchanan RW, Hale J. Relations between attentional deficits and clinical symptoms in
schizophrenic outpatients. Psychiat Res 1993;47:205-213.
*Vorungati LNP, Heslegrave RJ, Awad AG. Neurocognitive correlates of positive and negative
syndromes in schizophrenia. Can J Psychiatry 1997;42:1066-1071.
Zakzanis KK, Heinrichs RW. Schizophrenia and the frontal brain: A quantitative review. J Int
Neuropsychol Soc 1999;5:556-566.
Chapter 4
Controversies and Discussions 1
Medication and cognition in
schizophrenia
Aleman A, De Haan EHF. (2000). Antipsychotics and working memory in schizophrenia. Science,
(July 7) 289, 56-57.
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Patients with schizophrenia suffer from substantial cognitive deficits, notably in
the realm of memory functioning (Aleman, Hijman, De Haan & Kahn, 1999),
which warrants considerable research efforts aimed at developing
pharmacological treatment strategies. Castner, Williams and Goldman-Rakic
(2000)  report reversal of antipsychotic-induced working memory deficits in
monkeys by short-term dopamine D1 receptor stimulation. They emphasize that
the results of their study may have important therapeutic implications for
schizophrenia. However, we think that the putative implications for treatment of
cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia may be somewhat overstated.
Castner et al. explicitly propose that chronic haloperidol treatment
should induce severe working memory impariments. Although they cite some
studies that reported haloperidol-induced cognitive impairment in patients with
schizophrenia, most studies do not find haloperidol to influence cognitive
function significantly, as three recent reviews of the literature have concluded
(King, 1990; Mortimer, 1997; Sharma, 1999). In a review on adverse
neurobiological effects of long-term use of neuroleptics, Jeste et al. (1998)
conclude that “persistent cognitive impairment associated with long-term use of
typical neuroleptics has not been well documented” (p. 201) . In addition, two
recent well-controlled studies that appeared after these reviews also indicate that
haloperidol does not worsen working memory performance in schizophrenia
(Lee et al., 1999; Purdon et al., 2000). Indeed, in a multicenter, double blind study
with random assignment, Purdon et al. (2000) observed a near-significant
improvement on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (decline in number of
perseverative errors) after 12 months of treatment with haloperidol (effect size –
0.46, p=0.06).
Castner et al. have provided strong evidence that haloperidol can induce
working memory deficits in monkeys, which can be reversed by short-term
dopamine D1 receptor stimulation. However, as haloperidol does not seem to
impair working memory significantly in patients with schizophrenia, the clinical
implications of Castner et al.’s findings remain unclear.
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Chapter 5
Multi-dimensionality of
hallucinatory predisposition
Summary
A substantial percentage of normal people has been documented to  report
hallucinatory experiences. We investigated the multi-dimensionality of such
experiences in 243 subjects from the normal population who completed the
Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale. Principal components analysis with oblique
rotation was performed on the data. Three factors were obtained loading on items
reflecting (1) tendency towards hallucinatory experiences, (2) subjective externality
of thought, and (3) vivid daydreams. An additional exploratory factor analysis
revealed highly similar factors. The results support the concept of hallucinatory
disposition as a multi-dimensional construct.
Aleman, A., Nieuwenstein, M., Böcker, K.B.E., De Haan, E.H.F. (2001). Multidimensionality of
hallucinatory predisposition: factor structure of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale in a normal
sample. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 287-292.
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Introduction
Hallucinatory experiences have been reported to occur not only in psychiatric
patients, but in a substantial percentage of normal subjects as well. A number of
studies have established that 10 to 25% of subjects from the normal population
may have the experience of hearing voices without any objective basis (Posey &
Losch, 1983; Young et al., 1986; Tien, 1991). Such auditory-verbal hallucinatory
experiences may, to an important degree, resemble the hallucinations
characteristic of schizophrenia (Barrett & Caylor, 1998). A frequently applied
questionnaire for measuring hallucinatory experiences is the Launay-Slade
Hallucination scale (Launay & Slade, 1981, modified  version Bentall & Slade,
1985), which was developed  based on the assumption that hallucinatory
experiences form a continuum with normal psychological functioning (Slade &
Bentall, 1988). For example, the scale includes items related to daydreaming (e.g.
“The sounds I hear in my daydreams are usually clear and distinct”), but also
includes items related to psychotic hallucinations (e.g. “I have heard the voice of
the Devil”). The items of the LSHS can be found in table 1.
In the original scale (Launay & Slade 1981) subjects had to respond with
true/false to each of the twelve items, of which two were negatively stated. A
principal components analysis on the data of 54 normal controls, 42 psychiatric
patients and 200 prisoners (Launay & Slade, 1981) revealed two factors:
“tendency to hallucinatory experiences” and “negative response set”. All items
except items 9 and 11 loaded on the first factor, with items 9 and 11 (which were
negative response items) loading on the second factor.
Bentall & Slade (1985) modified the LSHS by introducing a 5 point
Likert scale instead of the simple true/false response dichotomy, and by
changing the negative response items to positive ones. For research purposes, the
LSHS is mainly used in subjects from the normal population (e.g., Aleman et al.,
1999; Rankin & O’Carroll, 1995). The multi-dimensionality of hallucinatory
disposition has not been studied yet in a sample from the normal population
using the modified LSHS. Levitan et al. (1996) investigated the factor structure of
the modified LSHS in a sample of 169 psychiatric patients. Principal component
analysis yielded four factors, characterised as “vivid daydreams” (items 1, 3, 5, 6
and 9), “clinical auditory hallucinations” (items 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12), “intrusive
thoughts” (items 1, 3, 4 and 12), and “sub-clinical auditory hallucinations” (items
8 and 9), respectively.
The aim of the present study was to investigate the multi-dimensionality
of hallucinatory experiences in a normal sample of 243 undergraduate students in
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order to shed more light on the nature of the concept of hallucinatory
predisposition.
Method
Subjects were 243 undergraduate students from Utrecht University, who
completed the Dutch translation of the modified version of the LSHS (Bentall &
Slade, 1985). Mean age was 22.6 years (SD=5.6). One hundred and eighty nine
subjects were female, and the other 58 subjects were male. LSHS items were
scored on  a five point scale as follows: 0=”certainly does not apply to me”,
1=”possibly does not apply to me”, 2=”unsure”, 3=”possibly applies to me” and
4=”certainly applies to me”. Factor structure of the data was examined by
principal component analysis (PCA). The number of components to be retained
was determined by Kaiser’s criterion (eigenvalue greater than 1) followed by
inspection of the scree plot in order not to miss possible relevant factors with
smaller eigenvalues. An oblique rotation (Oblimin with Kaiser normalisation) was
then carried out since the phenomena under investigation may well not lead to
independent factors. In order to check the fit of the PCA we also performed an
exploratory factor analysis in which common variance is explored by principal
axis factoring. All analyses were performed with SPSS 8.0 (SPSS Inc, Chicago).
Results
The mean total score of the subjects was 13.9, SD=6.7 (range from 0 to 36);
there was no evidence of sex differences in LSHS-ratings, t=0.23, p>0.8. The
distribution was positively skewed, comparable to the distributions reported by
Bentall & Slade (1985). A substantial percentage of subjects responded
affirmative (“possibly applies” or “certainly applies”) to typical hallucination-
items such as item 7 (7 and 4.1%) and item 8 (25.5 and 5.3%). All items
correlated significantly with the total test score (p<.01). The internal consistency
coefficient (equivalent to Cronbach’s alpha; Murphy & Davidshofer, 1994) was
0.82.
The PCA revealed three factors (eigenvalues>1) which accounted for
50% of the variance. Table 1 shows loadings of items on the three factors. The
first factor accounted for 29.8% of the variance and can be characterised as
general hallucinatory tendency (e.g., item 7). The second factor (accounting for
10.8% of the variance) concerned subjective externality of thought (e.g., item 3),
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and the third factor (9.5% of the variance) may be described as vividness of
daydreams (e.g., item 6). Correlations between factors were r=0.29 for I-II,
r=0.30 for I-III and r=0.12 for II-III.
Table 1. LSHS items and factor loadings (only loadings >0.4 are shown)
          Factor
Item    1    2    3
1 No matter how hard I try to concentrate, unrelated
thoughts always creep into my mind
0.70
2 In my daydreams I can hear the sound of a tune almost as
clearly as if I were actually listening to it
0.46
3 Sometimes my thoughts seem as real as actual events in my
life
0.79
4 Sometimes a passing thought will seem so real that it
frightens me
0.65
5 The sounds I hear in my daydreams are usually clear and
distinct
0.82
6 The people in my daydreams seem so true to life that some-
times I
 think they are
0.84
7 I often hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud 0.74
8 In the past I have had the experience of hearing a person’s
voice and then found that no one was there
0.51
9 On occasions I have seen a person’s face in front of me
when no one was in fact there
0.61
10 I have heard the voice of the devil 0.71
11 In the past I have heard the voice of God speaking to me 0.63
12 I have been troubled by hearing voices in my head 0.61 0.41
The results of the principal factor analysis with oblique rotation revealed the
same factors as the PCA, with small differences in the items loading on these
factors. Items that loaded higher than 0.40 on factor I were items 1, 7, 8, 9, 10
and 12, on factor II items 3 and 11, and on factor III items 5 and 6.  The
differences with the results of the PCA are mainly that item 2 did not load on
factor I in this analysis and that item 4 did not load on factor II. Correlations
between factors were r=0.41 for I-II, r=0.45 for I-III and r=0.20 for II-III.
Given the skewed distribution and the possibility that outliers (e.g., the
few individuals that may endorse the more pathological items) may strongly
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influence the factor structure, we conducted a third analysis. This analysis was
identical to the first one (i.e., PCA with oblique rotation) with exception that ln-
transformation was performed on the data prior to analysis, and outliers were
excluded (defined as z>4  [Stevens, 1996], which concerned five datapoints). This
analysis again yielded the same three factors, with the following items loading
higher than 0.40: items 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 on factor I; items 3, 4, and 11 on
factor II; and items 5, 6, 9 and 12 on factor III. The difference with the first PCA
was that item 9 also loaded on factor III (items 4 and 5 remained loading the
highest on this factor).
Discussion
In this study we investigated the multi-dimensionality of hallucinatory
predisposition as measured by the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS) in
normal subjects. A small, but clearly noticeable percentage of subjects reported
hallucinatory experiences (for example item 8), which is in accordance with
previous findings in college students in Great Britain (Young et al., 1986).
However, the mean total rating on the LSHS was lower than that reported in
previous studies (e.g. 13.9 in our study versus 19.6 reported by Bentall & Slade
[1985] in a very similar sample). The observation of a small, but substantial,
number of subjects from the normal population reporting hallucinatory
experiences is in accordance with the view of hallucinations as existing on a
continuum with normal mental events (Slade & Bentall, 1988; Aleman & De
Haan, 1998).
The multi-dimensionality of the LSHS was investigated with principal
component analysis, yielding three factors, which we characterised as (1)
tendency towards hallucinatory experiences, (2) subjective externality (“realness”)
of thought, and (3) vivid daydreams. These results indicate that hallucinatory
predisposition can be regarded to be a multi-dimensional construct, which is
consistent with the findings of Levitan et al. (1996) who investigated the factorial
structure of the LSHS in psychiatric patients. Levitan et al. (1996) also found
evidence for a vivid daydreams factor and for a factor related to vivid thoughts.
However, in addition to these factors, they report two hallucination factors,
“clinical auditory hallucinations” and “sub-clinical auditory hallucinations” (as
described in the introduction). In contrast, our analysis revealed only one general
hallucinatory tendency factor. Our failure to find two distinct hallucination
factors may be explained by the different subject group: normal subjects in our
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study versus psychiatric patients in the study by Levitan et al. (1996). Indeed, the
subjects in the Levitan et al. (1996) study scored much higher overall and showed
a greater range of LSHS scores. The finding of only one hallucination factor in
normal subjects suggests that the distinction between clinical and sub-clinical
hallucinations may be specific to psychiatric patients.
A number of  authors have associated high scores on the LSHS with
psychosis-proneness (Bentall et al., 1989; Kendler & Hewitt, 1992;  Vollema &
Van den Bosch, 1995).  It could be hypothesised that the factors underlying the
LSHS, as established in the present study, may be differentially related to
vulnerability to psychopathology. For example, high ratings on items loading on
factor 1 (tendency towards hallucinatory experiences) or factor 2 (subjective
externality of thought) may be a better predictor of the occurrence of subsequent
psychopathological symptoms than high ratings on factor 3 (vivid daydreams).
Future research may be directed at such questions and should also concentrate
on the cognitive processes involved in hallucinatory experiences.
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Chapter 6
Disposition towards  hallucination
and imagery vividness
Summary
In the present study we investigated the relation between subjective and objective
indices of vividness of imagery and disposition towards hallucination in 74 college
students. Self-reported imagery vividness was measured with the visual and auditory
subscales of the Betts Vividness of Imagery Scale. The objective task concerned  the
difference between a perceptual and an imagery condition of judgment of visual
similarity of named objects. In addition, subjects completed a hallucination
questionnaire (the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale). After assigning subjects to a
high and a low scoring group on the basis of scores on the hallucination scale,
analysis of variance revealed a significant interaction between group and the two
vividness of imagery measures. Subjects reporting hallucinatory experiences tended
to show higher imagery vividness ratings on the Betts Scale than nonhallucinating
subjects. In contrast, the reverse relation was found on the experimental imagery
task. Implications of these findings for the validity of self-report imagery vividness
measures are discussed.
Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E. & De Haan, E.H.F. (1999). Disposition towards hallucination and
subjective versus objective vividness of imagery in normal subjects. Personality and Individual
Differences, 27, 707-714.
Introduction
Hallucinations are perceptions in the absence of corresponding stimulation of the
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senses and are usually associated with the presence of psychopathology (Asaad &
Shapiro, 1986). The idea that increased vividness of mental imagery may be
associated with hallucinatory experiences was already expressed more than
hundred years ago by Francis Galton (1883).  The results of subsequent research
examining this hypothesis remain inconclusive. Roman & Landis (1945), Mintz &
Alpert (1972), and Slade (1976) report more vivid imagery in hallucinating
psychiatric patients as compared with nonhallucinating patients. Other studies
failed to find a relation between more vivid imagery and occurence of
hallucinations. Cohen (1938), Seitz & Molholm (1947), Brett & Starker (1977)
and Starker & Jolin (1982) found no evidence of increased vividness of imagery
in hallucinating patients. Starker & Jolin (1982) even go so far as to argue that
hallucinating patients have less vivid imagery compared to nonhallucinating
patients. All these studies employed introspective measures of imagery vividness.
In a review of theory and research on hallucinations, Bentall (1990) concluded
that the vividness of imagery hypothesis of hallucinations lacks convincing
empirical evidence. Recently, however, Barrett (1992) demonstrated high-scoring
college students on a verbal hallucination scale to have more self-rated imagery
vividness than low scoring subjects. Barrett (1992) interpreted these results as
support for the increased imagery vividness hypothesis of hallucinations.
An important distinction between percepts and images is that percepts,
which are based on externally presented stimuli, are characterized by more
detailed sensory, contextual and semantic information than images, which are
based on internal generated information (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Following this
distinction, the vividness of an image may be operationally defined as the degree
of resemblance of a mental image to the corresponding perceptual qualities; the
more vivid an image, the closer the experience is to actual perception of sensory
input. According to this definition an objective index of imagery vividness can be
obtained by comparing performance on a perceptual and an imagery condition
of an experimental task. The more vivid the images are, the smaller will be the
difference between performance on the imagery and the perception condition.
It was the same Galton (1883) who stated that hallucinatory experiences
may be much more widespread under the normal population than generally
expected.  In recent years, there is increasing evidence supporting this claim.
Several studies have documented the occurence of hallucinations in some 10% of
normal healthy subjects (Posey & Losch, 1983; Young, Bentall, Slade & Dewey,
1986; Tien, 1991). In a study of hallucinations in college students, Barrett and
Etheridge (1992) found that at least 25%  reported verbal hallucinations. From
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these studies it may be concluded that hallucinations can be seen as existing on a
continuum with normal mental events (Slade & Bentall, 1988).
Up to now, most studies examining the relation between vividness of
imagery and hallucination have made use of introspective measures. The validity
of these measures is unclear. The present study addressed two questions. First, is
greater imagery vividness related to increased reports of hallucinations? If so, we
would expect to replicate Barrett’s (1992) finding, and also find a relationship
between an objective imagery measure and reports of hallucinatory disposition. 
The second question concerned the validity of self-report measures of imagery
vividness. We examined whether an objective task of imagery vividness would
yield the same results in relation to hallucinatory disposition as a self-report
questionnaire. Convergence with an objective task of imagery vividness would
support the validity of subjective measures of imagery vividness.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 74 undergraduate students from Utrecht University. The mean age
of the participants was 21.2 years (SD=1.8). Fifty-four subjects were female and
twenty were male.
Materials
Two questionnaires and one experimental task were used. The auditory and
visual subscales of the Betts QMI Vividness of Imagery Scale (Richardson, 1969)
consist of nine verbal descriptions, such as "the sun as it is sinking below the
horizon" (visual) and “the miaowing of a cat” (auditory). The Launay-Slade
Hallucination Scale (LSHS; Launay & Slade, 1981) consists of 12 descriptions of
hallucinatory experiences, e.g. "I often hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud".
The experimental vividness of imagery task concerned a quantitative comparison
between imagery and perception, and was adapted from Mehta, Newcombe &
De Haan (1992). The task consisted of 22 object names printed on cards and 22
triads of line drawings of common objects (Snodgrass & Vanderward, 1980).
Procedure
All 74 subjects were given the two questionnaires and the experimental task.
Subjects first completed the hallucination questionnaire. For each of the 12
statements, subjects had to indicate if the statement was "true" or "false" for their
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case. The questionnaire was scored by summing the number of “true”
statements. A high score on the LSHS indicates increased predisposition to
hallucinations. Subsequently, subjects completed the two Betts subscales. They
were asked to rate their imagery vividness on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1:
"Perfectly clear and as vivid as the actual experience" to 7: "No image present at
all, you only 'knowing' that you are thinking of the object". The questionnaire
was scored by summing the ratings. A low score indicated more vivid imagery.
The experimental imagery vividness task had two conditions: a perceptual
condition and an imagery condition. From the triads of line drawings, the item
that was most deviant in terms of visual form characteristics had to be indicated.
In the perceptual condition the line drawings were actually presented, whereas in
the imagery condition the object names were read from cards. For example, in
the perceptual condition pictures of the following three objects were presented:
“pumpkin”, “lettuce” and “tomato”, whereas in the imagery condition only the
names of these three objects were presented to the subject. Thus, the imagery
condition required the subjects to form mental images in order to be able to
make a correct judgement (which in the example given would be “lettuce”). A
difference-score was calculated by subtracting the correct responses in the
imagery condition from the correct responses in the perceptual condition. The
more vivid the images are, the smaller will be the difference between
performance on the imagery and the perception condition. Hence, the
difference-score between both conditions was considered an objective index of
imagery vividness.
Results
Mean scores of the group as a whole (N=74) were 3.0 (SD=1.9) for the LSHS,
25.7 (SD=7.0) for the summed subscales of the Betts Scale, 21.0 (SD=1.0) for
the perception condition of the imagery perception comparison task, 18.9
(SD=1.5) for the imagery condition, and 2.1 (SD=1.6) for the difference
between perception and imagery.
A high and a low hallucination group was formed on the basis of scores
on the hallucination questionnaire, using a median-split. Subjects with a
hallucination score equal to the median value were not included in the analysis
(N=17).  The mean rating on the LSHS of the high hallucination group (N=26)
was 5.2 (SD=1.3), the mean for the low hallucination group (N=31) was 1.3
(SD=0.8). The difference between both groups was significant, t=14.2,
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p<0.0001. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed with Measure as
within-subjects factor consisting of two levels: objective and subjective imagery
scores. The scores on the Betts Scale and the imagery perception comparison
task were transformed to z-values before performing the analysis, as the scale
units are not comparable. Group was taken as between-subjects variable. The
effect of Gender was also considered, as some studies have shown more vivid
imagery ratings in females compared to males (Campos & Sueiro, 1993).
Table 1 shows means and SDs for the high and low hallucination groups
on the imagery vividness measures, and z-transformed means and SDs. The
ANOVA with z-transformed objective and subjective imagery scores as a two-
level within-subjects variable did not reveal a significant main effect of Group
(F<1), due to the difference in direction of the imagery measures (as can be seen
in table 1). However, the Group × Measure interaction was significant, F(1,
55)=8.0, p=0.006.
Table 1. Means scores (and standard deviations) for ratings on the Betts QMI Vividness of Imagery
(summed auditory and visual subscales, and visual subscale only) and difference between
perception and imagery performance on the imagery perception comparison task by hallucination
group as defined on the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale. Lower scores indicate more vivid
imagery.
High LSHS group
(N=26)
Low LSHS group
(N=31)
Betts Scale, visual + auditory 23.7 (5.4) 27.1 (7.1)
Betts Scale, visual only 13.0 (3.3) 14.6 (3.9)
Imagery-perception comparison task 2.5 (1.4) 1.7 (1.7)
In Figure 1 the relation between the two measures and the high and low LSHS
group are plotted. Post-hoc t-tests (on the scores without z-transformation) were
performed in order to examine differences between the hallucination groups on
each of the imagery measures separately. Subjects in the high hallucination group
reported more self-rated imagery vividness on the Betts Scale than subjects in the
low hallucination group. However, this difference just failed to attain significance
(t=1.95, p=0.056). In contrast, subjects in the high hallucination group tended to
show less imagery vividness as measured by performance on the imagery
perception comparison task than subjects in the low hallucination group,
although the difference between the high and low hallucination group failed to
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reach significance, t=-1.85, p=0.069. No significant effect nor interaction of
Gender was observed.
Figure 1. Z-transformed scores on the Betts QMI Vividness of Imagery Scale (summed visual and
auditory subscales) and the imagery perception comparison task for high (N=26) and low (N=31)
LSHS groups. Lower scores indicate more vivid imagery.
We also performed an ANOVA including only the visual subscale of the Betts
Scale, given that the experimental vividness measure is visual in nature. Thus, the
Imagery factor consisted of two levels, z-transformed scores on the Betts visual
subscale and on the imagery perception comparison task. Again, the Group ×
Measure interaction was significant, F(1,55)=5.78, p=0.02, demonstrating a
dissociation between objective and subjective vividness of imagery scores in
relation to hallucinatory disposition. Although nonsignificant (p>0.08), post hoc t-
tests showed trends in the same opposite direction for the Betts scale versus the
imagery perception comparison task as in the first analysis.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine whether vividness of mental imagery as
measured with a self-report measure (the visual and auditory subscales of the
Betts QMI Vividness of Imagery Scale) and with an experimental task (the Mehta
imagery perception comparison task) would be related to hallucinatory
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disposition in normal subjects. Our results demonstrate a dissociation between
self-report and objective vividness of imagery in relation to hallucinatory
disposition, as shown by the significant Group × Measure interaction.
The results do not permit straightforward conclusions regarding our first
research question, whether a relation exists between vividness of imagery and
disposition towards hallucination, given the divergence between the subjective
and objective imagery vividness measure. Nevertheless, the present findings may
have important implications for understanding possible relations between
vividness of imagery and hallucinations. Subjects reporting hallucinatory
experiences tended to show higher imagery vividness ratings on the Betts scale
than nonhallucinating subjects. Thus, we replicated the finding by Barrett (1992)
of a positive relation between hallucinatory disposition and self-report imagery
vividness. The observation that our results were less significant can be attributed
to the fact that Barrett (1992) included more extreme groups, with a larger
difference in hallucination ratings. Barrett (1992) employed a different
hallucination scale, the Verbal Hallucination Scale (Barrett & Etheridge, 1992).
Our replication of Barrett’s finding with the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale
provides additional support for the hypothesized relation between hallucinations
and self-report imagery vividness. In contrast, the reverse relation was found for
the experimental vividness of imagery task, which brings us to our second
research question, regarding the validity of self-report vividness of imagery
measures.
To our knowledge, this is the first study which contrasts subjective and
objective measures of imagery vividness in relation to hallucinatory disposition in
normal subjects. The divergence between objective and subjective measures of
imagery vividness observed in the present study is consistent with the study by
Kosslyn, Brunn, Cave & Wallach (1984), who failed to find a relation between
performance on an objective task of acuity of visual images and a self-report
imagery measure, the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks,
1973). These findings suggest that self-report imagery questionnaires are not
simply measures of imagery vividness but may reflect different sets of processes.
 A clear advantage of investigating the relation between imagery and
hallucinations with experimental “objective” tasks in which analyses are restricted
to cognitive processes is the avoidance of the methodological problems
associated with introspection. This advantage may be especially important when
investigating subjects with hallucinatory experiences, in which insight into the
subjects’ own psychological functioning may be distorted.
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The lack of convergence between self-report imagery ratings and an
experimental measure of imagery vividness indicates that studies including only
self-report measures must be interpreted with caution. Situational demand
characteristics may contribute importantly to the associations between self-report
imagery vividness and hallucination ratings, due to the similarity in content and
format of the hallucination and imagery vividness questionnaire. In addition, self-
report questionnaires concern the subject’s naive thinking about mental imagery,
which is influenced by certain meta-cognitive processes such as the subjects
theory of imagery and his or her idea of vividness (Cornoldi, 1995). The use of
the vividness rating scale may reduce the validity of self-report measures as
different people employ different criteria in considering the vividness of an
image.
On the other hand, one might argue that it is not “objective” imagery
vividness that counts in whether or not a person classifies an internal generated
experience as externally presented (resulting in a hallucinatory experience) but that
the person’s subjective bias may play a more important role. Thus, persons
biased in making high vividness ratings of their own internally generated
thoughts, may as a result thereof tend to misclassify an internal generated
experience as externally presented - a process which has been referred to as
“reality discrimination” (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Mintz & Alpert, 1972). However,
with self-report measures it is not possible to differentiate between constructs as
reality discrimination and vividness of imagery, whereas objective tasks can be
designed to be specifically aimed at measuring one of these constructs, which is a
major advantage (e.g. Böcker, Van der Lee, Hijman & De Haan, 1996; Mintz &
Alpert, 1972).
An important consideration with regard to objective measures is that they
may be restricted to a limited part of the concept of imagery vividness, by not
taking into account the content of imagery. For example, phenomenological
differences in the content of mental images may even explain our failure to
observe a relation between imagery vividness as measured by the experimental
task and hallucinatory predisposition. The possibility must be considered that the
hallucination group is producing more vivid images than the other group but
that these images are more idiosyncratic, so that in the imagery condition, the
most deviant image occasionally might not be the same named thing as in the
perception condition.
These concerns highlight the importance of validation of experimental
imagery vividness tasks as well as of self-report measures. Clearly, more research
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is needed into the relation between vividness of imagery and hallucinations, both
in the general population and in psychotic illnesses, with multiple objective tasks
in the visual as well as the auditory modality.  The results of a preliminary study
(Böcker et al., 1996) in which such experimental tasks are employed have
indicated that schizophrenic patients who experience auditory hallucinations have
more vivid auditory than visual imagery, compared to nonhallucinating patients.
We conclude that subjective and objective measures of imagery vividness
may not converge in predicting hallucinatory disposition. This finding calls for a
more thorough evaluation of the validity of measures of imagery vividness.
Future research focusing on multiple objective and subjective measures of
imagery vividness in relation to hallucinatory experiences may further elucidate
the cognitive basis of hallucinations.
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Chapter 7
Mental imagery and perception in
hallucination-prone individuals
Summary
College students screened for hallucination-proneness using the Launay-Slade
Hallucination Scale (LSHS) were compared on measures of self-report vividness
of imagery and on behavioral measures of imagery and perception (visual and
auditory). Specifically, we tested the hypothesis whether hallucination-prone
individuals would show smaller differences between imagery and perception
performance, which may be indicative of increased sensory characteristics of
mental images. We replicated earlier findings of higher self-report imagery ratings
in the high hallucination-prone group. However, the two groups did not differ on
five of six behavioral imagery-perception comparisons. Although vividness of
mental images may be subjectively associated with mild hallucinatory experiences,
we suggest that cognitive processes associated with reality discrimination rather
than increased perceptual characteristics of mental images  may play a role at the
information processing level.
Aleman, A., Nieuwenstein, M., Böcker, K.B.E., De Haan, E.H.F. (2000). Mental imagery and
perception in hallucination-prone individuals. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 188, 830-836.
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Introduction
Despite decades of research, the exact mechanisms underlying the puzzling
phenomenon of hallucination remain poorly understood. As a working
definition, hallucinations may be considered “sensory experiences that occur in
the absence of external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ, have the
compelling sense of reality of a true perception, are not amenable to direct and
voluntary control by the experiencer, and occur in an awake state” (Aleman and
De Haan 1998; see also Slade and Bentall 1988). Hallucinations may occur in a
wide range of medical and psychiatric conditions (Asaad and Shapiro 1986;
Brasic 1998; Slade and Bentall 1988) and are one of the characteristic disturbing
symptoms of schizophrenia (Schneider 1962). Slade and Bentall (1988) estimated
the prevalence of auditory hallucinations to be 60% in schizophrenia, based on
16 published reports including 2924 cases. However, hallucinations are not
always indicative of pathology, as indicated by numerous studies which have
established the occurrence of hallucinatory experiences in a substantial number
of persons from the normal population (Aleman et al. 2000; Barrett and
Etheridge 1992; Bentall and Slade 1985; Tien 1991).  Such auditory-verbal
hallucinatory experiences may, to an important degree, resemble the
hallucinations characteristic of schizophrenia (Barrett and Caylor 1998; Honig et
al. 1998). Indeed, it has been proposed that psychosis-like  experiences may be
thought of as existing on a continuum, ranging from very mild expressions in the
normal population to the bizarre symptoms characteristic of severe mental illness
(Crow 1998; Slade and Bentall 1988). Thus, the study of cognitive mechanisms
underlying hallucinatory experiences in individuals from the normal population
may provide important information about the possible mechanisms underlying
hallucinations in mental disorders.
Although theories of hallucination differ considerably (e.g. Bentall 1990;
David 1994; Frith and Done 1988; Hoffman 1986), some consensus is emerging
that hallucinations are a result of the confounding of internally-generated
experiences with externally-generated events (Slade 1994). It has been
hypothesized that such confounding may arise from biases in reality monitoring,
i.e., the processes involved in discriminating memories of internal generated
information from memories of external derived information (Bentall et al. 1991;
Morrison and Haddock 1997). However, a recent study (Keefe et al. 1999)
showed that hallucinating and nonhallucinating patients with schizophrenia did
not differ on measures of reality monitoring, although both groups showed
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significant more reality monitoring errors compared with a healthy comparison
group.
Alternatively, it may be hypothesized that  the erroneous attribution of
internally-generated events to external sources may result from mental images
having more perceptual characteristics than expected by the cognitive system.
The idea that hallucinations are extreme vivid manifestations of mental imagery
was allready stated by Galton more than a century ago (Galton 1883). Results
from studies in which this claim was investigated are contradictory. For example,
Mintz and Alpert (1972), Roman and Landis (1945), and Slade (1976) found
evidence of more vivid imagery in hallucinating patients compared to non-
hallucinating patients. Moreover, Barrett (1992) compared high-scoring college
students on a verbal hallucination scale with low scoring participants and found
high scoring participants to report more vivid self-rated imagery. In contrast,
Brett and Starker (1977), Seitz and Molholm (1947), and Starker and Jolin (1982)
failed to find evidence of increased imagery vividness in hallucinating
schizophrenic patients. However, these studies all concerned introspective
measures of imagery, which are limited to the subjective experience of imagery.
The aim of the present study was twofold. First,  to replicate the relation
reported by Barrett (1992) between hallucination-proneness in subjects from the
normal population and self-rated imagery vividness. Second, to investigate
whether a relation would be found between hallucination-proneness and imagery
on behavioral comparisons of measures of imagery and perception. According to
Johnson and Raye (1981) percepts, which originate from externally presented
stimuli, are characterized by more detailed sensory, contextual and semantic
information than internally generated images. Evidence that mental images are
less rich in perceptual details than ‘real’ percepts and that, as a consequence,
images are more difficult to perform mental operations upon, was recently
presented by Kosslyn et al. (1999). The hypothesis that imagery and perception
are more alike (and therefore harder to discern from each other) due to increased
sensory characteristics of mental images in individuals that experience
hallucinations thus predicts that these subjects will show smaller performance
differences between a perception and an imagery condition of the same task.
Methods
Subjects were two groups selected out of 243 undergraduate students (mean age
22.6 years, SD=5.6) from Utrecht University, who completed the Launay-Slade
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Hallucination scale1 (LSHS; Launay and Slade, 1981; revision Bentall and Slade,
1985). The LSHS consists of 12 descriptions of hallucinatory experiences, e.g. "I
often hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud". LSHS items were scored on  a
five point scale as follows: 0=”certainly does not apply to me”, 1=”possibly does
not apply to me”, 2=”unsure”, 3=”possibly applies to me” and 4=”certainly
applies to me”. The questionnaire was scored by summing the ratings. A high
score on the LSHS indicates increased predisposition towards hallucination. We
selected 19 high scoring participants (from the upper 15%) and 17 low scoring
participants (from the lower 15%) from the sample of 243 students. The mean
LSHS rating of the high group was 26.7(SD=3.6), and the mean rating of the low
LSHS group was 4.0 (SD=1.9). The difference between the two groups was
significant, t = 23.7, p < .0001. The male/female ratio was comparable in both
groups, 6:13 for the high LSHS group and 5:12 for the low LSHS group.
Procedure
Two questionnaires and six experimental tasks were used. The questionnaires
concerned the Betts QMI Vividness of Imagery Scale, and the Marks Vividness
of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ).  The experimental tasks concerned a
visual and auditory version of a triad imagery perception comparison task, a
visual and auditory version of an imagery-perception interaction task, a letter
imagery task (visual), and a Musical imagery task (auditory). A more detailed
description of the measures follows.
Betts QMI Vividness of Imagery Scale.  The auditory and visual subscales of
the shortened Betts QMI Vividness of Imagery Scale (Richardson 1969) consist
of nine verbal descriptions, such as "the sun as it is sinking below the horizon"
(visual) and “the meowing of a cat” (auditory). Participants are asked to rate their
imagery vividness on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1: "Perfectly clear and as vivid
as the actual experience" to 7: "No image present at all, you only 'knowing' that
you are thinking of the object". The questionnaire is scored by summing the
ratings. A low score indicates more vivid imagery.
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire. The Marks Vividness of Visual Imagery
Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973) is an extension of the visual subscale of the
Betts scale. It consists of 16 descriptions which must be rated on a 5-point
                                                                
1 Several studies have reported evidence in favour of the reliability and validity of the Launay-
Slade Hallucination Scale (Launay and Slade, 1981; Bentall and Slade, 1985; Rankin and
O’Carroll, 1995; Levitan, Wards, Catts and Hemsley, 1996; Morrison, Wells and Nothard,
2000)
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Likert-scale, in an identical way as the Betts scale. However, the subject must rate
the items once with eyes open, and once with eyes closed. The questionnaire is
scored by summing the ratings. Lower scores indicate more vivid imagery.
 Object  imagery. The object imagery task concerns a quantitative comparison
between imagery and perception of visual form characteristics of  common
objects (this task was adapted from Mehta et al. 1992) or sound characteristics of
common sounds (auditory version). Visual modality. The task consists of 22 object
names printed on cards and 22 triads of line drawings of common objects
(Snodgrass and Vanderward, 1980). From the triads of line drawings, the item
that is most deviant in terms of visual form characteristics has to be indicated. In
the perceptual condition the line drawings are actually presented, whereas in the
imagery condition the object names are read from cards. For example, in the
perceptual condition pictures of the following three objects are presented:
“pumpkin”, “lettuce” and “tomato”, whereas in the imagery condition only the
names of these three objects were presented to the subject. Thus, the imagery
condition requires the participants to form mental images in order to be able to
make a correct judgement (which in the example given would be “lettuce”). A
difference-score was calculated by subtracting the correct responses in the
imagery condition from the correct responses in the perceptual condition.
Auditory modality. The auditory task was similar to the visual version in that a triad
of common sounds was presented, and participants had to indicate the item that
is most deviant in terms of acoustic characteristics. In the perceptual condition
the sounds were actually presented (by the computer), whereas in the imagery
condition the names of the sounds were read from cards. An example of a sound
triad that was presented is “crying baby”, “laughing baby” and “meowing cat”,
where “laughing baby” was regarded the deviant item.
Imagery-perception interaction. Imagery is known to affect certain aspects of
perceptual processes, which makes it possible to obtain an indirect measure of
imagery qualities by recording objective perceptual processes. Farah (1989)
demonstrated that, in the visual modality, near-threshold stimuli are more easily
detected if they are presented on an image (say of a letter H) than when
presented off the image in a forced choice psychophysical paradigm. This effect
has also been found in the auditory modality; tones presented at absolute
perception threshold are detected more often when they are also imaged (Farah
and Smith, 1983). Visual modality. In this test, first the absolute threshold for
duration of dot presentation was determined by use of the staircase method.
Second, two series of 32 trials were presented, while the participants was
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imagining one of the two letters (capital T or H in a 5 x 5 grid). In 25% of the
trials the stimuli were “on-image” and in another 25% the stimuli were “off-
image”. For the other 50% no stimuli were present. The difference in the number
of detected stimuli in the on-image condition compared to the off-image
condition is a measure for the interaction between imagery and perception. In
contrast to the other behavioral measures, a larger difference value implies a
greater effect of imagery, which is expected in participants with hallucinatory
experiences according to the hypothesis that increased perceptual characteristics
of mental images are associated with hallucination. Auditory modality. The auditory
version of this task was identical to the visual version, with the difference that the
absolute threshold was determined for the loudness of two tones in 74 dB(A)
white noise, and that the stimuli presented during the experiment consisted of
tones which could be at a frequency of 440 or 1000 Hz. A tone at one of these
frequencies had to be imaged (e.g. 440 Hz), while a tone at one of either
frequency was presented as stimulus during the experiment, with 25% of the
stimuli being “on-image” (in this case 440 Hz) and 25% “off-image” (1000 Hz).
Letter imagery. We adapted the letter imagery task used by Kosslyn et al.
(1988). The subject is asked whether an X-mark, presented in a 4x5 grid, falls on
a capital letter. In the imagery condition, the letter is not actually presented in the
grid, but must be imaged by the subject. For example, after a fixation point a
lowercase letter ‘f’ is presented, followed by an empty grid with the X-mark at the
lower right corner. The subject must decide whether the target would fall on an
uppercase letter ‘F’ or not. In the perception condition, the letter actually
appeared in the grid. Eight letters were randomly presented during the task: ‘c’,
‘f’, ‘h’, ‘j’, ‘l’, ‘p’, ‘s’, ‘u’. Each condition of the task consisted of 32 trials, 4 trials
for each of the letters (two “on” and two “off” trials for each letter). We
modified the task slightly, in that we allowed the X-mark to appear only in cells
in which the chance that the X-mark would cover a letter was equal (thus, no X-
marks appeared in the most left column, as most capital letters would cover these
cells). The difference in number of correct responses between the imagery and
perception condition was the dependent measure.
Musical imagery. This task of musical imagery requires participants to
mentally compare pitches of notes corresponding to song lyrics, and was adapted
from Halpern (1988; experiment 2). Participants viewed the lyrics from the first
line of a familiar Dutch song on a screen and were asked to decide whether, of
two indicated lyrics (which were marked on both sides with asterisks and
appeared in uppercase letters), the pitch of the second lyric was higher or lower
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than that corresponding to the first lyric. Lyric refers here to a monosyllabic
word, or one syllable of a two-syllabic word. An English language example would
be: “*OH* say can *YOU* see”, taken from the American national anthem.
Participants responded by means of a key press. In the perceptual condition,
participants were actually presented with the song, which was played via a tape-
recorder. The imagery condition was identical, with the exception that the song
was not presented, and participants had to rely on their musical imagery in order
to be able to perform the task correctly. Again, the difference in number of
correct responses between the imagery and perception condition was calculated.
Statistical analyses. Analysis of variance was performed to investigate between
group differences on vividness of imagery ratings and performance differences
on imagery and perception conditions of the behavioral tasks. The level of
significance was set at p<.05 (two-tailed). In addition, non-parametric correlation
coefficients for the relation between imagery and perception performance were
calculated within each group.
Results
Table 1 presents means and SDs for the high and low LSHS group on the
imagery measures.
Self-rated  imagery vividness
For the ratings on the VVIQ, the groups differed significantly, F(1, 34)=4.7,
p<.05. Participants in the high LSHS group reported more vivid images than
participants in the low group (table 1). No significant differences were observed
between the high and low LSHS group on the Betts visual subscale (F[1, 34]=3.1,
p<.10), nor on the Betts auditory subscale (F[1, 34]=1.6, p>.10). The Betts visual
subscale as well as the VVIQ correlated significantly with ratings on the LSHS
(for both  r=-0.40, p<.05). The correlation between the Betts auditory subscale
and the LSHS was not significant (r=0.21, p>.10).
Behavioral measures of imagery and perception
Of the behavioral measures, only the visual object imagery task showed a
significant group difference in imagery/perception difference-scores. A
significant larger difference between imagery and perception performance was
observed in the low LSHS group compared with the high group, F(1, 34)=7.0,
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p<.05 (see table 1). The other five behavioral measures failed to reveal significant
differences between the high and the low LSHS group. There was no significant
difference between imagery scores in the visual and auditory modality in either
group (This was evaluated with ANOVA’s on z-transformed scores as the scales
of the different measures are not comparable).
Table 1. Means and SDs for the high LSHS and the low LSHS group on measures of imagery
vividness (lower scores indicate higher imagery)
Imagery vividness measure High LSHS group
(N=19)
Low LSHS group
(N=17)
VVIQ 34.1 (6.2) 37.5 (8.6)
Betts visual subscale 12.7 (3.7) 15.1 (4.6)
Betts auditory subscale 11.1 (3.9) 12.6 (3.3)
Object imagery visual 2.5 (1.7) 0.8 (2.2)
auditory 3.9 (2.0) 3.2 (2.6)
Imagery-perception
interaction
visual* 0.7 (2.2) 0.4 (3.3)
auditory* 2.2 (3.5) 1.9 (5.0)
Letter Imagery 3.0 (2.7) 2.1 (2.7)
Musical imagery 2.5 (3.1) 2.0 (3.8)
*higher scores indicate higher imagery performance
When performance on the perception and imagery conditions was analyzed
independently, no difference between the high and low group was found on any
of the six behavioral tasks (all p’s>.10). In addition, the two groups did not differ
in perceptual acuity as indicated by the auditory and visual threshold measures of
the imagery-perception interaction task (p>.70).
Correspondence between imagery and perception
As table 2 demonstrates, correlations between performance (number of correct
responses) on the imagery and perception tasks were substantial higher in the
high LSHS than in the low LSHS group for the object imagery task (visual and
auditory) and the musical imagery-perception task. No differences were observed
for the letter imagery-perception task.  For the imagery-perception interaction
task no correlations were computed, as this task, measuring the interaction
between imagery and perception, does not have strictly distinct imagery and
perception conditions.
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Table 2. Nonparametric correlations (Spearman’s rho) between performance on imagery and
perception conditions of the behavioral measures for the high LSHS and the low LSHS group
Imagery measure High LSHS group
(N=19)
Low LSHS group
(N=17)
Object imagery Visual .64** -.11
Auditory .45* .10
Musical imagery .62** .50*
Letter Imagery .34 .39
*p<.05, **p<.01
Discussion
The present study was designed to replicate the previously reported relation
between self-reported vividness of mental imagery and hallucination-proneness,
and more importantly, to investigate whether a relation between imagery and
hallucination-proneness would be observed on behavioral measures of
information processing. Subjects from the normal population with high ratings
on a questionnaire for hallucination-proneness (the Launay-Slade Hallucination
Scale) were contrasted with low hallucination-prone subjects on multiple
behavioral measures of imagery-perception comparisons in both the visual and
the auditory modality.
Consistent with earlier observations (Barrett 1992; Aleman, Böcker et al.
1999), the high group showed higher imagery vividness ratings than the low
group on the self-report measures. We thus replicated the relation between
hallucinatory predisposition and self-report imagery vividness in normal subjects
(Barrett 1992) using a different hallucination questionnaire (LSHS in stead of
Verbal Hallucination questionnaire) and including a different imagery
questionnaire (the VVIQ, in addition to the Betts scale). It is important to note
that the experiences considered in the LSHS as well as the imagery vividness
questionnaires are highly similar phenomenologically, which may contribute to
the observed association between these measures.
In contrast, there were no important differences between the high and
low hallucination-prone groups in imagery-perception comparisons as measured
with behavioral tests of imagery and perception. The groups differed on only one
of the six behavioral measures, the visual object imagery-perception task. For this
task, the difference between perception and imagery scores was larger in high
LSHS participants, indicating a possible decrease rather than increase in
perceptual characteristics of mental images. Cognitive dysfunction has been
consistently documented in schizophrenia (Aleman, Hijman et al. 1999;
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Heinrichs & Zakzanis 1998) and may to some extent be found in subjects with
high ratings on schizotypy scales (Lenzenweger 1998). The LSHS has been
considered a scale that provides an indication of positive schizotypy (Vollema
and Van den Bosch 1995). It could thus be argued that subjects in the high
hallucination-prone group may have a higher incidence of mild cognitive
problems which could explain a lower performance compared to low
hallucination-prone subjects. It is important to note, however, that the two
groups did not differ significantly on the perception nor on the imagery
condition of this task, implying that the difference between the groups can not be
attributed to attentional or motivational factors. It was the relative score of the
difference between perception and imagery that showed a significant difference
between groups, with high hallucination-prone subjects showing larger
differences between imagery and perception performance than subjects in the
low group. In an earlier study, in which the object imagery task was the only
behavioral measure, also a negative relation between imagery-perception
differences and LSHS ratings was observed (Aleman, Böcker et al. 1999).
Horowitz (1975) hypothesized that hallucinators have less vivid imagery than
non-hallucinators which would lead an occasional “vivid” image to be
misinterpreted as a perception. Indeed, it could be argued that there is no
absolute increase in imagery vividness in hallucinating individuals, but a relative
increase of imagery vividness in the modality of hallucination, caused by a
decrease of vividness in other modalities. It is therefore interesting to note that
the lower imagery vividness performance in the hallucination-prone group was
only in found on a visual imagery task, and that the LSHS mainly concerns
auditory hallucinatory experiences. This is consistent with the finding by Böcker
et al. (in press) of a modality-specific imagery difference in auditory hallucinating
patients (larger imagery-perception interaction in an auditory, but not in a visual
condition of an imagery task), which was not observed in a control group of
patients without hallucinations. Certainly, more detailed investigation of imagery-
perception comparisons with behavioral measures in psychiatric patients with
more severe and bizarre hallucinations characteristic of psychosis is needed
before strong final conclusions can be reached.
Our finding of a larger correlation between imagery and perception in
the high LSHS group than in the low LSHS group may support the plausibility of
an explanation in terms of cognitive processes that are involved in distinguishing
internal and external sources of perceived events, which has been termed “reality
discrimination” (cf. Bentall 1990).  The observation may imply that the cognitive
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processes involved in perception and imagery operate separately to a significant
extent in low hallucination-prone participants, but are more closely related in
high hallucination-prone participants. According to Johnson and Raye (1981),
errors in discriminating internal from external information are more likely to
occur when the cognitive processes involved are highly similar. Indeed, Rankin
and O’Carroll (1995) have provided evidence of deficient reality discrimination in
high LSHS participants compared to low LSHS participants.
Conclusion
In the present study, we replicated the finding of a positive relation between
hallucination-proneness and self-report vividness of mental imagery. However,
this relation was not observed on multiple behavioral measures of auditory and
visual imagery and perception. A higher correlation between imagery and
perception was observed in high hallucination-prone individuals compared to the
low group, which may imply that the cognitive processes involved in imagery and
perception may result less distinctive from each other in the high group, thus
making reality discrimination errors more likely. Future research in psychiatric
patients must be aimed at disentangling these complex relations to provide a
more detailed account of the cognitive basis of hallucinations.
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Chapter 8
Controversies and Discussions 2
Definition of hallucination
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In his interesting and thought-provoking article “Toward a new definition of
hallucination”, Liester (1998) proposed a revised definition of the concept of
hallucination. Taking the widely applied DSM-IV definition as a starting point,
Liester argued that there are important shortcomings in current definitions of
hallucination. DSM-IV defines hallucinations as follows:
“A sensory perception that has the compelling sense of reality of a
true perception but that occurs without external stimulation of the
relevant sensory organ.”
Liester (1998) mainly focused on two flaws: the failure to distinguish between
pathological and nonpathological experiences and the lack of appropriate
consideration to cultural beliefs of the individual experiencing the hallucination.
Liester formulated a revised definition of hallucination in which  these notions
are incorporated. He proposed the following definition of hallucination:
“A sensory experience that has the compelling sense of reality of an
“objective” perception, but that occurs without external stimulation
of the relevant sensory organ; that occurs  in conjunction with and
is believed to be etiologically related to, a  physical or mental
disorder; and that is not ordinarily experienced or accepted by other
members of the culture or subculture.”
 To our perception, however, the definition is not adequate, as it is based on
certain assumptions regarding the nature of psychopathology that remain
unjustified. In our comment we will address this issue, and will specifically pay
attention to the question whether a definition of hallucination must be restricted
to psychopathological experiences, as advocated by Liester (1998).
As recognized by Liester (1998), numerous reports have by now
established the occurence of hallucinatory experiences in the normal population
(Posey & Losch, 1983; Young et al., 1986; Tien, 1991; Barrett & Etheridge, 1992;
Aleman, Böcker & De Haan, 1998). Moreover, the percentage of normal subjects
reporting hallucinatory experiences is substantial, ranging from 10% (Tien, 1991)
to 25% (Barrett & Etheridge, 1992). The hallucinatory events reported by these
people are very similar to the auditory-verbal hallucinations characteristic of
schizophrenia. For example, in the study by Bentall & Slade (1985), 17.7% of the
subjects (N=136) scored the item “I often hear a voice speaking my thoughts
aloud” as “Certainly applies” and 15.4% scored the item “In the past I have had
the experience of hearing a person’s voice and then found that there was no one
there” as “Certainly applies”. These studies strongly suggest that hallucinations
can be seen as existing on a continuum with normal mental events. As Slade &
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Bentall (1988) have stated: “…Hallucinations should be studied in their own
right, rather than as part of larger psychiatric syndromes” (p.56).
Liester (1998) is particulary concerned with “the difficult problem of
distinguishing “pathological” from “normal” hallucinations.”  This conception of
hallucination is based on a medical model of psychiatric illness in which a
categorical distinction is assumed between “healthy” conditions and “ill”
conditions. However, there is considerable debate about the validity of such an
approach to the classification of abnormal behavior (Blashfield, 1984; Bentall,
1990a). As an alternative, abnormal experiences might be seen as existing on a
continuum with normal mental events, differing only in degree of severity. Or, as
Crow (1998) recently put it: “…The phenomena of psychosis can be regarded as
a component (albeit an extreme or “boundary” condition) of the diversity of
human psychological structure…” (p. 504). In this approach it is not necessary to
distinguish between “pathological” and “normal” hallucinations. Rather, it is the
task of the clinician to evaluate whether the hallucinations arise in the context of
a psychiatric condition or not.
There is no a priori reason, therefore, nor is there a theoretical
justification for limiting the definition of hallucinations to psychopathological
experiences. Restricting the definition of hallucination to psychopathology may
result in a rather arbitrary classification practice. Consider the following example.
John and Mark both often experience “a voice speaking their thoughts aloud”. A
psychiatrist conducts a psychiatric examination on both, and concludes that John,
in contrast to Mark, presents some (other?) symptoms of psychopathology. Is the
same hallucinatory experience, shared by John and Mark, to be defined
hallucination in John, but not in Mark? And, if so, what is the hallucinatory
experience of Mark to be called?
We also doubt whether the elimination from the definition of
hallucination of hallucinatory events that are accepted within certain cultural
contexts will prove to be valuable. Whether occurring in a particular cultural
context, in a general medical condition or in a psychiatric disorder, the
phenomenology of hallucination is similar. As long as the social, cognitive and
neurobiological mechanisms underlying hallucinatory experiences are not fully
specified, and the etiology thus remains unknown, it does not seem reasonable to
term the same phenomenological event as “hallucination” in one instance (e.g.
within a psychopathological context), but not in another (e.g. within a cultural
context).
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Therefore, we are more at ease with the working definition given by Slade &
Bentall (1988):
“Any percept-like experience which (a) occurs in the absence of an
appropriate stimulus, (b) had the full force or impact of the
corresponding actual (real) perception, and (c) is not amenable to
direct and voluntary control by the experiencer.”
However, a shortcoming of the definition by Slade & Bentall (1988) might be
that vivid dreams (with clear and lively imagery) fulfill the criteria of the
definition, and must hence be termed “hallucinations”. It does not seem
appropriate to consider vivid dreams as hallucinations, as the possibility of
hallucination implies the possibility of adequate discrimination between
perceptual events with and without an objective (“real”) basis. This latter ability
requires a conscious, awake state. We would therefore like to propose the
following revised working definition of hallucination:
“A sensory experience which occurs in the absence of external
stimulation of the relevant sensory organ, but has the compelling
sense of reality of a true perception, is not amenable to direct and
voluntary control by the experiencer, and occurs in an awake state.”
This definition specifies the unique phenomenological characteristics of
hallucinations and differentiates hallucinations from vivid mental imagery
(“not amenable to direct and voluntary control”) and from vivid dreams
(“in an awake state”).
Future research aimed at elucidating the exact mechanisms that give rise to
hallucinations is necessary. Increasing knowledge of hallucinatory
phenomena may indeed lead to a revised conception of these perceptual
“illusions of reality” (Bentall, 1990b). For the moment, however, in order
to achieve a better understanding of hallucinations, a working definition
confined to the phenomenological level is the best we have.
Definition of hallucination
101
References
Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E. & De Haan, E.H.F. (1998). Disposition toward hallucination and
subjective versus objective vividness of imagery in normal subjects. Submitted.
Barrett, T.R. & Etheridge, J.B. (1992). Verbal hallucinations in normals, I: People who hear ‘voices’.
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6, 379-387.
Bentall, R.P. (1990a).  The syndromes and symptoms of psychosis. In R.P. Bentall (Ed.),
Reconstructing schizophrenia  (pp 23-60). London: Routledge.
Bentall, R.P. (1990b). The illusion of reality: a review and integration of psychological research on
hallucinations. Psychological Bulletin, 107 , 82-95.
Bentall, R.P. & Slade, P.D. (1985). Reliability of a scale measuring disposition towards hallucination:
a brief report. Personality and Individual Differences, 6, 527-529.
Blashfield, R.K. (1984). The classification of psychopathology; neo-Kraepelinian and quantitative approaches.
New York: Plenum Press.
Böcker, K.B.E., Van der Lee, J., Hijman, R. & De Haan, E.H.F. (1996). Perception, mental imagery
and reality discrimination in hallucinating and nonhalucinating schizophrenic patients. Journal
of the International Neuropsychological Society, 2 , 204-205.
Crow, T.J. (1998). From Kraepelin to Kretschmer leavened by Schneider. Archives of General
Psychiatry, 55 , 502-504.
Liester, M.B. (1998). Toward a new definition of hallucination. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 68,
305-312.
Posey, T.B. & Losch, M.E. (1983). Auditory hallucinations of hearing voices in 375 normal
subjects. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 2, 99-113.
Slade, P.D. & Bentall, R.P. (1988). Sensory deception; a scientific analysis of hallucination. Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press.
Tien, A.Y. (1991). Distribution of hallucinations in the population. Social  Psychiatry and Psychiatric
Epidemiology, 26 , 287-292.
Young, H.F., Bentall, R.P., Slade, P.D. & Dewey, M. (1986).  Disposition towards hallucination,
gender and EPQ scores. Personality and Individual Differences, 7 , 247-249.
Chapter 8
102
Chapter 9
Music training and mental imagery
Summary
Neuroimaging studies have suggested that the auditory cortex is involved in music
processing as well as in auditory imagery. We hypothesized that music training
may be associated with improved auditory imagery ability. In this study,
performance of musically trained and musically naive subjects was compared on
1) a musical mental imagery task (in which subjects had to mentally compare
pitches of notes corresponding to lyrics taken from familiar songs), 2) a non-
musical auditory imagery task (in which subjects had to mentally compare the
acoustic characteristics of every-day sounds) and 3) on a comparable measure of
visual imagery (in which subjects had to mentally compare visual forms of
objects). The musically trained group did not only perform better on the musical
imagery task, but also outperformed musically naive subjects on the non-musical
auditory imagery task. In contrast, the two groups did not differ on the visual
imagery task. This finding is discussed in relation to theoretical proposals about
music processing and brain activity.
Aleman A, Nieuwenstein M, Böcker KBE, De Haan EHF (2000). Music training and mental
imagery ability. Neuropsychologia, 38, 1664-1668.
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Introduction
Musical mental imagery, or the ability to “hear” melodic sound-sequences with
the “mind’s ear” in the absence of external stimulation, plays an important role in
musical performance [2]. Musicians often rely on musical imagery to guide their
performance and to memorize or compose new music. Moreover, the ability to
read written music silently is an acquired skill that often involves mental imagery.
Halpern [4] devised a task aimed at measuring mental scanning in auditory
imagery for songs, modeled on the visual scanning study by Kosslyn et al. [6].
Subjects were asked to mentally compare pitches of notes corresponding to lyrics
taken from familiar songs (e.g. “The Star Spangled Banner”). Results showed that
reaction times increased as a function of the distance between two beats and as a
function of  the starting point of the earlier lyric [4], and thus provided evidence
that auditory imagery is not only a strong subjective experience, but, analogous to
visual imagery, can be quantified to a certain extent.
It has been suggested that music training and listening to music may
have beneficial effects on other cognitive processes. For example, Rauscher et al.
[12] reported that college students who listened to the first ten minutes of
Mozart’s Sonata for Two Piano’s in D Major (K.448) subsequently scored
significantly higher on a spatial-temporal task than after listening to ten minutes
of progressive relaxation instructions or after ten minutes of silence (although
this effect has not always been replicated for other cognitive tasks, cf. ref. 15).
Indeed, evidence has also been provided that music training may improve
preschool children’s spatial-temporal reasoning [14].
The putative effects of music training on cognitive performance may not
be limited to spatial-temporal tasks, however. Chan et al. [1] recently reported
higher verbal but not visual memory performance in subjects with at least six
years of music training before the age of twelve compared to a control group
without music training. These authors argued that the improved verbal memory
in musically trained subjects may be due to a larger planum temporale in the left
hemisphere relative to the right hemisphere in musicians, as has been shown in
previous MRI-studies [17]. However, there is no evidence of involvement of the
planum temporale in memory processing  [18] and in a recent review on structure
and function of the planum temporale [18] it is concluded that “the functional
significance of asymmetrical planum temporale remains obscure” (p.41).
A more straightforward approach would be to predict which cognitive
processes may be enhanced in musically trained individuals compared to non-
trained individuals by taking into account the neural structures activated in music
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processing. Two studies using positron emission tomography (PET) have been
reported [19, 5], in which basically the same auditory cortical areas (in the
temporal lobes, bilateral) were activated during  musical imagery and musical
perception, and it has been proposed that these areas are involved in auditory
imagery in general [19]. A related finding was recently reported in an fMRI-study
of vivid auditory imagery associated with auditory hallucinations in patients with
schizophrenia, which activated sensory auditory cortex [20]. In the present study
we compared performance of subjects with and without music training on tasks
of musical auditory imagery, non-musical auditory imagery and visual imagery. If
music training leads to more proficient processing of mental images in auditory
cortical areas, better performance of musically trained subjects on musical
imagery may well extend to non-musical auditory imagery. This is not a trivial
prediction, as there is evidence that music (the domain in which the training
occurs) concerns a very specific type of auditory information processing and
representation, that may dissociate with other types of auditory information [11].
According to our hypothesis, musically trained subjects will not perform better on
a visual object imagery task compared to subjects without musical training, as
visual imagery activates different cortical areas [6].
Method
Subjects
   Thirty-five college students from Utrecht University participated in the study.
Subjects were assigned to either a “musically-trained” group (fifteen subjects) or
a “non-trained” group (twenty subjects). Subjects in the musical group had to 1)
actively play a musical instrument at the moment of testing, and 2) have received
at least two years of formal music training. The two groups differed significantly
(P < 0.01) in number of years of music training (musicians 5.4;  non-musicians
1.5). The two groups did not differ in terms of age (musicians 22.5 yrs; non-
musicians group 21.1 yrs; t = 1.25) or number of years of education (musicians
16.3; non-musicians 16.0; t = 0.49). The male/female ratio was 6/9 in the trained
group and 5/15 in the non-trained group.
Measures
Musical auditory imagery task. Musical imagery was assessed with a pitch comparison
task (based on the task described by Halpern [4]) that consisted of a perception
and an imagery condition and required subjects to compare the pitches of notes
corresponding to song lyrics. Subjects viewed the lyrics from the first phrase of a
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familiar Dutch song on a screen and were asked to decide whether, of two
highlighted lyrics which appeared in uppercase letters, the pitch of the second
lyric was higher or lower than that of the first lyric. An English-language example
of a song-line would be “OH say can you SEE”, taken from the American
national anthem. Lyric refers here to a monosyllabic word, or one syllable of a
two-syllabic word. Subjects responded by means of a key-press and were asked to
respond as fast as possible. In the perceptual condition, subjects were actually
presented with the song, which was played on a tape-recorder, and thus viewed
the lyrics and heard the song at the same time. The imagery condition was
identical, with the exception that the song was not presented, and subjects had to
rely on their musical imagery in order to be able to perform the task correctly.
The task consisted of 31 trials, divided over five well-known Dutch songs.
Number of correct responses and reaction times were recorded.
Non-musical auditory imagery task. This task was modeled on the visual imagery
object comparison task developed by Mehta et al. [9], described below. The task
concerned a quantitative comparison between imagery and perception of acoustic
characteristics of common sounds. A triad of common sounds was presented,
and subjects had to indicate the most deviant item in terms of acoustic
characteristics. In the perceptual condition, the sounds were actually presented
(with use of a personal computer), whereas in the imagery condition the names
of the sounds were read from cards, which required subjects to form mental
images in order to be able to make a correct judgement. An example of a sound
triad that was presented is “crying baby”, “laughing baby” and “meowing cat”,
where “laughing baby” was regarded the deviant item. The task consisted of 23
triads.
Visual imagery task. This task was adapted from Mehta et al. [9] Subjects had to
indicate the odd-one-out in terms of visual form characteristics of  a triad of
common objects. The task consisted of 24 object names printed on cards and 24
triads of line drawings of common objects [18]. From the triads of line drawings,
the item that was most deviant in terms of visual form characteristics had to be
indicated. In the perceptual condition the line drawings were actually presented,
whereas in the imagery condition the object names were read from cards. For
example, in the perceptual condition pictures of a “pumpkin”, “lettuce” and
“tomato” were presented, whereas in the imagery condition only the names of
these three objects were presented to the subject. Thus, the imagery condition
requires the subjects to form mental images in order to be able to make a correct
judgement of the odd-one-out (in the example given, “lettuce”).
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Results
We conducted a 2 (Group: musicians, non-musicians) × 2 (Condition:
perceptual, imagery) × 3 (Measure: musical, non-musical, visual) multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA). Number of correct responses was the
dependent variable included in the analysis for the three imagery measures. A z-
tranformation was applied to the scores before analysis, as the scales of the
different measures are not comparable. Only the between-subjects factor Group
was significant, F(1, 33) = 6.6, P < 0.02. Table 1 shows the means and SDs of
both groups on the different measures.
Table 1. Means (and SDs) of subjects in the musically trained group and in the non-trained group
on measures of auditory and visual imagery and perception
Task Condition Trained group
(N=15)
Non-trained
group (N=20)
musical pitch comparison perception 29.0 (1.7) 27.8 (2.9)
imagery 28.1 (3.4) 24.3 (4.0)
everyday-sound comparison perception 20.6 (1.3) 19.8 (1.9)
imagery 17.6 (1.6) 15.8 (2.8)
visual form comparison perception 21.2 (1.3) 20.7 (1.8)
imagery 19.5 (2.0) 19.1 (2.4)
In a subsequent MANOVA on only the imagery measures, again only a
significant effect of Group was obtained, F(3, 31) = 3.6, P < 0.03. Follow-up
univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) revealed a significant difference
between the musically trained and the non-trained group on the musical imagery
task, F(1, 33) = 8.6, P < 0.01. Musically trained subjects had more correct
responses for this task. The groups did not differ in reaction time, F(1, 33) =
0.04, P > 0.10. The difference between both groups was also significant for the
non-musical auditory imagery task, F(1, 33) = 4.9, P < 0.05. Again, musically
trained subjects performed better. There was no difference between the groups
for performance on the visual imagery task, F(1,33) = 0.3, P > 0.10. In Figure 1
mean percentage correct responses of both groups are presented graphically for
the three imagery tasks.
The MANOVA with perceptual conditions of the three tasks as
dependent variables did not reveal significant differences between the musically
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trained and the non-trained group, although a trend seemed to emerge, F(3, 31)
= 3.6, P < 0.07.
Figure 1  Mean percentage correct responses given by subjects with and without music training on
the musical auditory imagery task, the non-musical auditory imagery task and the visual imagery
task.
Follow-up ANOVA’s, in order to examine the direction of this trend, failed to
reach significance (all P ’s> 0.10). We also performed within-group analyses to
examine whether subjects within a group differed on the three tasks. No
significant differences were found (all P ’s> 0.20), indicating that the three
measures did not differ importantly in difficulty level.
Discussion
In this study the hypothesis  was tested whether musically trained subjects would
perform better than non-trained subjects on a musical imagery task and whether
this better performance would extend to a non-musical auditory imagery task.
The results suggest that music training may improve both musical and non-
musical auditory imagery but not visual imagery, consistent with the evidence of
temporal association cortical involvement in auditory imagery [11].
The musically trained group did not differ from the non-trained group
on the perceptual condition of the musical imagery task. The fact that people
with little musical training performed as well as trained subjects on this task may
be due to the use of relatively easy stimuli: familiar songs with well-known
melodies. This could likewise explain why the non-trained group also performed
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fairly well on the imagery task. Indeed, as most of us will confirm from personal
experience, the experience of having “tunes running through ones head” is not
confined to musicians only. Notwithstanding, the musically trained group
performed significantly better than the non-trained group on the imagery
condition of the musical imagery task, suggesting more efficient processing of
musical image representations in people with musical training.
Alternatively, one could argue that this is not a result of  better
processing of auditory image representations, but rather of an enhanced ability to
organize and manipulate musical information in working memory. For example,
analogous to expertise in chess, extensive music training may lead to the use of
effective strategies involving abstract schemata, in this case regarding  pitch
relationships within melodic sound-sequences. However, the fact that trained
subjects did not perform better than the non-trained subjects on the perception
condition of the musical task is at odds with this possibility. More importantly,
such an explanation would not predict better performance of musical trained
subjects on non-musical auditory imagery tasks with everyday sounds (e.g., “a
train passing”) as stimuli. However, this was exactly what we found in the present
study: musically trained subjects also performed better on a non-musical auditory
imagery task than non-trained subjects.
An alternative explanation for the observed relation between music
training and auditory imagery ability could be that it may be due to other
variables, such as attention and memory, on which the two groups may differ and
that may influence imagery performance. However, the subjects were drawn
from a group (college students of identical age) that is relatively homogeneous in
terms of cognitive abilities. In addition, the fact that the two groups did not
perform differently on the visual imagery task, which has similar cognitive
processing demands as the auditory tasks, suggests that the groups did not differ
importantly on such variables. Another possibility would be that the musically
trained subjects might be more interested in auditory tasks, thus causing more
attention to this condition. However, if musicians are more interested in auditory
tasks than in visual tasks, one would expect higher performance on the auditory
tasks than on the visual tasks, which was not the case.
The possibility could also be considered that music training leads to a
general improvement of imagery ability, regardless of the modality involved.
Contrary to this hypothesis, the musically trained group did not perform better
on a visual imagery task that was comparable to the non-musical auditory
imagery task in terms of task-related characteristics. This finding is consistent
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with theoretical proposals regarding the neural basis of auditory imagery as
involving auditory cortical areas in the temporal lobe [11] and visual imagery as
involving occipital cortical areas [6]. Music training, which involves musical
mental imagery, may thus lead to more proficient processing of imagery
representations in auditory cortical areas, which may eventually result in a general
enhancement of auditory imagery ability. It is important to note that the lack of a
difference between musicians and non-musicians on the visual imagery task is not
in contradiction with the findings by Rauscher et al. [12]. As Rauscher and Shaw
[15] have explicitly pointed out, the Mozart effect is only observed on tasks
which strongly require spatial-temporal processing (e.g., paperfolding tasks).
Thus, measures that mainly require visual object recognition or imagery (i.e.
without the temporal component of image transformation) may not show
improvement after listening to music.
Rauscher et al. [13] proposed a neurophysiological basis for the
enhancement of spatial-temporal task performance after listening to a Mozart
piano sonata. Their model is based on Mountcastle’s [10] organizational principle
in which the cortical column is the basic neural network of the cortex. These
networks have a large repertoire of inherent, periodic spatial-temporal firing
patterns which can be excited in specific symmetries. The computation by
symmetry operations among the inherent brain patterns is considered a key
property of higher brain function and, more specifically, of spatial-temporal
tasks, and may be enhanced and facilitated by music. To complement this
account, we suggest that this effect may be especially pronounced in localized
networks, which may explain why non-musical auditory imagery is enhanced in
musically trained subjects. This is consistent with the study by Sarnthein et al.
[16] who observed enhanced synchrony between the neural activity in right
frontal and left temporoparietal cortical areas in an EEG coherence study of the
Mozart effect. Indeed, recent studies have shown that training in a specific
domain alters structure and function of localized brain areas [8]. Without doubt,
more research is needed on the relation between music training and mental
imagery and the neural correlates involved before strong conclusions can be
reached. For example, it would be interesting to compare musicians and non-
musicians in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) design on patterns
of brain activation during various imagery tasks.
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Chapter 10
Neuroanatomy of visuospatial
imagery: evidence from fMRI and
rTMS
Summary
A major debate in functional brain imaging research concerns the functional
organisation, in the human brain, of internally reproduced images. By using two
complementary techniques, functional MRI and repetitive Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation, we determined the nature of the involvement of visual and parietal
cortex, two areas that have been hypothesized to be necessary in the mediation of
visuospatial mental imagery. The results clearly indicate that the posterior parietal
cortex is essential for visuospatial mental imagery, not the visual cortex.
Aleman, A., Ramsey, N., Van Honk, J.E., Kessels, R.P.C., Hoogduin, J., Schutter, D.L.G., Postma,
A., Kahn, R.S., De Haan, E.H.F. (submitted). Parietal cortex mediates visuospatial imagery:
evidence from fMRI and rTMS.
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Introduction
Which brain areas are involved in visual mental imagery, or “seeing with the
mind’s eye”? The results of numerous neuroimaging studies conducted over the
past decade are inconclusive.1 Some studies reported activation of Area 17
(primary visual cortex), whereas other studies only observed activation of parietal
cortex. Kosslyn et al.2 hypothesised that Area 17 may subserve depictive rather
than spatial imagery (which may primarily involve parietal cortex), and provided
evidence of Area 17 involvement in depictive imagery. Using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
(rTMS), we demonstrate that spatial mental imagery relies on activation of the
posterior parietal cortex.
Method and Results
Two experiments were conducted: one with fMRI and one with rTMS. fMRI
reveals the cortical structures activated during a cognitive task, but cannot
establish whether this activation is essential to task performance. By transiently
disrupting neural activity in cortical areas, rTMS can provide evidence of a causal
relation. Five healthy subjects performed a behaviorally controlled visuospatial
mental imagery task3 during fMRI brain scanning. Subjects had to indicate
whether a crossmark, presented in a 4 by 5 grid on a computer screen, would fall
on an imaginary letter or not. A lowercase letter was presented before the grid,
and subjects were asked to image the corresponding uppercase letter into the
grid. The control task used the same stimuli, but did not invoke imagery: subjects
had  to indicate whether the crossmark appeared  in the lower or in the upper
half of the grid. Regions of interest were bilateral primary visual cortex and right
superior parietal lobule. Right-hemisphere parietal lobe was taken as region of
interest, as most studies imply the right parietal cortex to be involved in spatial
processing.4 fMRI activation was measured in a single-session experiment on a
1.5 Tesla Philips ACS-NT scanner with the BOLD-sensitive 3D PRESTO fMRI
pulse sequence (functional scan TE/TR 36.8/23.8 ms; flip angle 9º; FOV
256x208x88; matrix 64x52x22; slice thickness 4 mm; scan time 2 s). Difference
images (active – control condition) were analysed for regions of interest using
multiple regression analysis with detrending factors,6 resulting in a t-value for
each voxel. Significance threshold was set at t=3.5 (corresponding to a=0.05,
after Bonferroni correction). Subtraction analysis of the individual fMRI datasets
revealed that right parietal cortex was active during spatial imagery in all subjects
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(Fig. 1). In contrast, there was no evidence of primary visual cortex activation in
any of the subjects. One could argue that fMRI was not sensitive enough for
visual cortex activity, but the detection of parietal activity at the same significance
threshold does not support this.
Figure 1. Number of significantly activated voxels revealed by fMRI for right Brodmann
area 7 (superior parietal lobule); and Brodmann area 17 (occipital cortex), and difference
reaction times between the real rTMS and sham rTMS conditions for the Oz (Area 17)
and P4 (Area 7) positions.
In the second experiment, eight healthy subjects were stimulated continuously
with 2Hz-TMS for 20 min., after which they performed the imagery task. rTMS
was carried out with a Neopulse stimulator (Neotonus Inc., iron-core coil) at a
frequency of 2 Hz and intensity of  90% of each subject’s motor threshold. Real
rTMS and sham rTMS (which controlls for the characteristic sound and
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sensation on the scalp of real rTMS) were applied to the Oz scalp position
(corresponding to Area 17) and to the P4 position (Area 7, right hemisphere).
Subjects were tested in four sessions, each session on a different day: 1) real
rTMS at the Oz position, 2) sham rTMS at the Oz position, 3) real rTMS at the
P4 position, and 4) sham rTMS at the P4 position. The order of the conditions
was counterbalanced over participants, to control for practice effects. Real rTMS
conditions were compared with the sham condition of the other location to
avoid type 2 errors due to the possibility of slight effects of sham rTMS on
information processing in the targeted brain area.7 The results revealed a
significant effect (increase in reaction time, RT) of rTMS at P4, compared to
sham rTMS (ÄRT = 181 ms, P = 0.003), and compared to real rTMS at Oz (ÄRT
= 208 ms, P = 0.006). There was no effect of real rTMS at Oz compared to
sham. None of the conditions affected the number of correct responses. The
overall mean reaction time on the imagery task was 870 ms (standard deviation:
240).
Discussion
We describe two experiments in which the functional organization of visuospatial
mental imagery is investigated: one with fMRI and one with rTMS. Results from
both neuroimaging methods converged, and provide strong evidence for parietal
mediation of spatial mental imagery. Thus, our finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that depictive visual mental imagery may involve activation of visual
areas in the occipital lobe2, whereas visual imagery that requires a spatial decision
would  depend on parietal structures. The fMRI experiment confirms the only
fMRI study reported to date with a behaviorally controlled visuospatial imagery
task, in which evidence was presented of posterior parietal cortex but not
occipital activation.5 Extending beyond this, our rTMS results now demonstrate a
causal link between such parietal activation and spatial imagery.
Neuroanatomy of visual imagery
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Chapter 11
Effects of rTMS on hallucinations
and neurocognition in
schizophrenia
Summary
We investigated the effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of left
auditory cortex on hallucination severity and neurocognition in medication-
resistant hallucinating patients. Nine hallucinating patients with schizophrenia
were stimulated 20 minutes daily at the left auditory cortex with TMS at 1Hz for
ten treatment days. At baseline, after 5 days and after 10 days a standardized
hallucination rating scale was completed. In addition, at baseline and after the
treatment a wide range of verbal and nonverbal neuropsychological measures was
administered. A statistically significant improvement was observed on the
hallucination scale and on a measure of auditory imagery. No difference between
pre- and post-treatment testing was observed on the other neuropsychological
variables. We conclude that TMS may have the potential to improve hallucination
severity, without having adverse effects on cognitive functioning.
D’Alfonso, A.A.L., Aleman, A., Kessels, R.P.C., Schouten, E.A., Postma, A., Van der Linden, J.A.,
Cahn, W., Greene, Y., De Haan, E.H.F., Kahn, R.S. (in revision). TMS of left auditory cortex in
schizophrenia: effects on hallucinations and neurocognition.
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Hoffman et al.1, 2 recently reported beneficial effects of low-frequency TMS of
left temporo-parietal cortex in medication-resistant hallucinating patients. In the
first study, patients were stimulated during four days with TMS (the mean
duration of stimulation was 10 minutes daily). All three patients demonstrated
considerable improvement in hallucination severity as rated on a visual analogue
scale after the 4-day period. In the second study2, 12 medication-resistant
hallucinating patients with schizophrenia were treated with TMS, and again active
stimulation reduced ratings of hallucination severity relative to sham stimulation.
Four patients could be classified as nonresponders, because they did not improve
or the improvement was negligible.
The rationale of Hoffman et al. 1 ,  2 to stimulate left temporo-parietal
regions in their TMS studies originated from the hypothesis that brain regions
underlying speech perception contribute to auditory hallucinations. However,
although there is some evidence for the involvement of left temporo-parietal
cortex in hallucinations3, most brain imaging studies of hallucinating patients
indicate the auditory cortex (middle and superior temporal gyri) to be mainly
involved in the experience of auditory hallucinations3-5. Therefore, in this study
we investigated whether TMS at the auditory cortex would improve severity of
hallucinations. In addition, we stimulated for a longer period, i.e. two weeks, and
included a standardized hallucination rating scale. Finally, we evaluated the effect
of low-frequency TMS treatment on a wide range of neurocognitive functions.
Method
Nine medication-resistant patients with auditory hallucinations participated in the
study after giving written informed consent. The study was approved by the
medical committee of the UMC. All patients had DSM-IV diagnosis of
schizophrenia (as established with the Comprehensive Assessment of  Symptoms
and History [CASH]). All patients had a stable medication status and used
atypical antipsychotics. None of the patients received concomitant anticonvulsant
drugs or benzodiazepines, which may reduce TMS effects. Further patient
characteristics are given in table 1.
Patients were stimulated daily with TMS for 20 min. during two weeks
consecutively (only workdays, in total 10 days) in an open trial. Stimulation was
carried out with a Neopulse stimulator (Neotonus Inc.) at a frequency of 1 Hz
and an intensity of  80% of the motor threshold. For one patient (patient #1) the
rTMS treatment of hallucinations
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intensity was lower, approximately 50%, because of painful muscle contraction at
higher intensities. The location of stimulation was approximately 2 cm above T3
electrode position (10-20 international system). The definition of this stimulation
position was based on Tailarach Atlas coordinates (coronal plane) in order to
influence predominantly the superior temporal gyrus. At base-line, after one
week, and at the end of the treatment a standardized hallucination scale, the
Topography of Voices Rating Scale6, was completed by each patient. This scale
measures frequency, audibility, clarity and affective response to auditory-verbal
hallucinations, and consists of 5 items which are rated on a 5-point scale by the
patient. The author who carried out the stimulation (AALd’A) was not involved
in collecting the data.
Sensitive neuropsychological measures were included that were primarily
aimed at auditory and verbal functions: an auditory imagery test7 in which
subjects were asked to mentally compare acoustic characteristics of every-day
sounds, Rey Auditory-Verbal Learning Test (verbal memory), Token Test, short
form (verbal comprehension), and tests of verbal fluency and phoneme
detection. The following nonverbal measures were also included: Judgment of
Line Orientation, Line Bisection Test, Benton Visual Retention Test and the Test
for Facial Recognition, short form (for description of all neuropsychological tests
see ref. 8).
Nonparametric statistical analysis (Friedman’s test) was performed in the
analysis of hallucination ratings, as the measurement scale was ordinal.
Results
One patient was excluded from the analysis because of discontinuing medication,
after which symptoms aggravated. Symptom ratings of the remaining 8 patients
are listed in table 1. A significant effect of TMS treatment was observed on the
Topography of Voices Rating Scale between baseline and at the end of the
treatment, ÷2=4.5, df=1, p=0.034 (Means and SDs: 13.4 ±2.8 at baseline and
14.6±1.8 at end of treatment). We also computed the corresponding effect size,
which was r=0.65. The difference between baseline and week 1 showed the same
trend, but failed to reach significance, ÷2=3.6, df=1, p=0.070. Of the
neurocognitive measures, only the auditory imagery test revealed a significant
performance difference, t=-2.6, df=5, p=0.046 (for this test baseline data were
not available for two patients). Performance was significantly better at post-
treatment (M=17.7 correct out of 21) than at baseline (M=15.3).
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Table 1. Patient characteristics and ratings of hallucination severity on the Topography of Voices
Rating Scale at baseline, after 1 week and after 2 weeks of daily TMS treatment
Patient Age Sex Medication Handed-
ness
Duration
of illnessa
PANSSb Topography of
Voices Rating Scalec
Baseline 1
week
2
weeks
1 43 F 425 mg
clozapine
Right 18 103 13 15 17
2 29 M 300 mg
clozapine
Left 5 83 12 13 13
3 19 M 400 mg
clozapine
Right 3 70 12 12 17
4 32 M 400 mg
clozapine
Right 7 109 14 20 16
5 31 M 500 mg
clozapine
Right 13 143 12 14 13
6 33 M 400 mg
clozapine
Right 13 72 11 25 13
7 32 M 350 mg
clozapine
Right 14 143 13 13 15
8 22 M 15 mg
olanzapine
Right 5 75 20 16 13
anumber of years; bPositive and Negative Syndrome Scale, total psychopathology; csum of ratings
on individual items; higher scores indicate less severity of hallucinations, maximum=25,
minimum=5
Discussion
The present study was designed to investigate whether two weeks of daily 1Hz
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of left auditory cortex would influence
hallucination severity and neurocognition in  medication-resistant hallucinating
patients. A statistically significant effect was observed on hallucination severity
ratings as measured with a standardized scale. Thus, our results are in accordance
with the findings of  Hoffman et al.1, 2 who also reported beneficial effects of
TMS on hallucinations in schizophrenia. However, in the present study, all
patients still experienced hallucinations after the treatment. Indeed, considering
that the location of stimulation was based on the weight of the neuroimaging
rTMS treatment of hallucinations
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evidence and that we stimulated for 20 minutes daily during two weeks, we had
expected more promising results.
Examination of the individual data revealed that hallucination severity
improved in seven out of eight patients at week 2; in 5 patients this was an
improvement of 2 points or more on the standardized scale. The fact that a few
patients did not seem to respond substantially to TMS (and one actually
deteriorated), is in accordance with Hoffman et al’s study2 in which 4 out of 12
patients were classified as nonresponders because they did not improve more
than one point on a ten-point visual analog scale. We observed individual
differences in the onset of the improvement, whereas a previous study2 revealed
large individual differences in the duration of the TMS-effect. These data suggest
that there may be a complex interaction between number of treatments, brain
location of treatment, and improvement that differs from patient to patient,
which deserves further exploration.
In the neurocognitive domain, only auditory imagery showed
improvement after TMS treatment. Speculatively, the concurrent improvement
of hallucination severity and auditory imagery may be seen as in accordance with
theories that have implicated deficient imagery processes in hallucination.
Alternatively, improvement on the imagery task may be attributed to a test-retest
effect, although such effects would then also be expected on the other
neurocognitive tests.
A limitation of this explorative study was the lack of a placebo-control
group. Clearly, larger double-blind placebo-controlled trials are needed before
strong conclusions about TMS treatment of auditory hallucinations can be
reached. To our knowledge, the present study is the first study to use TMS in
patients using clozapine. It would be interesting to investigate possible
interaction between type of medication and effectiveness of TMS. Future
research must also evaluate the effect of TMS of the right hemisphere.
Finally, an important finding of this study was that daily TMS stimulation
during two weeks did not have adverse effects on cognitive functioning. This is
specifically important, as TMS is known to be able to transiently disrupt
processing in brain areas. With regard to clinical safety, our results on cognitive
function thus converge with recent MRI studies which indicate no structural
brain changes in humans after high-dose repetitive TMS.9
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Controversies and Discussions 3
Cognitive processes and
hallucination
Aleman, A. & De Haan, E.H.F. (2000). Non-language cognitive deficits and hallucination in
schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157 , 487.
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Ralph E. Hoffman, M.D., and colleagues (Hoffman et al., 1999) reported
impaired performance of hallucinating schizophrenic patients on a narrative
speech perception task and a sentence repetition task relative to both non-
hallucinating patients and normal subjects. However, the hallucinating and non-
hallucinating groups did not differ on a measure of continuous performance,
indicating that the differences in speech perception were not due to deficits in
sustained attention. Hoffman et al. concluded: “Results support the hypothesis
that hallucinated voices in schizophrenia arise from disrupted speech perception
and verbal working memory systems rather than from non-language cognitive or
attentional deficits” (p. 393). We think that the first part of the conclusion is
adequate (i.e., it is supported by the data), but the latter part of the conclusion
may be premature. Specifically, the two non-language cognitive functions that
have figured most prominently in cognitive theories of hallucination, namely
reality monitoring and imagery vividness, were not assessed by the authors.
Previous studies have revealed differences between hallucinating and non-
hallucinating patients on tasks measuring these functions (e.g., Mintz & Alpert,
1972; Morrison & Haddock, 1997; Böcker et al. 1996). Although, as Hoffman et
al. point out, one PET-study of hallucinations failed to find activation of Broca’s
area, which challenges the reality monitoring account that hallucinations are
misidentified thoughts, all studies of functional brain imaging during auditory
hallucinations (e.g., Silbersweig et al., 1995) have demonstrated activation of
temporal areas, consistent with as well speech perception as imagery accounts
(auditory imagery has been shown to activate temporal auditory association areas
[Zatorre et al., 1996]). In addition, the speech perception tasks used by Hoffman
et al. may involve mental imagery to a significant extent. The process of  “filling
in the blanks” during speech perception in order to reduce acoustically
ambiguous speech is clearly dependent upon imagery. Indeed, Kosslyn and
Sussman (1995) have argued that “immaculate perception” does not exist: in
most circumstances perception and imagery are intimately intertwined. This
underscores the importance of a thorough investigation of differences between
patients with and without hallucinations on multiple tasks aimed at measuring
language-specific (e.g. speech perception) as well as non-language-specific (e.g.
reality monitoring and mental imagery) cognitive functions that may be involved
in the cognitive basis of hallucination. It is too early yet to discard the possible
contribution of disruptions in nonlanguage cognitive functions to the occurence
of hallucinations in schizophrenia.
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Chapter 13
Hallucinations in schizophrenia :
theory and findings
Summary
Hallucinations are a mysterious psychological phenomenon. In this paper,
current theory and research on the neurocognitive basis of hallucination are
reviewed. The phenomenology of hallucinations in schizophrenia is discussed,
followed by an overview of functional brain imaging studies of cortical areas
involved in hallucination. Theories addressing the putative cognitive mechanisms
underlying hallucination are critically reviewed. Hypotheses concerning the role
of inner speech, speech perception, reality monitoring, mental imagery, verbal
self-monitoring and top-down perceptual expectations are discussed in light of
the published evidence. Proposals for integration of various cognitive models are
described and future directions for research are outlined.
Revision and translation of Aleman, A. (2000). Hallucinaties bij schizofrenie: hoe het brein zichzelf
misleidt. De Psycholoog, 35, 154-159.
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Hallucinations are an intriguing psychological phenomenon. The brain perceives
something: a sound, a voice, an image. However, there is no corresponding
source in the world outside.
Where do hallucinations come from? In non-western cultures, the answer
usually is: from gods and ghosts (Al-Issa, 1995). This is also the case for ancient
Greece literature, such as the Illias. In our culture, hallucinations are mostly
associated with the use of stimulants, and with medical and psychiatric
conditions. A hallucination can be defined as a perceptual experience in the
absence of sensory stimulation. In order to distinguish this from mental imagery
and dreaming (cf. Slade & Bentall, 1988; Aleman & De Haan, 1998), it is
instructive to add to this definition that hallucinations are not under voluntary
control of the individual (contrary to mental imagery), and occur in a wakeful
state (contrary to dreaming). Hallucinations may occur in a wide range of
circumstances. For example, Brasic (1998) lists more than 40 medical and
psychiatric conditions in which hallucinations may occur. This paper will be
restricted to hallucinations in schizophrenia, on which cognitive research has
concentrated over the past few decades (David, 1999).  After a description of the
phenomenology of hallucinations, neuroimaging studies of patterns of cerebral
activation associated with hallucination will be reviewed, and cognitive theories
of hallucination will be discussed.
Phenomenology
Hallucinations may occur in any sensory modality: auditory, visual,
somatosensory, gustatory and olfactory. In schizophrenia, auditory
hallucinations are by far most frequent, 65% of patients with schizophrenia has
suffered at least once from auditory hallucinations (Slade & Bentall, 1988).
Visual hallucinations are less frequent, some 20% of patients. Less than 5% of
patients reports hallucinations in the other modalities.
Auditory hallucinations may differ considerably in their phenomenology.
They may consist of simple sounds, such as “tapping on the scalp” or ringing of
deathbells. In other cases, music is heard. Predominant, however, are verbal
hallucinations or “hearing voices”. A well-known classification of these are the
hallucinations designated “first-rank” symptoms of schizophrenia by Kurt
Schneider (Schneider, 1962). He distinguished three types of hallucination: 1) the
patient hears ongoing commentary on his behavior, 2) the patient hears voices
talking about him in the third person, and 3) the patient hears his own thoughts
spoken aloud.
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There is significant inter-individual variability between patients in formal
characteristics of hallucinations (Junginger & Frame, 1985). This concerns the
frequency (which varies from almost never to continuously), location (inside or
outside the head), clearness (wich varies from unclear and not understandable to
very clear) and loudness (which varies from very soft, almost inaudible, to very
loud, screaming). Despite this variability, a study conducted with 54 hallucinating
patients (Junginger & Frame, 1985) revealed that a majority of patients can
understand the voices clearly, with a volume comparable to normal
conversation. With regard to the location, a small majority reported that this was
“outside the head”. Nayani & David (1996) replicated these results in a study
with 100 patients.
In a large number of cases, the “voices” heard by patients with
schizophrenia are experienced as hostile. For example, the voices may
continuously criticize the patient’s behavior, or command the patient to behave
against his will. Nayani & David (1996) observed that the most frequent
expressions in auditory-verbal hallucinations concerned abusive language. Such
hallucinations are a stressful experience which may severly impair the patient’s
ability to function normally in daily life.
Visual hallucinations may also tend to be of bizar content. An example is the
case described by Silbersweig et al. (1995). This patient saw moving, colorful
scenes, with rolling heads without body, adnd heard these heads speak to him,
giving him instructions.
Are hallucinations pathologic?
In the absence of a direct cause, such as use of stimulants, or a medical
condition such as a brain-tumor, hallucinations are usually taken to imply some
form of mental illness. However, a number of studies has demonstrated that a
substantial part of individuals from the normal population (varying from 5-25%)
reports hallucinatory experiences (Aleman et al. 2001; Morrison et al. 1999;
Young et al. 1986; Barrett & Etheridge, 1992). For example, a British study
among 203 college students reported that 13% of the respondents answered
“certainly applies to me” to the item “In the past I have had the experience of
hearing a person’s voice and then found that no one was there” (Young et al.
1986). Such hallucinatory events have not only been reported by college students
but have been corroborated by large epidemiological studies (Tien, 1991). On
the basis of these studies, it can be concluded that  hallucinatory experiences
form a continuum with normal psychological processes (cf. Slade & Bentall,
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1988). An important distinction with hallucinations in schizophrenia is that, in
individuals from the normal population, hallucinatory events rarely are
experienced as unpleasant, emotional threathening or  hostile (Barrett & Caylor,
1998). In much cases a person only hears his or her name, while no one is
around.
Brain activity during hallucinations
Which brain areas are involved in experiencing a hallucination? Researchers have
tried to answer this question with the use of modern functional neuroimaging
techniques, such as PET and fMRI (for a recent review, see Weiss & Heckers,
1999). In the first study (McGuire et al. 1993), 13 patients were scanned with
PET in an episode of their illness in which they experienced hallucinations. They
were scanned again on a second occassion, when the hallucinations were absent.
Compared to the second measurement, hallucination-related activity was
observed in language-related areas, especially Broca’s area (involved in speech
production). Although to a lesser extent, activity was also found in the anterior
cingulate (involved in attentional processes), and in the left temporal cortex (a.o.
auditory perception and  memory processes). In a comparable design, Suzucki et
al. (1993) observed an increase in regional bloodflow in the left temporal lobe
(auditory association cortex) in five hallucinating patients. Silbersweig et al.
(1995) reported activation of subcortical structures, the parahippocampal gyrus
and the middle temporal gyrus in five patients during auditory hallucinations.
One of their patients also hallucinated in the visual modality. For these
hallucinations, activation was observed in visual areas (lingual, fusiform and
occipital gyri).
Lennox et al. (1999) imaged a hallucinating patient with fMRI. This patient
hallucinated with consequent intervals: approximately for 26 seconds he heard a
“voice”, followed by a comparable period in which hallucinations were absent.
The patient indicated with a key press when he heard the “voice”. This was an
ideal condition for a controlled fMRI study, in which a within-subject
comparison could be made between hallucinatory periods and hallucination-free
periods. The results revealed strong activity in the right middle temporal gyrus.
In the same way, using the “button-pressing method”, Dierks et al. (1999)
managed to scan three patients with fMRI. They observed activity in Broca’s
area, in the temporal gyri, and in the primary auditory cortex (Heschls gyrus).
Studies by David et al. (1996) and Woodruff et al. (1997) also indicate that
primary sensory areas may be involved in the experience of hallucination. These
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investigators found that the primary auditory cortex is less responsive to
auditory stimuli during hallucinations compared to absence of hallucinations.
This is an indication that the primary auditory cortex is actively involved in
hallucinations, and therefore no “resources” are left for additional processing of
auditory stimuli. For visual hallucinations, an identical finding has been reported
(Howard et al., 1995). In the most recent study, Shergill et al. (2000) used a novel
fMRI method to measure brain activity during hallucinations in 6 patients. In
this “random sampling” method, a large number of individual scans is acquired
at unpredictable intervals in each subject while they are intermittently
hallucinating. Immediately after each scan, subjects report whether they had
been hallucinating at that instant. Neural activity is then compared for the scans
when patients were and were not experiencing hallucinations. The results
revealed a distributed network of cortical and subcortical activity associated with
auditory hallucinations: inferior frontal/insular, temporal cortex bilaterally, right
thalamus and inferior colliculus, and left hippocampus and parahippocampal
cortex.
To summarize, neuroimaging studies reveal a distributed network of cortical
and subcortical areas involved in the experience of hallucinations. Although the
exact role of these areas is not clear yet, it could be hypothesized that
hallucinations are triggered by activity in subcortical and frontal areas, which in
turn project to modality-specific association cortex, thereby leading to a
conscious perceptual experience. With respect to auditory hallucinations, some
studies observe activity in language-production areas during auditory
hallucinations, some studies observe activity in the primary auditory cortex, but
all studies report activity in the temporal lobe, more specifically in the middle or
superior gyri. For visual hallucinations, activity is observed in secondary visual
cortex.
Cognitive theories
Four approaches can be distinguished in recent cognitive theories regarding the
mechanism of hallucination. These approaches focus respectively on 1) “inner
speech”, 2) speech perception, 3) reality discrimination, and 4) mental imagery.
In contrast to the latter, the first two approaches are confined to auditory-verbal
hallucinations.
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Inner speech
Most individuals report the experience of “inner speech” (either occasionally or
continuously) when they think. Some hallucinating patients indicate that they
cannot distinguish well between their inner speech and the “voices” they hear.
In addition, subvocal muscle activity has been reported, associated with
hallucinations (Green & Kinsbourne, 1990). The “inner-speech” hypothesis of
hallucinations holds that some distortion in the production of inner speech leads
to the erroneous interpretation that the “inner speech” is of non-self origin. A
cognitive neuropsychological study by David & Lucas (1993) was not able to
confirm the inner speech hypothesis. On the basis of Baddeley’s working
memory model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986) these authors argued
that inner speech is mediated by phonological processes in short-term memory
(the “phonological loop” in Baddeley’s terms). If hallucinations and inner speech
both call on resources in the phonological loop, a dual task will disrupt either
process, given the limited nature of processing resources in working memory.
David & Lucas (1993) went on to demonstrate that phonological processing
during auditory-verbal hallucinations was not affected in a continuously
hallucinating patient. The authors suggest that their finding implies that inner
speech and auditory-verbal hallucinations are different processes. Moreover, in
contrast to what the inner speech hypothesis would predict,  Haddock et al.
(1996) did not find specific impariments in phonological processing which could
underly distortions in  inner speech in hallucinating patients as compared to
non-hallucinating patients.
McGuire et al. (1993) and Dierks et al. (1999) reported activity of
Broca’s area during hallucinations, which may be consistent with the inner
speech theory. However, other  PET and fMRI studies failed to find Broca area
involvement (Silbersweig et al., 1995; Lennox et al., 1999).
Speech perception
According to Hoffman (Hoffman et al., 1999) a dysfunction of the speech
perception system underlies auditory-verbal hallucinations. In the analysis of
every-day sound characteristics, there is an important degree of acoustic
ambiguity, due to background noise, and due to the “pasting” of phonemes (also
called “blurring”). Syntactical and semantical expectations, based on earlier learnt
words, therefore play a crucial role in speech perception. Hoffman’s hypothesis
is that hallucinations arise from an impairment in verbal working-memory,
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which leads to pronounced linguistic expectations that could generate
spontaneous perceptual “outputs”.
Evidence for this hypothesis comes from a study in which hallucinating
and non-hallucinating patients were compared on a speech perception task in
which the presented speech was so distorted that it was difficult to recognize
(Hoffman et al., 1999). As predicted, hallucinating patients performed
significantly worse than their non-hallucinating comparison patients. On a
measure of verbal working-memory (sentence repetition), the hallucinating
group also performed worse, but not on a measure of sustained attention,
indicating that the performance differences could hardly be ascribed to
attentional deficits.
However, on the basis of his theory Hoffman (1986) predicted that
hallucinating patients would have more difficulties in the production and
processing of speech than non-hallucinating patients, but subsequent research
has failed to confirm this prediction (Slade & Bentall, 1988). Nevertheless, PET
and fMRI studies of brain activity during hallucinations are consistent with the
speech-perception hypothesis: all studies report acitivation in temporal auditory-
linguistic association areas.
Reality monitoring
“Source monitoring” refers to the ability to distinguish between different
sources of information, e.g., whether something was read in a newspaper, or
whether it was told by a friend (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Reality
discrimination and reality monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981) are considered to
belong to this category of processes. Reality discrimination refers to distinguishing
between internally generated information and externally presented information
(e.g., imagination and perception), whereas reality monitoring refers to memories of
whether information was or internal or external origin (e.g., did I imagine it, or
did it really occur?). Thus, reality discrimination refers to the “online”
distinguishing of external versus internal sources, whereas reality monitoring
refers to information that was presented or generated in the past. Reality
discrimination measured with a signal detection task was reported by Bentall &
Slade (1985), who found that hallucinating patients made significantly more
errors than non-hallucinating patients (specifically, the hallucinating patients
erroneously indicated that a word had been presented in a burst of white noise).
An example of a reality monitoring task is a memory task in which the subject is
asked to remember words that have either been said by the experimenter or have
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been generated by the subject himself (after indications by the experimenter).
Subsequently, the subject is asked to indicate, from a list of words, whether a
word was a) previously read by the experimenter, b) generated by the subject
himself, or c) whether the word is new. According to the reality monitoring
hypothesis (Bentall, 1990), hallucinating patients will more frequently
erroneously assign self-generated words to an external source (by indicating that
the word was presented by the experimenter). A number of behavioral studies
has provided evidence for such a relation between reality monitoring errors and
the occurence of hallucinations (Bentall, Baker & Havers, 1991; Morisson &
Haddock, 1997; Brébion et al., 2000). However, the question remains as to how
specific disorders in reality monitoring are to hallucinations. Keefe et al. (1999),
for example report that patients without hallucinations (but with other positive
symptoms) made the same errors as hallucinating patients.
According to Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay (1993), areas in the
frontal lobe are crucially involved in reality monitoring. Only a few
neuroimaging studies have revealed frontal activity associated with
hallucinations, however (McGuire et al., 1993; en Dierks et al. 1999).
Mental imagery
In the 19th century, Fancis Galton wrote that mental imagery exists as a
continuum in the population, ranging from a total absence of mental images
(subjectively) to imagery of great intensity and vividness, ending in pure
hallucination (Galton, 1883). A number of studies investigated the imagery
hypothesis  (e.g., Roman & Landis, 1945; Mintz & Alpert, 1972; Starker & Jolin,
1982), but with inconsistent results. The fact that none of the studies included
adequate behavioral measures may account for this inconsistency. Indeed, Slade
& Bentall (1988) have drawn attention to the fact that explaining hallucinatory
experiences with a phenomenologically highly similar event – subjectively rated
imagery vividness – borders to circularity.
However, it is not easy to think of a method to measure vividness of
mental imagery behaviorally. A possible approach could be the one first
described by Aleman et al. (1999; cf. Aleman et al., 2000), in which performance
is compared on a perception and on an imagery condition of the same
behavioral task. According to Johnson and Raye (1981) percepts, which originate
from externally presented stimuli, are characterized by more detailed sensory,
contextual and semantic information than internally generated images. Evidence
that mental images are less rich in perceptual details than ‘real’ percepts and that,
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as a consequence, images are more difficult to perform mental operations upon,
was recently presented by Kosslyn et al. (1999). The hypothesis that imagery and
perception are more alike (and therefore harder to discern from each other) due
to increased sensory characteristics of mental images in individuals that
experience hallucinations thus predicts that these subjects will show smaller
performance differences between a perception and an imagery condition of the
same task.
Using this method, Böcker et al. (2000) compared hallucinating and
non-hallucinating patients on two measures of auditory and two of visual
imagery and perception. No differences were found between both groups when
performance on the imagery measures relative to perception performance was
compared. However, after performing within-group comparisons, the authors
observed more vivid auditory than visual imagery in patients that hallucinated in
the auditory modality. Evans et al. (2000) also reported a lack of differences
between hallucinating and non-hallucinating patients with schizophrenia on a
number of auditory imagery measures. However, these authors did not include
perception conditions, nor measures in another non-hallucination modality.
It is interesting to note that it has also been argued that hallucinating
patients may suffer from an imagery deficit, rather than a general increase in
vividness. For example, Horowitz (1975) hypothesized that hallucinating
patients have less vivid mental images, which leads them to attribute occasional
vivid images to an external source. However, in both instances of imagery
theory, a vivid mental image ultimately gives rise to the hallucinatory experience.
Neuroimaging studies are consistent with activation that would be
predicted by the imagery hypothesis: both auditory hallucinations and auditory
imagery appear to activate auditory association areas (Dierks et al., 1999; Zatorre
et al., 1996). The same holds for visual hallucinations and visual imagery (ffytche
et al. 1999; Kosslyn et al. 1999).
Integrating the various perspectives
Despite the differences between these four cognitive approaches, there is also
some conceptual overlap, which makes the possibility of integration especially
attractive. Indeed, it could be argued that two earlier theories, namely the
proposals of Frith (1992) and of Grossberg (1999) incorporate elements of more
than one approach.
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Frith’s theory (Frith & Done, 1988; Frith, 1992) can be seen as an
integration of the “inner speech” hypothesis and the reality monitoring
hypothesis. According to Frith, hallucinations arise from failures in the
monitoring of own intentions during inner speech (sometimes called ‘self-
monitoring’ by Frith). As a consequence, the cognitive system does not
recognize that inner speech originates from the self, and thus erroneously
attributes it to a non-self source. Thus, this approach does not consider the
production of inner speech to be impaired, but rather states that auditory
hallucinations are derived from defective monitoring of inner speech. Evidence for
this hypothesis was recently presented by Johns & McGuire (1999).
Hallucinating patients, non-hallucinating patients and normal control subjects
were asked to speak presented words out aloud in a microphone. Ocassionally,
the spoken word was distorted by the experimenter (by modulating the pitch).
Participants heard the words in their headphones and were asked to indicate if
the source of the heard word: “myself”, “somebody else”, or “unsure”. The
hallucinating group made significantly more errors by attributing own (distorted)
speech to someone else. Indeed, this study was inspired by the “speech-
monitoring” approach, but is clearly also consistent with the speech perception
hypothesis of Hoffman (1999). A problem for the verbal self-monitoring theory
concern the results reported by Leudar, Thomas & Johnston (1994). These
authors investigated whether schizophrenic patients have deficient internal error
detection in speech repairs (especially when these occur rapidly, before external
acoustic feedback can have come into play). Although patients with
schizophrenia showed less internal error detection than controls, consistent with
a failure of verbal self-monitoring, there was no difference between patients with
and without hallucinations.
In accordance with Frith’s speech-monitoring hypothesis, McGuire et al.
(1995) found reduced temporal activation during verbal self-monitoring tasks in
hallucinating patients. Other neuroimaging studies have implied this region in
self-monitoring in healthy subjects (e.g., McGuire et al., 1996). Shergill et al.
(2000) also argue that their findings are consistent with Frith’s verbal self-
monitoring theory. However, they relate this to the attenuated activation of the
supplementary motor area (SMA) during hallucinations. As the SMA has been
implicated in the deliberate generation of inner speech, and lesions in this region
have been associated with the alien limb syndrome (in which a patient attributes
self-generated movements to someone else), the paucity of SMA activation
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during hallucinations might be related to a lack of awareness that inner speech
has been generated.
A different approach to hallucinations has been described by Grossberg
(2000), based on the finding that top-down perceptual expectations can
importantly affect the detection of stimuli (Coren, Wards & Enns, 1994).
Indeed, such top-down mechanisms play an important role in perception, by
modulating, priming and matching incoming bottom-up information (cf.
Kosslyn, 1994). Thus, for example, an expected stimulus will be detected better
than an unexpected stimulus. The neurophysiological basis of this effect has
been well studied (Grossberg 1999), and includes feedback circuits in which a
balance is reached between top-down excitation and inhibition (e.g. by feedback
into information flow in visual cortex layers via an on-center, off-surround
pathway). However, although such top-down expectations can modulate,
sensitize, or prime the processing of bottom-up information, they cannot by
themselves cause supra-threshold activation of their target cells. Nevertheless, as
Grossberg (2000) recently hypothesized, under normal behavioral conditions, a
volitional signal can be phasically turned on that can alter this balance to favor
top-down excitation, which can create conscious experiences in the absence of
bottom-up information. In this way, conscious mental imagery can arise. In
addition, Grossberg (2000) proposes a mechanism by which hallucinations in
schizophrenia could arise, namely when the phasic volitional signal becomes
chronically hyperactive. As a result, top-down sensory expectations can generate
conscious experiences that are not under the volitional control of the individual
who is experiencing them. The net effect is a hallucination. Further details on
the possible neurophysiological mechanisms can be found in Grossberg (2000).
This theory integrates elements of the imagery hypothesis (which bears on
strong top-down processes) and is reminiscent of Hoffman’s statement that
“pronounced linguistic expectations can generate perceptual outputs”.
Consistent with the perceptual expectations hypothesis are the findings reported
by Haddock , Slade & Bentall (1995). They suggested to subjects that on
listening to a word repeated over and over (e.g., the word “tress”) they would
hear new words. Indeed, the subjects reported hearing more transformations
(e.g., stress, dress), but the subjects with hallucinations in addition reported
hearing other words (e.g., caressed, Christmas).
An approach similar to the one by Grossberg (2000) has been described
by Behrendt (1998), although he is less explicit in proposing a neural
mechanism. Behrendt states that hallucinations could arise from “facilitated
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formation of cortical associations between representations of expectations and
internal symbols” (p. 236). In this way, “mental factors of perception”, rather
than sensory information, take over to predominate the context and form of
perception, which will in fact be a hallucination. Thus the normal balance
between sensory and “mental” factors is distorted. (The “mental factors” of
Behrendt refer to top-down mechanisms, whereas sensory factors refer to
bottom-up mechanisms; for a more detailed description of theory and empirical
evidence regarding top-down influences intrinsic in perception, see Kosslyn &
Sussman [1995]).
Conclusion
Most cognitive theorists agree that hallucinations are misattributions of
internally generated information to an external source. Different hypotheses
have been developed, concerning the role of inner speech, speech perception,
reality monitoring, and mental imagery. Probably, the most accurate summary of
the current state of affairs was recently advanced by David (1999): “Auditory
imagery – that is, a sensory component – is intuitively central to the experience
of hallucinations, and recent fMRI studies support this. Either a distortion of the
image itself (its prosody, pitch or timbre), its apparent coherence, or ego-alien
content, or a defect in the self-monitoring (or a combination of all these) leads
to a misattribution of the source. This mislabelling requires more precise
cognitive dissection” (p. 101). One component that is not mentioned here by
David is a possible perceptual deficit (although he discusses perceptual deficits
earlier in his paper). McKay et al. (2000) have provided evidence for higher
order perceptual deficits in hallucinating schizophrenic patients. In an attempt to
further “cognitive dissection”, we will take on the issue of an imbalance between
imagery and perception in the next chapter.
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Chapter 14
Imagery and perception in a
continuously hallucinating patient
Summary
It has been hypothesized that hallucinations may be associated with vivid mental
imagery or with deficient higher-order perception. In a neuropsychological case-
study design, we studied a 41-year old patient (Mr. A.) with schizophrenia who
experienced on-going auditory-verbal hallucinations. Performance was measured
on four behavioral tasks of imagery and perception (two visual and two auditory)
and compared with the performance of five patients without hallucinations.
Performance on imagery conditions was compared relative to performance on the
perception condition of each task. Relative to perception, Mr. A. showed
substantial higher imagery scores on both auditory tasks, but not on the visual
tasks. In contrast, the five comparison patients did not reveal such performance
differences between the two modalities. The results support the hypothesis of an
imbalance between imagery and perception specific to the modality of
hallucination.
Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E., Hijman, R., Kahn, R.S., & de Haan, E.H.F. (submitted).
Hallucinations in schizophrenia: distorted balance between imagery and perception? A cognitive
neuropsychiatric approach.
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Introduction
Hallucinations are a prominent and disturbing symptom of schizophrenia. For
centuries, it has been hypothesized that hallucinations may arise from abnormally
vivid mental imagery (Galton, 1883). Although the imagery hypothesis of
hallucinations is usually taken to imply that hallucinating individuals will have
more vivid imagery than non-hallucinating individuals, it has also been argued
that people with hallucinations may suffer from an imagery deficit. For example,
Horowitz (1975) hypothesized that hallucinating patients have less vivid mental
images, which leads them to attribute occasional vivid images to an external
source.
Studies investigating imagery in hallucinating and non-hallucinating
patients do not provide consistent support for the hypothesis that imagery would
be deficient or more vivid (reviewed by Bentall, 1990; cf. Evans et al. 2000).
However, a shortcoming of these studies is that they did not assess imagery in
relation to perception. This is important, as the absolute level of imagery
vividness may not be the crucial issue, but rather the difference in vividness
between imagery and perception, which determines the ease with which
information of internal and external origin can be distinguished (Johnson & Raye,
1981). Recent theoretical accounts of hallucination (Grossberg, 2000; Behrendt,
1998) have suggested that a disordered balance between “mental” and “sensory”
factors of perception could underlie hallucinations. Mental factors refer to top-
down perceptual expectations (a form of mental imagery) and sensory factors
refer to constraints imposed on perception by bottom-up sensory information.
Specifically, “mental factors of perception”, rather than sensory information, take
over to predominate the context and form of perception, which will in fact be a
hallucination. (Grossberg [2000] hypothesized that this occurs when a chronically
hyperactive volitional signal is turned on, and he specified neuronal mechanisms
that could be involved). In the present study we investigate whether a imbalance
between performance on an imagery and a perception condition of the same task
may be associated with hallucination. In the imagery condition, “mental” factors
contribute importantly to performance, whereas in the perception condition,
“sensory” factors play an important role in performing the task.
Another limitation of previous studies may be that imagery performance
was not evaluated in different modalities, which could reveal relative, modality-
specific alterations.  Shallice et al. (1991) and David (1993) have argued that the
neuropsychological case-study approach may be potentially fruitful in research on
cognitive functions in schizophrenia. A limitation of studies with large groups of
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patients, may be that the heterogeneity of schizophrenia will lead to group means
that do not reflect the behavior of any individual. In the case-study approach,
multiple tests are administered to a few selected patients (on the basis of a priori
criteria), where the within-subject comparison of differential test performance
may reveal specific domains of dysfunction characteristic to the condition
studied. In addition, with regard to hallucinations we hypothesized that the most
pronounced effects may be observed when “the system is trapped in action”, i.e.
studying patients with on-going hallucinations. It is hard to study such patients in
a group design - most patients with hallucinations hallucinate for discrete periods
and patients with ongoing hallucinations may be difficult to test due to
concentration problems. In the present study, we applied a neuropsychological
case-study design, in which we contrasted the performance of a patient with
ongoing auditory-verbal hallucinations with the performance of 5 non-
hallucinating patients on four tasks of mental imagery and perception (two in the
auditory and two in the visual modality). David & Lucas (1993) applied the
neuropsychological case study design to the study of continuous auditory-verbal
hallucinations and demonstrated that these hallucinations do not call on the same
verbal working memory resources as inner speech. Here, we focus on imagery
and perception.
Method
Case study
Mr. A was a 41-year-old man with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia, whose
main complaint regarded continuous, medication-resistant auditory-verbal
hallucinations. Severity of hallucination was rated ‘7’ on the hallucination-item of
the PANSS (Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale). In addition, his score on the
Topography of Voices Rating Scale (Hustig & Hafner, 1990) was 8 (extremes are
5 [very severe] – 25 [very mild]). Symptom ratings on the PANSS were 24 for the
positive subscale, 26 for the negative subscale, and 48 for the general
psychopathology subscale. Level of education was 11 years.
The phenomenology of Mr. A’s hallucinations was explored with the
Cognitive Assessment Schedule (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1995), which concerns
a structured interview to assess form and content of the voice; beliefs about the
voices’ identity, meaning and power; patients’ evidence for their beliefs; and
affective and behavioral responses. Mr. A heared one voice, in his ears (not in his
head nor outside his head), and was not sure whether it concerned a male or
female voice. The voice talks about him and also conversates with him. In
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addition, the voice can be commanding, and Mr. A. usually obeys this
commands, “to relieve myself”. The voice also insinuates and uses abusive
language. There are almost no moments in which he doesn’t hear the voice.
Usually, his emotional reaction is one of distress, although it can also be flat, and
incidentally angry when he is scolded. He is sure that the voice is very powerful
and that he exerts no control whatsoever on it. He talks back (and sometimes
screams) to the voice only when he is alone. He does not know who’s voice he
hears, but he is almost sure it must be a psychologist. According to the patient,
the voice originates from small speakers that have been inserted by psychologists
in his auditory organs. He does not know precisely why this has been done, but
he suspects psychologists are interested in him because of his rare combination
of a low level of education and nevertheless a high performance in chess.
Comparison patients
Five non-hallucinating, patients with schizophrenia who were participants in a
larger study  on hallucinations and cognitive functioning at our Department were
included as comparison-subjects. Three of the patients had never hallucinated
(which was confirmed by the consulting clinician), and the other two were
hallucination-free for more than 3 months. All patients were male. DSM-IV
diagnosis of schizophrenia was confirmed with the CASH interview (Andreasen,
1987). Mean age was 32 years (SD=8.6), and level of education was 12.4 years
(SD=2.1). Symptom ratings on the PANSS were as follows: for the positive
subscale, 12.6 (SD=1.5), for the negative subscale, 19.8 (SD=5.3), and for the
general psychopathology subscale, 34.4 (SD=6.8).
Measures
Performance of Mr. A was compared to the 5 control patients on four tasks of
mental imagery: two in the visual and two in the auditory modality (cf. Aleman et
al., 2000). First, absolute perceptual thresholds were determined with the stair-
case method for both the auditory and visual modality, in order to exclude the
possibility of gross hearing or vision impairment. For the auditory modality these
thresholds were set for the loudness of tones in 74 dB(A) white noise, and for
the visual modality the threshold was determined for the duration of dot
presentation (1 pixel) on the centre of a computer screen. For all participants,
these values were within the normal range.
Auditory and Visual Object  imagery. The object imagery task concerns a
quantitative comparison between imagery and perception of visual form
Imagery/perception balance in continuous hallucinations
149
characteristics of  common objects (this task was adapted from Mehta et al. 1992)
or sound characteristics of common sounds (auditory version). Visual modality.
The task consists of 22 object names printed on cards and 22 triads of line
drawings of common objects (Snodgrass and Vanderward, 1980). From the triads
of line drawings, the item that is most deviant in terms of visual form
characteristics has to be indicated. In the perceptual condition the line drawings
are actually presented, whereas in the imagery condition the object names are
read from cards. For example, in the perceptual condition pictures of the
following three objects are presented: “pumpkin”, “lettuce” and “tomato”,
whereas in the imagery condition only the names of these three objects were
presented to the subject (figure 1). Thus, the imagery condition requires the
participants to form mental images in order to be able to make a correct
judgement (which in the example given would be “lettuce”). A difference-score
was calculated by subtracting the correct responses in the imagery condition from
the correct responses in the perceptual condition. Auditory modality. The auditory
task was similar to the visual version in that a triad of common sounds was
presented, and participants had to indicate the item that is most deviant in terms
of acoustic characteristics. In the perceptual condition the sounds were actually
presented (by the computer), whereas in the imagery condition the names of the
sounds were read from cards. An example of a sound triad that was presented is
“crying baby”, “laughing baby” and “meowing cat”, where “laughing baby” was
regarded the deviant item.
Visual Letter Imagery. This task concerned an adaptation of the task
described by Podgorny and Shepard (1978). The subject is asked whether an X-
mark, presented in a 4x5 grid, falls on a capital letter. In the imagery condition,
the letter is not actually presented in the grid, but must be imaged by the subject.
For example, after a fixation point a lowercase letter ‘f’ is presented, followed by
an empty grid with the X-mark at the lower right corner. The subject must decide
whether the target would fall on an uppercase letter ‘F’ or not. In the perception
condition, the letter actually appeared in the grid. Eight letters were randomly
presented during the task: ‘c’, ‘f’, ‘h’, ‘j’, ‘l’, ‘p’, ‘s’, ‘u’. Each condition of the task
consisted of 32 trials, 4 trials for each of the letters (two “on” and two “off” trials
for each letter). We modified the task slightly, in that we allowed the X-mark to
appear only in cells in which the chance that the X-mark would cover a letter was
equal (thus, no X-marks appeared in the most left column, as most capital letters
would cover these cells). Percentage correct responses was taken as dependent
measure for both conditions (perception and imagery).
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Auditory Musical imagery - . This task of musical imagery requires
participants to mentally compare pitches of notes corresponding to song lyrics,
and was adapted from Halpern (1988; experiment 2). Participants viewed the
lyrics from the first line of a familiar Dutch song on a screen and were asked to
decide whether, of two indicated lyrics (which were marked on both sides with
asterisks and appeared in uppercase letters), the pitch of the second lyric was
higher or lower than that corresponding to the first lyric. Lyric refers here to a
monosyllabic word, or one syllable of a two-syllabic word. An English language
example would be: “*OH* say can *YOU* see”, taken from the American
national anthem. In the perceptual condition, participants were actually presented
with the song, which was played via a tape-recorder. The imagery condition was
identical, with the exception that the song was not presented, and participants
had to rely on their musical imagery in order to be able to perform the task
correctly. They were not allowed to hum the melody. Again, percentage correct
responses was taken as dependent measure for both conditions (perception and
imagery).
Results
In order to examine possible differences between the performance of Mr. A and
the control patients on the imagery measures, a z-score analysis was carried out
on the imagery/perception difference scores. Significant differences emerged for
both auditory tasks and for the visual letter imagery task (table 1). The interesting
point is that the direction of the imagery/perception difference is opposite to the
direction in the control group for both auditory measures only.
Table 1. Means for the continuously hallucinating patient Mr. A and the non-
hallucinating control group (means with SDs) on measures of perception/imagery
concordance (lower scores indicate larger concordance)
Imagery/perception measure Mr. A Non-hallucinating
patients (N=5)
z-value
Object imagery Visual 4 3.2 (2.9) 0.28
Auditory -2 2.6 (1.1) -4.18***
Letter Imagery 19 4.4 (6.5) 2.24*
Musical imagery -6 2.4 (3.4) -2.47**
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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This difference in direction is more clearly illustrated in figure 1, that plots the
performance of Mr A and the 5 controls on the auditory and the visual object
imagery task (percentage correct responses). As is evident from the figure, Mr. A
does not show the normal pattern of better perception performance relative to
imagery performance on the auditory task (the modality of hallucination). In
contrast, he does show this pattern on the visual task. Fig. 2 shows performance
on the auditory musical imagery task and the visual letter imagery task. Again, Mr.
A does not show the normal difference between imagery and perception on the
auditory task, but does show this difference on the visual task.
Fig. 1. Percentage correct responses on perception and imagery conditions of Auditory
(A) and Visual Object Imagery (B) task for Mr. A and 5 non-hallucinating control
patients
Discussion
Cognitive theories of hallucination in schizophrenia assume that an erroneous
attribution is made of internally generated information to an external source (e.g.,
Bentall, 1990; David, 1999; Frith, 1992; Hoffman et al., 1999). Johnson & Raye
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(1981; Johnson, Raye & Hashtroudi, 1993) have developed a theory of source
discrimination and monitoring in which it is hypothesized that internally
generated information (mental images) and information of external origin
(percepts) are distinguished by the cognitive system by taking into account the
proportion of sensory, contextual and semantic information, which is more
detailed for percepts.
Fig. 2. Percentage correct responses on perception and imagery conditions of the Musical
(A) and Letter Imagery (B) task for Mr. A and 5 non-hallucinating control patients
Evidence that mental images are less rich in perceptual details than percepts and
that, as a consequence, images are more difficult to perform mental operations
upon, was recently presented by Kosslyn et al. (1999). This implies that subjects
will make more errors on an imagery condition of  a cognitive task, compared to
a perception condition of the same task. We recently reported that this indeed is
the case for non-psychiatric college students (Aleman et al. 2000). However, in
the present study we demonstrated that in a continuously hallucinating patient
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this balance (of more vivid perception relative to imagery) was reversed in the
modality of hallucination (auditory), but not in another modality (visual).
Thus, the results of the present neuropsychological case-study suggest
that auditory hallucinations may be associated with a modality-specific distortion
in the balance between imagery and perception performance. Such a distortion
may also be interpreted as  a modality-specific increase in vividness of mental
imagery relative to perception. In this way, our results are in accordance with
Böcker et al. (2000), who observed more vivid auditory than visual imagery in
auditory-verbal hallucinating patients. It could be argued, however, that the
observed distortion in the balance between imagery and perception is mainly
caused by higher-order perceptual dysfunction in hallucinating patients. This
interpretation is supported by the recent study by McKay et al. (2000), in which a
wide range of auditory perception tests were administered to hallucinating and
nonhallucinating schizophrenic patients and to normal comparison subjects.
Although all patients with schizophrenia appeared to perform worse on higher
order perceptual tasks, this dysfunction was more pronounced for the
hallucinating patients.
How a distortion in the balance of imagery and perception can lead to
hallucinatory experiences can be best understood within the framework of
Johnson & Raye’s theory of reality monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson,
Raye & Hashtroudi, 1993). They hypothesize that sensory qualities of an
experience help tag the event as having been perceived, whereas metacognitive
processes associated with the activity of imagining would help tag the event as
having been imagined. Increased sensory qualities of mental images, or decreased
sensory qualities of percepts will then result in reality discrimination errors, in
which internally generated information may mistakenly be attributed to an
external source. In addition, metacognitive processes could also play an
important mediating role. An internal attribution is based on reference to
metacognitive processes, with the amount of effort involved in generation being
a determining factor (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Perception may be as effortful as
generating mental images for hallucinating subjects, which is evident from the
relative low scores on perception conditions compared to imagery performance
(and consistent with the findings by McKay et al., 2000). In contrast, in non-
hallucinating individuals, mental imagery is clearly more effortful than perception.
Thus, due to the smaller difference in effortful processing between imagery and
perception, less information concerning the cognitive operations involved may
be available to the hallucinating subjects, contributing to errors in source
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attribution. There is increasing evidence that reality monitoring is deficient in
hallucinating patients (Bentall et al., 1991; Morisson & Haddock, 1997; Brébion
et al., 2000). The present study may contribute in elucidating a potential
underlying mechanism of such confusions, namely, a distortion in the balance
between imagery and perception.
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Reality monitoring and mental
imagery vividness
Summary
It is generally acknowledged that hallucinations in schizophrenia are a result of the
erroneous attribution of internally generated information to an external source.
Distortions in mental imagery vividness may underlie such confusions. We
investigated performance of 43 patients with schizophrenia on multiple behavioral
measures of auditory and visual mental imagery and perception, a measure of
reality monitoring and a signal detection measure. Hallucinating patients were
contrasted with non-hallucinating patients, after controlling for attentional factors
that may influence task performance. We replicated earlier findings of significantly
more source discrimination errors in hallucinating patients compared to non-
hallucinating patients. No differences emerged on any of the mental imagery
measures, nor on criterion bias in signal detection. Our results provide strong
evidence that there is no trait-related distortion of mental imagery  in patients with
hallucinations.
Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E., Hijman, R., Kahn, R.S., &  De Haan, E.H.F. (in
preparation).  Reality monitoring and imagery vividness in patients with and without
hallucinations.
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Introduction
An increasing number of recent studies report that hallucination-prone patients
with schizophrenia have difficulties in discriminating between an internally
generated, imagined event and an externally presented, real event (Bentall &
Slade, 1985; Bentall et al., 1991; Morrison & Haddock, 1997; Brébion et al., 1998;
Johns & McGuire, 1999; Böcker et al. 2000; Brébion et al., 2000; Franck et al.
2000). Such difficulties may arise from one of three possible mechanisms, or a
combination of these (Böcker et al. 2000). The first possibility concerns deficits
in perception: degraded percepts will more easily be confounded with mental
images. Second, an increase in the “vividness” of mental images, in which images
have more sensory characteristics than expected by the cognitive system, may
lead to confusions between percepts and images. Finally, a bias in a meta-
cognitive process involved in monitoring the source of information that is
processed in our brains could account for the confusion. Specifically, it has been
hypothesized that reality monitoring 1 biases, distinguishing between internally
generated information and externally presented information, may underlie
hallucinations in schizophrenia (Slade & Bentall, 1988).
Clearly, the recent research reporting biases in discriminating between
imagined events and an externally presented events, is consistent with the third,
“reality monitoring” hypothesis. This is not to say, however, that alterations in
imagery or perception could not underlie such confusions. Research examining
these hypotheses may more precisely delineate the cognitive mechanisms
involved in hallucination. Regarding the perception hypothesis, Böcker et al.
(2000) compared hallucinating versus non-hallucinating patients on measures of
basic auditory and visual perception, specifically sensory acuity. No significant
differences were observed. However, a recent study by McKay et al. (2000) also
failed to find deficits in basic (low-level) perception associated with
hallucinations, but did find higher order impairments. The authors administered a
wide range of auditory perception tests to hallucinating and nonhallucinating
schizophrenic patients and to normal comparison subjects. Although all patients
                                                                
1 A distinction has been made between the terms “reality monitoring” and “reality
discrimination”, where the latter refers to distinguishing “on-line” between real and
imaginal events, whereas reality monitoring refers to memories of the (internal versus
external) source of earlier presented information (Bentall, 1990). However, following
recent authors (e.g. Brébion et al., 2000) we will use the terms interchangeably, as they
concern the same psychological construct.
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with schizophrenia appeared to perform worse on higher order perceptual tasks,
this dysfunction was more pronounced for the hallucinating patients.
Most previous studies that investigated the imagery hypothesis of
hallucinations (e.g., Roman & Landis, 1945; Mintz and Alpert, 1972; Starker &
Jolin, 1982) did not include adequate behavioral measures of mental imagery,
which may explain the inconsistent results. Two recent studies assessed the
relation between mental imagery and hallucination with objective, behavioral
measures (Evans et al., 2000; Böcker et al. 2000). Evans et al. (2000) only used
auditory measures and failed to find differences between hallucinating and non-
hallucinating patients. Böcker et al. (2000) assessed imagery and perception in the
auditory and visual modalities. Consistent with Evans et al. (2000), no between-
group differences were observed. However, after performing within-group
comparisons, they observed more vivid auditory than visual imagery in
hallucinating patients (that hallucinated in the auditory modality). This difference
was not observed in the non-hallucinating group. Moreover, in a recent cognitive
neuropsychiatric case-study (Aleman et al., submitted), we observed a modality-
specific imbalance between imagery and perception in a patient with continuous
auditory hallucinations, compared to five non-hallucinating patients. Specifically,
whereas control subjects always perform better on a perception than on an
imagery condition of the same task (the perception-superiority effect), this
patient showed the reverse (imagery>perception) in the auditory, but not visual
modality.
Our aim was twofold. First, to replicate the finding of reality monitoring
errors in relation to hallucinations, and, second, to investigate whether
differences in imagery vividness underlie such errors. Thus, the present study was
designed as a thorough follow-up to the study by Böcker et al. (2000). Measures
of imagery and perception were included, as well as measures of discrimination
bias and reality monitoring. Specifically, the design was improved on five points
with respect to earlier studies. First, a more comprehensive evaluation of imagery
and perception was carried out by including more (behavioral) measures. Second,
larger patient groups were studied. Third, patients with more severe
hallucinations were included. Fourth, a subgroup of patients was included that
had never hallucinated at all. Finally, we controlled statistically for non-specific
attentional factors that contribute to cognitive test performance.
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Method
Subjects
Forty-three patients with a clinical diagnosis of schizophrenia participated in the
present study. They were recruited from the Schizophrenia Research Unit of the
Department of Psychiatry, University Medical Center, and from a local
Psychiatric Hospital (Willem Arntz Huis, H.C. Rümke Groep). DSM-IV
diagnosis was established on the basis of the life-time version of the
Comprehensive Assessment of Symptoms and History (CASH; Andreasen,
1987). With the exception of two patients, all were on neuroleptic treatment
(Table 1). Clinical ratings were made from the Positive And Negative Symptom
Scale (PANSS; Kay, Opler and Fiszbein, 1986), regarding the individual
symptoms during the week preceding the interview. The interview, by the first
author, who reached consensus with a second rater, took place on the first day of
testing. Twenty patients had experienced hallucinations, ranging from a mild
degree (once or twice, without behavioral consequences, score 3) to a very severe
degree (hallucinations dominate thinking and behavior, causing verbal and
behavioral reactions, score 7). Patients were included in the non-hallucinating
group(N = 23)  if they were hallucination-free for at least three months prior to
testing (as indicated by self-report and confirmed by the consulting clinician).
Eleven patients had never experienced hallucinations. Table 1 lists demographic
and clinical characteristics of the patients included in the study.
Testing Materials
Reality monitoring, discrimination bias, and imagery/perception relations were
tested by use of experimental psychological methods. To control for non-specific
attentional factors, measures were included of attention and working memory, in
the auditory and visual modality. These were the digit span forward and
backward, from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 1955), and the
Visual Elevator test from the Everyday Attention Test (EAT; Robertson et al.
1996), respectively.
Reality monitoring and discrimination bias
Reality monitoring. This was an adaptation of the reality monitoring task
described by Harvey (1985). During the learning-phase, one of the three most
typical words (e.g., 'Gold') in one of twenty categories from Van Loon-Vervoorn
and Pijpers-Kooiman (1988), was read aloud to the subjects. For a second word
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the category-name plus the first letter were presented (e.g. 'Metal-I....') with the
assignment to image the first word which came to mind, as if actually spoken.
Table 1.  Demographic and clinical characteristics of the studied sample
Patients with
hallucinations
(N=20)
Patients without
hallucinations
(N=23)
Education1 12.9 (3.5) 13.5 (2.8)
Age1 32.2 (8.7) 29.5 (6.4)
Duration of illness1 10.1 (8.7) 4.4 (4.4)*
Number of hospitalisations 3.1 (2.1) 2.1 (1.3)
Hallucination rating (PANSS) 4.5 (1.1) 1 (0.0)***
Positive symptoms (PANSS)2 11.8 (4.3) 11.0 (4.5)
Negative symptoms (PANSS) 15.1 (6.1) 17.7 (6.5)
General psychopathology (PANSS) 31.0 (9.3) 31.5 (8.0)
1in years, 2after subtraction of hallucination ratings
*p<0.05; ***p<0.001
In the test-phase the participants had to indicate verbally for each of 30 words
whether it was perceived earlier ('Gold'), imaged earlier ('Iron') or whether it
concerned a new word ('Copper'). This was done immediately after presentation
of the words (immediate recognition) and again after 15 minutes (delayed
recognition). Between both tests, another task was performed (the letter imagery
task). Reality monitoring data were analyzed by calculating a source
discrimination parameter, and two sensitivity parameters. The source
discrimination parameter was the average conditional source identification
measure (ACSIM), which, in contrast to more traditional measures, is
independent of item recognition (Murnane & Bayen, 1996). In addition, we
calculated recognition parameters D1 and D2 (Batchelder & Riefer, 1990), which
refer to sensitivity for words that were heared (externally presented) and words
that were imaged (internally generated), respectively.
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Discrimination bias. The non-parametric measure for response bias (B) is
regarded as an indicator of external attribution bias, an important factor in reality
discrimination. A stronger external attribution bias leads to more false positives,
i.e., more internal events being classified as external. It is determined in a signal-
detection task.
The subjects were presented with 100 trials on which they were requested to
indicate whether they perceived a particular word presented  over a speaker at 60
to 65 dB(A) in 72 dB(A) white background noise. They verbally indicated this on
a 5-point rating scale with the anchors being  'definitely yes', 'probably yes', 'don't
know', 'probably not' or 'definitely not'. On 50% of the trials the word which was
asked for had indeed been presented. Bentall and Slade (1985) found the
response bias, which is inversely related to the external attribution bias, to be
weaker in hallucinating subjects, who were more prone to acknowledge that they
heard a stimulus in the noise.
The number of false alarms on the imagery-perception interaction tasks
was also considered a measure of discrimination bias.
Relation mental imagery/perception
First, four tests will be described that concern concerned a comparison between
imagery and perception. Subsequently, two measures will be described that are
aimed at the interaction between imagery and perception (cf. Aleman et al. 2000;
Böcker et al. 2000).
Imagery-perception comparison. The first two tasks (which we will
call the visual and auditory triad comparison task) concerned a quantitative
comparison between imagery and perception of visual form characteristics of
common objects (this task was adapted from Mehta et al. 1992) or sound
characteristics of common sounds (auditory version; Aleman et al., 2000). Visual
modality. The task consists of 22 object names printed on cards and 22 triads of
line drawings of common objects (Snodgrass and Vanderward, 1980). From the
triads of line drawings, the item that is most deviant in terms of visual form
characteristics has to be indicated. In the perceptual condition the line drawings
are actually presented, whereas in the imagery condition the object names are
read from cards. For example, in the perceptual condition pictures of the
following three objects are presented: “pumpkin”, “lettuce” and “tomato”,
whereas in the imagery condition only the names of these three objects were
presented to the subject (figure 1). Thus, the imagery condition requires the
participants to form mental images in order to be able to make a correct
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judgement (which in the example given would be “lettuce”). A difference-score
was calculated by subtracting the percentage correct responses in the imagery
condition from the percentage correct responses in the perceptual condition.
Auditory modality. The auditory task was similar to the visual version in that a triad
of common sounds was presented, and participants had to indicate the item that
is most deviant in terms of acoustic characteristics. In the perceptual condition
the sounds were actually presented (by the computer), whereas in the imagery
condition the names of the sounds were read from cards. An example of a sound
triad that was presented is “crying baby”, “laughing baby” and “meowing cat”,
where “laughing baby” was regarded the deviant item.
The third task concerned Letter imagery. We adapted the letter imagery
task used by Kosslyn et al. (1988). The subject is asked whether an X-mark,
presented in a 4x5 grid, falls on a capital letter. In the imagery condition, the
letter is not actually presented in the grid, but must be imaged by the subject. For
example, after a fixation point a lowercase letter ‘f’ is presented, followed by an
empty grid with the X-mark at the lower right corner. The subject must decide
whether the target would fall on an uppercase letter ‘F’ or not. In the perception
condition, the letter actually appeared in the grid (figure 2). Eight letters were
randomly presented during the task: ‘c’, ‘f’, ‘h’, ‘j’, ‘l’, ‘p’, ‘s’, ‘u’. Each condition of
the task consisted of 32 trials, 4 trials for each of the letters (two “on” and two
“off” trials for each letter). We modified the task slightly, in that we allowed the
X-mark to appear only in cells in which the chance that the X-mark would cover
a letter was equal (thus, no X-marks appeared in the most left column, as most
capital letters would cover these cells). The difference in percentage correct
responses between the imagery and perception condition was the dependent
measure.
The last imagery-perception comparison task was of Musical imagery. This
task of requires participants to mentally compare pitches of notes corresponding
to song lyrics, and was adapted from Halpern (1988; experiment 2). Participants
viewed the lyrics from the first line of a familiar Dutch song on a screen and
were asked to decide whether, of two indicated lyrics (which were marked on
both sides with asterisks and appeared in uppercase letters), the pitch of the
second lyric was higher or lower than that corresponding to the first lyric. Lyric
refers here to a monosyllabic word, or one syllable of a two-syllabic word. An
English language example would be: “*OH* say can *YOU* see”, taken from the
American national anthem. Participants responded by means of a key press. In
the perceptual condition, participants were actually presented with the song,
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which was played via a tape-recorder. The imagery condition was identical, with
the exception that the song was not presented, and participants had to rely on
their musical imagery in order to be able to perform the task correctly. Again, the
difference in percentage correct responses between the imagery and perception
condition was calculated.
Imagery-perception interaction. This test was based on the notion that
stimuli which are presented at the level of the absolute perception threshold are
detected more often when at the same time a person also images that stimulus. In
the visual modality this has been reported for dots at locations covered by a
concurrent image of a letter (Farah, 1989) and in the auditory modality for a tone
while the subjects imaged a tone of the same frequency (Farah and Smith, 1983).
At the first stage of this test absolute thresholds (for the duration of the target
dot and the loudness of the two target tones in 74 dB(A) white noise,
respectively) were determined by the staircase method. During the second stage
two series of 32 trials were presented in each modality, while the subjects were
imaging one of the two letters (capital T or H in a 5 * 5 square) or tones (440 or
1000 Hz). On 50% of the trials a target stimulus (dot or tone) was presented
while the subjects were imaging. On each trial subjects indicated verbally whether
or not they perceived a target stimulus. The difference score calculated from the
number of stimuli detected when the image was similar (in location or pitch) to
the target stimulus (25% of the trials), minus those detected when it was not
(another 25% of the trials), is a measure for the interaction between imagery and
perception. This difference is presumed to be larger in subjects with a more vivid
imagery, which are the hallucinating patients according to our second hypothesis.
Procedure
The auditory and visual tests were administered in two sessions, on different
days, with a maximum delay of one week. The order of the tests within one part
was fixed, to minimize interference on the one hand and to create standard filled
intervals on the other hand. A break was inserted halfway.
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Experimental design and statistical analysis
This study focuses on the contrast between hallucinating and non-hallucinating
patients. Comparing these two groups reveals the cognitive disturbances that
probably contribute to the hallucinations. For direct comparisons between
different imagery comparison tests the percentage correct responses was
computed, because the measurement scales of the different tasks are not
comparable. ANCOVA’s were carried out on the data, with tests of
attention/working memory as covariate. Two--tailed significance levels are
reported, with exception of the reality monitoring task, for which the strong
expectations of the direction of the effect (based on theory and empirical
findings) allowed the use of one-tailed levels.
Results
Although the two groups did not differ significantly on digit span nor on Visual
Elevator performance, these measures were included as covariate in the analyses,
in order to control for the portion of variance in the cognitive measures that
could be explained by attentional factors.
Reality monitoring and signal detection bias
For the reality monitoring task, a highly significant difference emerged between
the hallucinating and non-hallucinating group on the delayed source
discrimination measure F(1, 36)=9.3, p<0.005. For immediate source
discrimination, this difference was also significant, F(1,39)=2.9, p<0.05. The
groups did not differ on the recognition parameters D1 and D2. Thus, although
patients with hallucinations made more source confusions, there was no
differential sensitivity for self-generated or experimenter presented items. Table 2
lists the parameters for the source monitoring task.
Performance of hallucinating patients was indistinguishable from non-
hallucinating patients on the non-parametric index of response bias in the
detection task. That is, patients with hallucinations were not more willing to
indicate they had heard a particular word in the white noise when that word was
not actually present. Moreover, the groups did not differ in number of false
alarms on the percepion interaction tasks.
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Table 2. Reality monitoring parameters for the two groups
Parameter Patients with hallucinations1 Patients without
hallucinations1
Immediate ACSIM 0.93 (0.08) 0.97 (0.05)
Delayed ACSIM 0.85 (0.12) 0.90 (0.12)
Imm. D1 0.61 (0.28) 0.55 (0.27)
Imm. D2 0.90 (0.13) 0.87 (0.13)
Del. D1 0.42 (0.34) 0.30 (0.38)
Del. D2 0.91 (0.12) 0.68 (0.86)
1N for the different analyses: 20/22 for the immediate measures and 18/21 for the
delayed measures
Imagery-perception comparisons
Table 3 shows means (and SDs) for the imagery-perception comparison
measures. No between-group differences emerged from the MANCOVA on the
four imagery-perception comparison measures (F<1, p>0.20). A 2 × 2
ANCOVA with modality as within-subjects factor with two levels (auditory,
visual) also failed to show Group × Modality interactions. In addition, a
subgroup analysis in which patients with hallucinations (N=17) were contrasted
with patients that had never experienced hallucinations (N=9) neither revealed
between-group differences.
Imagery-perception interactions
For the auditory imagery-perception interaction task we observed the predicted
gain due to imagery. That is, stimuli that had been imaged were detected
significantly better than stimuli that had not previously been imaged, t=4.8,
p<0.001. However, there was no group difference in the effect of imagery on
perception, F(1,33)=2.01, p<0.20.
For the visual imagery-perception interaction task, we failed to replicate
the typical imagery gain (e.g., reported by Farah, 1989). This is essential to the
validity of the task, as the task can not be said to measure imagery-perception
interaction when no influence of imagery on perception is found. Therefore, we
will not further discuss this task. (There were no group differences in
performance on this task, F<1, p>0.50.)
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Table 3. Means (and SDs) for perception minus imagery performance on the imagery-perception
comparison tasks
Task Patients with hallucinations1 Patients without hallucinations1
Auditory triad comparison 2.4 (3.1) 3.2 (2.2)
Visual triad comparison 2.8 (1.8) 2.2 (1.8)
Musical imagery 5.1 (10.4) 4.5 (8.7)
Letter imagery 9.8 (10.4) 13.0 (18.2)
1Due to practical problems not all tasks could be administered to some patients. Therefore the N
was as follows: 20/23, 20/23, 18/19 and 17/18, respectively.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was twofold. First, to replicate the finding of reality
monitoring errors in patients with hallucinations. Second, to test the “vivid
mental imagery” hypothesis of hallucinations in schizophrenia, which states that
mental images have more percept-like characteristics in hallucinating individuals.
Our finding of source discrimination errors associated with hallucinations is
consistent with a range of earlier studies on this subject (Bentall et al., 1991;
Böcker et al. 2000;  Morrison & Haddock, 1997; Brébion et al., 2000; Franck et
al., 2000).
Although the finding of increased reality monitoring deficits in patients
with hallucinations is usually taken to imply that biases in reality monitoring lead
to hallucinations (Bentall, 1990), it has also been argued that reality monitoring
errors are a consequence rather than a cause of psychotic experiences
(Vinogradov et al., 1997; Hoffman et al., 2000). According to this account,
patients develop an external attribution bias as an explanation for the
overwhelming, emotional demanding and confusing abnormal
perceptual/cognitive experiences of psychosis. Detailed longitudinal
investigations in large patient groups are necessary to clarify the causal direction
of reality monitoring errors in relation to hallucination.
Brébion et al. (1997 ; 2000) have pointed out that the term reality
monitoring/discrimination can refer to different types of distinctions. For
example, between actual events and non-events (i.e., perception vs. imagery) one
one hand, and between self- and non-self-generated events on the other hand. In
this study we found evidence that patients with hallucinations primarily differ
from patients without hallucinations on the latter dimension (tapped by the
reality monitoring task). In contrast, no differences were observed on
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discrimination bias in two signal detection tasks. Such discrimination biases (of
the false alarm type) would reflect difficulties in  distinguishing between actual
and non-events. The lack of group differences on this measure is at odds with
results reported by Bentall & Slade (1985) and Brébion et al. (1997), but is
consistent with Böcker et al. (2000). The discrepancy may be explained by the
fact that our task was identical to the one applied by Böcker et al. (2000), but
differed from the tasks applied by Bentall & Slade (1985) and Brébion et al.
(1997). More specifically, in the task of Bentall & Slade (1985) only one word was
included, which could be present (in white noise) or absent (only white noise). In
contrast, in our task a subject was asked to indicate whether a particular word
was present in the noise (with different words being presented in the noise).
Thus, the discrimination in our task was “same” versus “different”, whereas in
Bentall & Slade’s task the discrimination concerned “present” or “absent”.
Although both tasks measure the willingness of a subject to admit having heard a
word that was not actually presented, Bentall & Slade’s task might more explicitly
concern the distinction between material of internal and external origin.
The imagery hypothesis starts from the assumption that, in normal
conditions, mental images are less vivid, i.e. have less sensory and contextual
characteristics, than percepts. Kosslyn et al. (1999) and Aleman et al. (2000)
recently provided evidence for this assumption in non-psychiatric samples.
According to the theory of Johnson & Raye (1981) increased vividness of images
will make them less distinctive from percepts, which may lead to reality
monitoring errors. To test the imagery hypothesis, we investigated whether
patients with hallucinations would show smaller differences in performance on
imagery and perception conditions of the same task, after controlling for non-
specific attentional variables.
For all four behavioral measures, no differences were observed between
the hallucinating and non-hallucinating groups. This is consistent with our earlier
findings in hallucination-prone individuals (Aleman et al., 2000). If cognitive
alterations are associated with hallucinations as a trait (the disposition towards
hallucination), our findings could be obscured by the fact that a number of
patients in the non-hallucinating group had actually experienced hallucinations in
the past (although this had to be more than three months before the study).
Therefore, we conducted an analysis in which a subgroup of patients that had
never hallucinated was contrasted with the hallucinating group. However, again no
significant differences emerged on measures of imagery and perception. Neither
were differences observed for imagery-perception interaction. The results
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corroborate earlier studies by Böcker et al. (2000) and Evans et al. (2000), who
also failed to find between-group differences on multiple measures of imagery.
However, Böcker et al. (2000) in addition observed more vivid auditory than
visual imagery in hallucinating patients on an imagery-perception interaction task.
We were not able to replicate this finding, which may be due to the fact that our
visual imagery-perception interaction task failed to show the characteristic
imagery-gain which is a prerequisite to the validity of the task. However, our
other tasks did not show evidence of within-group modality differences.
In conclusion, the present study observed reality monitoring deficits in
patients with hallucinations, but no abnormalities were found in imagery-
perception relations. Thus, the present results strongly suggest that patients with
hallucinations do not have a trait-like alteration of mental imagery that may
eventually lead to the emergence of hallucinations. It could be hypothesized,
however, that increased vividness of imagery is strictly confined to the
hallucinatory state, i.e. occurs only during the actual experience of hallucinations.
Indeed, evidence from a case-study of a continuous hallucinating patient suggests
that transient, state-dependent alterations in vividness of imagery may play a role
in hallucinations (Aleman et al., submitted; see chapter 14). We recommend
future research to investigate this  more extensively. In addition, research may
concentrate on possible interactions between reality monitoring and
abnormalities in perception (cf. McKay et al., 2000) or top-down perceptual
expectations (cf. Grossberg, 2000).
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Chapter 16
Controversies and Discussions 4
Hallucinations and the cerebral
hemispheres
Aleman, A. (in press). Hallucinations and the cerebral hemispheres. Journal of Psychiatry &
Neuroscience.
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In his thought-provoking commentary, Dr. Sher (J Psychiatry Neurosci
2000;25:239-240) draws attention to the recent suggestion by Olin (1999) that
neuroimaging studies would confirm the hypothesis of hallucinations arising
from a bicameral mind. More specifically, according to Olin two recent studies
on the neuroanatomical basis of hallucinations in schizophrenia revive Julian
Janes’ theories, who in his 1976 book The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the
bicameral mind hypothesized that human beings had no consciousness until 1000
BC. Instead, their behavior was controlled by a “bicameral mind”, with the left
hemisphere as the site for speech, and hallucinations (voices of gods and
demons) arising from the right hemisphere. However, of the two studies (Lennox
et al. 1999; Dierks et al. 1999) cited by Olin, only one concluded that auditory
hallucinations are associated with right hemisphere activation. This was the study
by Lennox and colleagues which concerned one patient. The study by Dierks and
co-workers concerned 3 patients, two of which showed predominantly left
activation of the transverse temporal gyrus (these patients were right-handed),
whereas the third showed right activation of this gyrus (this patient was left-
handed). Dierks et al. indicate that “this result is suggestive of a particular role for
the language-dominant hemisphere in the generation of auditory hallucinations”
(p. 618), although they caution that the small sample size does not permit strong
conclusions. Thus, the results of this particular study appear to be in contradiction
with Janes’ hypothesis of distinct roles of both hemispheres in language vs.
hallucinations, rather than supporting it. In addition, a number of other
neuroimaging studies concerning auditory hallucinations, which are not taken
into account by Olin, did not reveal a special role for the right hemisphere in
auditory hallucinations (Silbersweig et al. 1995; McGuire et al. 1993).
   On the basis of the available evidence it must be concluded that the intriguing
theories of Janes lack convincing support. Research on hallucinations should
therefore focus on more “down-to-earth” hypotheses, for example,  concerning
cognitive processes like reality monitoring and mental imagery (e.g., Johns &
McGuire, 1999).
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Summary and conclusions
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The research reported in the present thesis concerned the neurocognitive basis
of hallucinations. Specifically, we focused on mental imagery, its neural
correlates, and its relation to hallucinatory experiences in non-psychiatric
participants and in participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. First, however,
we reviewed cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia in relation to symptom
dimensions, to clarify the nature of general cognitive disability in schizophrenia.
Cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia
Based on quantitative analyses and integration of the published evidence (chapter
2), we concluded that memory impairment in schizophrenia is of large
magnitude, and not importantly affected by age, medication, duration of illness,
patient status, severity of psychopathology or positive symptoms. Negative
symptoms showed a small, but significant relation with memory impairment.
Indeed, consensus is emerging that memory is a major domain of disability in
schizophrenia, with implications for social and vocational functioning (Green &
Nuechterlein, 1999). The meta-analysis was not able to address the question
whether attentional dysfunction could underlie the memory impairment, as few
studies have examined this in a design including a healthy control group.
Recently, evidence has been presented that reduced speed of information
processing may contribute substantially to memory dysfunction; even more so
than deficits in selective attention (Brébion et al., 2000a; Krabbendam, 2000).
No evidence for a relation between positive symptoms and memory impairment
was observed in the meta-analysis. With regard to the mechanisms involved in
hallucinations, this may imply that a non-specific failure in long-term or short-
term memory factors can not account for hallucinations.
In chapter 3, meta-analyses of the relation between schizophrenia
symptom dimensions and executive and attentional performance were
presented. The weighted correlations across studies were only significant for
negative and disorganisation dimensions. However, the correlations were small
in magnitude. These typical weak associations were interpreted as evidence for a
relative independence of executive and attentional functioning on the one hand
and symptom dimensions on the other hand. Recent models of schizophrenia
have also suggested that (clustered) psychiatric symptoms are to a large extent
independent of cognitive deficits (Green & Nuechterlein, 1999). Positive
symptoms (a category that includes hallucinations) did not show associations
with traditional measures of cognitive dysfunction, which calls for a more
detailed analysis of cognitive processes that might be involved in hallucinations.
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After concluding that weak relations exist between schizophrenia syndromes and
classical neuropsychological measures, we suggest the next step to be 1)
investigate symptoms rather than syndromes, and 2) include very specific tests
on the basis of theories regarding detailed cognitive mechanisms, rather than
investigating broad constructs such as “attention” and “executive function”.
Hallucinatory experiences and mental imagery in non-psychiatric individuals
Investigating hallucinatory experiences and their cognitive basis in non-
psychiatric individuals is a useful research strategy, as it avoids the confounding
factors associated with psychopathology. A limitation might be that these
hallucinatory experiences are less pronounced and do not interfere with normal
functioning.
The structure of hallucinatory predisposition was investigated in a
sample of 243 college students who completed the Launay-Slade Hallucination
Scale (chapter 5). Factor analyses revealed three factors: (1) hallucinatory
experiences, (2) perceived externality of thought, and (3) vivid daydreams. These
results suggest that hallucinatory predisposition is a multi-dimensional construct.
Future research may focus on the possibility of differential relations between
these three factors and cognitive processes in patients with hallucinations. In
addition, this study clearly shows that hallucinations may be seen as existing on a
continuum with normal mental events (Slade & Bentall, 1988), given that
daydream experiences were shown to correlate highly with the total LSHS score
(which mainly consists of hallucination items).
Chapter 6 and chapter 7 will be discussed together, as they were aimed at
the same question: is hallucinatory predisposition associated with increased
vividness of mental imagery? Chapter 6 investigated the relation between
subjective and objective indices of vividness of mental imagery and disposition
towards hallucination in a sample of 74 non-selected college students. Chapter 7
concerned a more detailed investigation, in which a high hallucination-prone
group and a low hallucination-prone group were selected from a large sample.
These two groups were then contrasted on six behavioral measures of imagery
vividness. Both studies (chapters 6 and 7) converged in their results: subjects
that were prone towards hallucination did not differ from the control subjects
on the behavioral imagery measures. However, on introspective measures of
imagery vividness (Marks, 1973; Richardson, 1969) hallucination-prone subjects
rated their imagery as significantly more vivid than non-hallucination-prone
subjects. Thus, these latter results are in accordance with the vivid imagery
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hypothesis. However, caution is needed, given the problems associated with
introspection. Such problems include demand characteristics, individual
differences in the conception of “vividness”, response tendency, and insight into
one’s own psychological processes. Moreover, the experiences targeted by the
LSHS and by such imagery questionnaires are highly similar phenomenologically.
Slade & Bentall (1988) have indicated that explaining hallucinatory experiences
with subjectively rated imagery vividness may border to circularity. Findings
reported in this thesis clearly underline this warning.
In the second experiment (chapter 7) we observed larger correlations
between imagery and perception in the hallucination-prone group compared to
the control group. We think that this finding may support the plausibility of an
interpretation in terms of processes that are involved in discriminating internal
and external generated information, termed reality discrimination. The finding
can be interpreted to imply that imagery and perception are more closely related
in hallucination-prone subjects, and thus more difficult to distinguish from one
another. Evidently, as this does not seem to be due to an increased vividness of
mental images, it may originate from less distinctive meta-cognitive processes
associated with internally versus externally generated information (cf. Bentall,
1990). Indeed, Rankin & O’Caroll (1995) observed reality monitoring biases in
hallucination-prone college students compared to control students.
Mental imagery, hallucinations and the brain
According to Kosslyn (1994), imagery and perception basically share the same
processing structures in the brain. Kosslyn’s theory of functional overlap of
imagery and perception is highly relevant to the imagery hypothesis of
hallucination, because if imagery and perception share the same processing
systems, this enhances the plausibility that under certain circumstances an image
can be mistaken for a percept. Up to now, studies on the functional
neuroanatomy of auditory imagery have been limited to musical imagery
(Zatorre et al. 1996; Halpern & Zatorre, 1999). It is suspected that other forms
of auditory imagery will depend on the same auditory association areas as
revealed by these two PET-studies. Chapter 9 provides indirect support for this
assumption. We hypothesized that music training may be associated with
improved auditory imagery ability. Performance of musically trained subjects was
compared with performance of musically naïve subjects on three measures,
concerning musical imagery, non-musical auditory imagery, and a comparable
measure of visual imagery, respectively. The musically trained group did not only
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perform better on the musical imagery task (as was expected) but also
outperformed the musically naïve subjects on the non-musical auditory imagery
task. In contrast, the two groups did not differ on the visual imagery task. We
interpreted the results in light of the theoretical proposals about music
processing and brain activity advanced by Rauscher and colleagues (e.g.,
Rauscher, Shaw & Ky, 1995). Interestingly, the notion that auditory imagery
relies on auditory association areas in the temporal lobe, and the fact that
neuroimaging studies of hallucinations show activity in these areas (chapter 13)
is at least consistent with the hypothesis that imagery processes may play a role
in the genesis of hallucinations.
Results of research on the functional neuroanatomy of visual mental
imagery are mixed (for review, see Mellet et al., 1998; Behrmann, 2000). Chapter
10 concerns a strong test of the hypothesis that visuospatial imagery (in contrast
to merely depictive imagery, cf. Kosslyn et al., 1999) relies on the parietal cortex,
not the visual cortex. Functional MRI and repetitive Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation (rTMS) were used to determine areas of activation, and whether
such areas are crucially involved in the task performance. For each of the 5
subjects included in the fMRI study, activated voxels were observed in right
posterior parietal, but not visual, cortex during visuospatial imagery (relative to a
perception control condition with the same stimuli). In addition, rTMS (8
subjects) significantly delayed reaction times when applied over the P4 electrode
scalp position (corresponding to posterior parietal cortex), but did not affect
reaction times when applied over the occipital cortex. The results indicate that
imagery does not necessarily rely on activation of sensory areas, but may share
higher order brain areas with perception (cf. Trojano et al., 2000). With respect
to hallucinations, most studies also fail to find activation of primary sensory
cortex (e.g., Silbersweig et al., 1995; Shergill et al., 2000a; but see Dierks et al.
1999), whereas all studies report activation of modality-specific association areas
(chapter 13).
Finally, the neuroanatomy of hallucinations was investigated with rTMS
(chapter 11). Besides a fundamental hypothesis, i.e., whether the left temporal
cortex is involved in auditory hallucinations, this study addressed a clinically
relevant question: is rTMS effective in the treatment of medication-resistant
hallucinations? Nine hallucinating patients with schizophrenia were stimulated
20 minutes daily over the left auditory cortex with TMS at 1Hz for ten treatment
days. At baseline, after 5 days and after 10 days a standardized hallucination
rating scale was completed. In addition, at baseline and after the treatment a
Chapter 17
182
wide range of verbal and nonverbal neuropsychological measures was
administered. A statistically significant improvement was observed on the
hallucination scale and on a measure of auditory imagery. No difference between
pre- and post-treatment testing was observed on the other neuropsychological
variables. The fact that rTMS over the temporal lobe affected auditory imagery is
in accordance with our suggestion in chapter 10 that this cortical area is involved
in auditory imagery processing. Complementing neuroimaging studies of
hallucination, these preliminary findings for the first time show that left
secondary auditory cortex may necessarily be involved in hallucinations (a
number of previous PET and fMRI studies also found left temporal activation,
but whereas these techniques reveal the cortical structures activated during
hallucinations, they cannot establish whether this activation is essential to it).
Although caution is needed because of the lack of a placebo-control, we
tentatively conclude that TMS may have the potential to improve hallucination
severity in patients with schizophrenia. In a placebo-controlled design, Hoffman
et al. (2000a) recently reported that rTMS over the left temporo-parietal cortex
was effective in reducing hallucination severity in patients with schizophrenia.
Cognitive basis of hallucinations in schizophrenia
Chapter 13 reviewed theory and findings with regard to hallucinations in
schizophrenia. The phenomenology of hallucinations was discussed and it was
concluded that, although there may be a large variability between patients in
formal characteristics of hallucinations (frequency, location, clearness, loudness),
most patients report high levels of conviction about the reality of the sensory
stimuli, clarity of content, and lack of volitional control. In addition, for a
majority of patients the contents of hallucinations are emotionally threatening.
With regard to the neuroanatomy of auditory hallucinations it was concluded
that, whereas a minority of studies report involvement of subcortical areas,
language-production areas, and primary sensory cortex, all studies up to now
report activity in the temporal lobe, more specifically in the middle or superior
gyri. This implies a role of auditory-association areas, which may also include
areas involved in language-perception (cf. the review by Weiss & Heckers, 1999).
For visual hallucinations, activity has been reported in subcortical areas and in
secondary visual areas.
Cognitive theorizing on hallucinations has taken different approaches in
the past decades. Whereas a number of researchers focused on abnormalities in
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the production of inner speech, others have implied defective speech perception,
and still others biases in the meta-cognitive skill of reality monitoring. Finally,
the hypothesis that vivid mental imagery may underlie hallucinations (Galton,
1883) has recently been revived. Frith’s verbal self-monitoring hypothesis (Frith,
1992), in which hallucinations are thought to arise from failures in the
monitoring of own intentions during inner speech can be seen as an integration
of the inner speech hypothesis and the reality monitoring hypothesis. It also
overlaps to some extent with the speech-perception hypothesis, e.g., both
approaches predict that hallucinations may be associated with errors in speech
tracking. More recently, Grossberg (2000) proposed a mechanism by which
“chronically hyperactive volitional signals” could lead to the generation of
conscious sensory experiences by top-down sensory expectations that are not
under volitional control. This approach can be seen as an integration of the
imagery hypothesis (which bears upon strong top-down influences) and the
speech perception account (which states that pronounced linguistic expectations
can generate perceptual outputs), although it is not limited to auditory-verbal
hallucinations (as is the case for the speech perception account).
Most empirical research has concentrated on the reality monitoring
hypothesis and on the verbal self-monitoring/speech perception approach (cf.
David, 1999). Findings have been reported that are consistent with these
approaches (e.g., Morrison & Haddock, 1997; Johns & McGuire, 1999; Hoffman
et al., 1999). However, there are a number of criticisms with regard to these
hypotheses. First, it has been suggested that reality monitoring errors are a
consequence rather than a cause of hallucinations (Hoffman et al., 2000). The
persistent experience of hallucinations may condition patients to expect an
external, non-self locus of control for particular thoughts. In addition, even
though reality monitoring deficits are assumed to play a causal role, they may not
provide a satisfactory account of hallucinations on their own, because reality
monitoring deficits have also been associated with delusional thinking (Frith,
1987), thought disorder (Harvey, 1985) and have been reported in patients who
are not characterized by positive symptoms (Keefe et al., 1999; Vinogradov et
al., 1997). Thus, an additional alteration may be necessary for hallucinations to
arise. With regard to the verbal self-monitoring hypothesis, an important study
failed to observe such deficits in patients with hallucinations (Leudar et al.,
1994).
Very relevant points of concern have been raised by Behrendt (1998):
“One could, however, doubt whether thoughts, inner speech, verbal images, or
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memories transform into external experiences just by virtue of their
misattribution to an external origin. A difficult question to answer is how these
mental events acquire acoustic qualities that are characteristic for verbal
hallucinations (tone, loudness, etc.). Moreover, theories have to account for the
fact that verbal hallucinations resemble voices of particular people and not just
the hallucinator’s voice, as would be expected from an alienation of thoughts or
inner voice. Furthermore, one needs to explain how mental events, in becoming
verbal hallucinations, could acquire a grammatical structure that is typical for
hallucinations in schizophrenia. Hallucinatory voices tend to appear in the
grammatical form of a third person discussing or commenting about the patient.
Self-generated mental events do not normally obey grammatical laws of
interpersonal communication.” (p. 238). Clearly, an approach that focuses on
mental imagery may overcome the limitations that are listed here. For example,
the hypothesis that, in hallucinations, vivid mental images are mistaken for
percepts does not neglect the fact that mental events acquire sensory properties.
In addition, whereas inner speech, in contrast to verbal hallucinations, is usually
not in the third person grammatical form, auditory-verbal imagery may well
occur in second or third person grammatical forms. We therefore conducted a
thorough investigation of imagery vividness (with the use of behavioral
measures) in patients with and without hallucinations.
In a cognitive neuropsychiatric case-study design, we investigated
whether the normal balance between imagery and perception performance
would be distorted in the modality of hallucination in a patient with continuous
auditory hallucinations, Mr. A. (chapter 14). In normal conditions, when
performance on an imagery and a perception condition of the same task is
compared, subjects show better performance in the perception condition (the
perception-superiority effect). In contrast to five comparison patients without
hallucinations, who showed the normal perception-superiority effect, Mr. A had
higher imagery scores, relative to perception, on auditory tasks. This was not the
case for visual tasks (for these tasks he showed the normal perception
superiority, which we expected, as he hallucinated in the auditory, not visual,
modality). Expanding on theoretical suggestions from Böcker et al. (2000) and
from our earlier work (chapter 7) we propose that an imbalance between imagery
and perception might be a potential underlying mechanism in reality monitoring
errors. Indeed, this new approach, that stresses the balance between imagery and
perception, moves on from the traditional hypotheses of either defective
imagery (Evans et al., 2000), vivid imagery (Mintz & Alpert, 1972), or defective
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perception (cf. Böcker et al. 2000; McKay, Headlam & Copolov, 2000). These
earlier hypotheses are all stated in rather absolute terms, whereas the “balance-
hypothesis” concerns relative relations, which may have more explanatory power
in the light of Johnson & Raye’s model of reality monitoring (1981). According
to Johnson and Raye (1981) percepts, which originate from externally presented
stimuli, are characterized by more detailed sensory, contextual and semantic
information than internally generated images. Confusions between percepts and
images may arise when mental images become more rich in perceptual detail, or
when percepts become less rich. Clearly, it is the relative relation between images
and percepts that matters here, not the absolute level.
Chapter 15 investigated imagery/perception relations in a group study.
Measures included multiple behavioral tasks of auditory and visual mental
imagery and perception, a measure of reality monitoring and a signal detection
measure. Hallucinating patients were contrasted with non-hallucinating patients,
after controlling for attentional factors that may influence task performance.
Consistent with a body of previous research, hallucinating patients made
significantly more errors in source discrimination than non-hallucinating patients
(Bentall et al., 1991; Morrison & Haddock, 1997; Johns & McGuire, 1999;
Böcker et al. 2000; Brébion et al., 2000b; Franck et al. 2000). However, no
differences emerged on any of the mental imagery measures. The results
corroborate earlier studies by Böcker et al. (2000) and Evans et al. (2000), who
also failed to find between-group differences on multiple measures of imagery.
The fact that our study included more measures, larger patient groups, patients
with more severe hallucinations, a subgroup of patients that had never
hallucinated at all, and finally, controlled statistically for non-specific attentional
factors, allows us to conclude with more confidence that patients with
hallucinations do not have more vivid imagery relative to perception than
patients without hallucinations. Thus, there is no trait-like alteration in mental
imagery that eventually leads to hallucinations.
Within the framework provided by Johnson & Raye (1981), two
possibilities remain to be investigated more thoroughly: (1) It could be
hypothesized that increased vividness of imagery is strictly confined to the
hallucinatory state, i.e. occurs only during the actual experience of hallucinations.
Our case-study provides some evidence for this hypothesis. (2) According to
Johnson & Raye (1981; Johnson et al., 1993), reality discrimination difficulties
can arise in one of two ways: the images and percepts are less distinctive with
regard to their sensory characteristics, or they are less distinctive with regard to
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the meta-cognitive processes associated with each (e.g., generating mental
images requires more cognitive effort). The second possibility has received little
attention hitherto, in relation to hallucinations. Indeed, the research of Heilbrun
(1980) merits extension: he reported that patients with hallucinations are less
familiar with the properties of their own thinking than non-hallucinating
patients, which would make hallucinating patients more likely to mislabel the
source of their thoughts.
Final Comments
The enigma of hallucination has not been solved yet. Notwithstanding, the
studies described in this thesis have the potential of furthering our knowledge of
the cognitive and neuroanatomical basis of hallucinations. We demonstrated that
a symptom-oriented, cognitive neuropsychiatry approach may contribute
significantly to the research into hallucinations. Specifically, our data suggest that
a state-dependent imbalance between imagery and perception may play a role in
the confusion between internally generated and externally presented stimuli.
Such an imbalance may be strictly limited to periods in which hallucinations are
actually experienced, as we observed an imbalance between imagery and
perception only in a continuous hallucinating patient, not in patients that
hallucinated during the week prior to testing. Indeed, the findings in normal and
psychiatric samples strongly suggest that there is no stable, trait-like alteration in
mental imagery that eventually leads to hallucinations. In our research, we
focused on universal cognitive mechanisms that might underlie the phenomenon
of hallucination. It would be interesting for future research to take into account
the contents of hallucination, and relate this, for example, to experimental
psychological measures of emotion-processing.
It was concluded that the temporal cortex plays an important role in
auditory hallucinations, and secondary visual areas in visual hallucinations. This
is consistent with the hypothesis of a state-dependent alteration of imagery
processes, as mental images have been shown to be processed in such modality-
specific association areas. Future functional neuroimaging studies must focus on
these regions and their connectivity by investigating group-differences associated
with hallucinations during different cognitive tasks (involving reality monitoring,
mental imagery/perception comparisons, etc.). Two important
neurophysiological aspects were not addressed in our research, and deserve
further investigation (cf. Asaad & Shapiro, 1986): the relation between the
neurophysiology of dreams and that of hallucinations, and neurotransmitter
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systems involved in hallucinations (e.g., postsynaptic catecholamine,
indoleamine, or a neuroregulatory imbalance among normally interacting
neurotransmitter systems).
With respect to clinical practice, our findings have a number of
implications. First, memory impairment is extensive in many patients with
schizophrenia, which will affect daily functioning and the type of therapies that
are indicated (for example, certain insight-related therapies might be too
demanding). Second, although not acknowledged by a substantial number of
clinicians, hallucinations are not necessarily pathological (cf. Honig et al., 1998).
For purposes of diagnosis, it may not be the presence or absence of
hallucinatory experiences that matters, but rather whether such hallucinations are
experienced as unpleasant, emotionally demanding or interfere with normal
functioning. Third, there is increasing scientific basis for developing cognitive
behavioral therapies aimed at improving reality monitoring skills. Indeed, such
therapies are being developed, and the positive results of the first evaluation
studies indicate that they will become an important treatment strategy in the near
future (for reviews, see Haddock et al., 1998; Shergill, Murray & McGuire, 1998).
Moreover, our research demonstrated that sensory factors may contribute to the
mechanism of hallucinations. Therefore, it may be worth the effort to focus
cognitive behavior therapy not only on content-related factors, but also on
distinguishing between differential sensory qualities of internally generated and
externally presented perceptual material. Finally, rTMS may be a new tool in the
treatment of medication-resistant hallucinations, although more research is
needed to establish its efficacy, moderating factors (e.g., atypical medication),
and possible contra-indications.
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Samenvatting
Hallucinaties zijn een merkwaardig psychologisch verschijnsel. Het betreft een
vorm van sensorisch bedrog, die bij patiënten met schizofrenie het dagelijks
functioneren belemmert en de kwaliteit van leven negatief beïnvloedt. Het brein
neemt iets waar: een geluid, een stem, een beeld. Maar in werkelijkheid is er niets.
Hoe is dat mogelijk? Hoewel er geen afdoende psychologische verklaring is voor
het optreden van hallucinaties, zijn onderzoekers het er over eens dat er sprake is
van het foutief toewijzen van intern gegeneerde informatie aan een externe bron.
Het doel van het in dit proefschrift beschreven onderzoek is om meer inzicht te
verkrijgen in de mogelijke cognitieve en neurobiologische mechanismen die
hiertoe kunnen leiden.
Het onderzoek is verricht vanuit de cognitief-neuropsychiatrische
benadering, waarbij er van uit gegaan wordt dat hallucinaties in isolatie
bestudeerd kunnen worden. De voornaamste hypothese die onderzocht werd
stelt dat (1) hallucinaties op een continuum van psychologische processen liggen,
die loopt van subjectieve ervaringen bij mensen uit de gezonde populatie tot de
ervaringen die patiënten met schizofrenie rapporteren, en (2) dat hallucinaties
secundair zijn aan gestoorde cognitieve verwerkingsprocessen. Dergelijke
cognitieve stoornissen kunnen gerelateerd worden aan specifieke hersengebieden
die in verband gebracht worden met schizofrenie. Meer in het bijzonder werd de
hypothese getoetst dat een abnormale mentale verbeelding cruciaal is bij de
foutieve toekenning van intern gegenereerde ervaringen naar een externe bron.
Eerst werden cognitieve stoornissen die voorkomen bij patiënten met
schizofrenie in het algemeen door middel van kwantitatief literatuuronderzoek
samengevat. Vervolgens werden hallucinatoire ervaringen onderzocht bij mensen
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zonder psychiatrische afwijking en werd de relatie tussen dergelijke ervaringen en
de levendigheid van de mentale verbeelding gemeten. Daarna werd ingegaan op
de neurale basis van mentale verbeelding en van hallucinaties. Tenslotte werd
onderzocht of patiënten met hallucinaties verschillen van patiënten zonder
hallucinaties op diverse maten voor waarneming, mentale verbeelding en het
vermogen tot brondiscriminatie.
Er spelen een aantal controversen in het cognitieve schizofrenie onderzoek, die
betrekking hebben op methodologische en conceptuele vragen. Aan het eind van
elke sectie van het proefschrift wordt dit geïllustreerd door een kritische evaluatie
van een controversieel punt, behorend tot het onderwerp van de sectie. Dit zijn
de hoofdstukken 4, 8, 12 en 16.
Cognitieve functiestoornissen bij schizofrenie
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt op basis van een kwantitatieve integratie van gepubliceerde
studies (meta-analyse) geconcludeerd dat er bij schizofrenie sprake is van een
aanzienlijke stoornis in diverse geheugenfuncties. Deze geheugenstoornissen
worden niet noemenswaardig beïnvloed door leeftijd, medicatie, lengte van de
ziekte, of de patiënt wel of niet opgenomen is of ernst van de symptomen. In
tegenstelling tot negatieve symptomen lieten positieve symptomen geen verband
zien met de ernst van de geheugenstoornis. Dit betekent dat hallucinaties en
wanen niet verklaard kunnen worden door non-specifieke geheugenstoornissen.
Hoofdstuk 3 betrof een meta-analyse naar verbanden tussen symptoom dimensies
van schizofrenie en het concentratie- en denkvermogen (volgehouden aandacht
en mentale flexibiliteit). De resultaten lieten verbanden zien tussen negatieve
symptomen en beide domeinen van neuropsychologisch functioneren.
Disorganisatie symptomen waren alleen gerelateerd aan mentale flexibiliteit.
Hierbij was het steeds zo dat hoe ernstiger de symptomen, hoe slechter de
prestatie op de neuropsychologische taken was. De correlaties waren echter
steeds klein. Positieve symptomen lieten geen verband zien met verminderd
functioneren in de twee onderzochte cognitieve domeinen. Geconcludeerd werd
dat symptoom dimensies grotendeels onafhankelijk zijn van stoornissen in de
klassieke neuropsychologische functiedomeinen, in overeenstemming met een
recent model. Een volgende stap is om het onderzoek te richten op individuele
symptomen en op gedetailleerde subprocessen die aan het licht gebracht zijn
door de experimentele psychologie.
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Hallucinatoire ervaringen en mentale verbeelding
In hoofstuk 5 werd de factorstructuur van de Launay Slade Hallucinatie Schaal
(LSHS) onderzocht, de meest gebruikte schaal om de dispositie tot hallucinatoire
ervaringen te meten. De schaal werd afgenomen bij 243 studenten, waarvan
ongeveer 5% bij vragen naar hallucinatoire ervaringen "zeker van toepassing"
antwoordde, en 25% "waarschijnlijk van toepassing". Voorts bleken er drie
dimensies te onderscheiden van de LSHS, die we aanduidden met "hallucinatoire
ervaringen", "externe attributie van gedachten", en "levendige dagdromen". De
resultaten ondersteunen de hypothese dat hallucinatoire ervaringen een
continuüm vormen met normale psychologische processen.
Zowel hoofdstuk 6 als hoofdstuk 7 betreffen de vraag: is dispositie tot
hallucinaties gerelateerd aan een sterkere levendigheid van het mentale
verbeeldingsvermogen? In hoofdstuk 6 werd dit met een subjectieve en een
objectieve taak voor levendigheid van de mentale verbeelding gemeten bij 74
studenten. Hoofdstuk 7 beschrijft een uitvoeriger onderzoek waarin een groep
personen die hoog scoorde op gevoeligheid voor hallucinatie vergeleken werd
met een groep die daar laag op scoorde (deze groepen waren geselecteerd uit een
grote steekproef). Bij beide groepen werden zes gedragsmatige taken voor
perceptie en mentale verbeelding afgenomen en een drietal introspectieve taken.
Beide studies (hoofdstukken 6 en 7) lieten dezelfde resultaten zien: personen met
een geneigdheid tot hallucineren verschilden niet van personen zonder deze
geneigdheid op gedragsmatige taken van levendigheid van mentale verbeelding.
Op de subjectieve (introspectieve) maten verschilden beide groepen echter wel -
de groep met hallucinatoire ervaringen had een levendiger verbeelding.
Aangezien de betreffende subjectieve verbeeldingslijsten en de gebruikte
hallucinatielijst fenomenologisch verwante verschijnselen in kaart brengen, is dit
wellicht niet zo verwonderlijk. Onderzoek met objectieve, gedragsmatige taken
bij patiënten (met ernstiger en frequenter hallucinaties dan deze groepen) is
noodzakelijk als uiteindelijke toets van de "mentale verbeeldingshypothese" van
hallucinaties.
Mentale verbeelding, hallucinaties en het brein
Kosslyns theory van gedeelde processen bij perceptie en mentale verbeelding is
relevant voor onderzoek naar de "mentale verbeel-dingshypothese" van
hallucinaties. Wanneer perceptie en verbeelding dezelfde hersenstructuren
activeren, verhoogt dit de plausibiliteit van de hypothese dat onder bepaalde
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omstandigheden hallucinaties kunnen ontstaan doordat perceptie en verbeelding
niet goed van elkaar onderscheiden worden. Onderzoek met beeldvorming van
hersenactiviteit heeft zich tot nu toe beperkt tot muzikale verbeelding en
perceptie. Gedacht wordt dat dezelfde hersengebieden betrokken zijn bij andere
vormen van auditieve verbeelding. In hoofdstuk 9 wordt hier indirecte
ondersteuning voor gegeven. Muzikaal getrainde proefpersonen  werden
vergeleken met proefpersonen zonder muzikale training op drie taken voor
mentale verbeelding: een muzikale taak, een andere (niet-muzikale) auditieve taak
en een vergelijkbare visuele taak.  Onze voorspelling was dat de muzikaal
getrainde groep niet alleen op de muzikale verbeeldingstaak beter zou presteren
dan de controlegroep, maar ook op de niet-muzikale auditieve verbeeldingstaak
(als deze inderdaad op dezelfde hersengebieden een beroep zou doen). De
groepen zouden dan echter niet moeten verschillen op de visuele
verbeeldingstaak (waar immers andere hersengebieden bij betrokken zijn). De
resultaten waren conform deze voorspelling.
In een directer onderzoek werd in hoofdstuk 10 de functionele neuro-
anatomie van visuele mentale verbeelding onderzocht met behulp van
functionele magnetische resonantie beeldvorming (fMRI) en repetitieve
transcraniële magnetische stimulatie (rTMS). Hierbij werd geen activatie van de
primaire schors gevonden, zoals voorspeld door sommige theorieën, maar wel
betrokkenheid van de posterieure pariëtale schors. Dit werd door beide
methoden bevestigd. Met betrekking tot hersenactiviteit tijdens hallucinaties
vinden de meeste studies eveneens geen activiteit in primaire sensorische
gebieden en wel in modaliteit-specifieke associatie cortex. Hoofdstuk 11
onderzocht de effectiviteit van TMS over de linker auditieve cortex op het
verminderen van hallucinaties. Deze studie kan daarmee tevens uitspraken doen
over de neuro-anatomie van hallucinaties. Negen hallucinerende patiënten
werden gedurende 10 dagen met TMS behandeld, 20 minuten per dag. Metingen
voor en na de behandeling lieten een significante vermindering van de auditieve
hallucinaties zien. Ook was er verbetering op een maat voor auditieve
verbeelding. Hoewel voorzichtigheid geboden is, gezien het ontbreken van een
placebo-controle, laten de resultaten zien dat TMS mogelijk ingezet kan worden
als behandeling van medicatie-resistente hallucinaties. Overigens liet een recente
placebo-gecontroleerde studie van TMS bij hallucinaties eveneens positieve
resultaten zien.
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Cognitieve basis van hallucinaties bij schizofrenie
Hoofdstuk 13 gaf een overzicht van theorie en empirische bevindingen met
betrekking tot hallucinaties bij schizofrenie. Eerst werd de fenomenologie
besproken. Hallucinaties kunnen in elke modaliteit voorkomen. Zo zijn er
auditieve, visuele, tactiele, smaak- en geurhallucinaties. Bij schizofrenie zijn
auditieve hallucinaties het meest frequent – zo’n 65% van de patiënten heeft er
op enig moment van de ziekte last van (Slade & Bentall, 1988). Visuele
hallucinaties komen minder voor, bij een kleine 20% van de patiënten. Minder
dan 5% van de patiënten heeft hallucinaties in de overige modaliteiten. De
meeste patiënten ervaren hallucinaties als onprettig en emotioneel bedreigend.
Studies naar hersenactiviteit tijdens hallucinaties laten de betrokkenheid van
subcorticale gebieden zien en met name van secundaire auditieve gebieden in de
temporale schors (mediale en superieure gyrus), zowel in de rechter- als
linkerhemisfeer. Ook bij visuele hallucinaties wordt voornamelijk activiteit
gerapporteerd in de secundaire visuele gebieden. Cognitieve theorievorming werd
uitvoerig beschreven. Deze theorievorming heeft zich gericht op
taalverwerkingsprocessen, brondiscriminatie en mentale verbeelding. Sommige
benaderingen betreffen een integratie van dergelijke hypotheses, een voorbeeld is
de "verbal self-monitoring" theorie van Frith. Weinig studies hebben de balans
tussen perceptie en verbeelding onderzocht.
In hoofdstuk 14 werd een cognitief-neuropsychiatrische studie beschreven
die expliciet met dit doel opgezet was, namelijk om te onderzoeken of een
continu hallucinerende patiënt (auditieve hallucinaties) een disbalans tussen
perceptie en mentale verbeelding zou laten zien, in vergelijking met patiënten
zonder hallucinaties. Onder normale condities scoren mensen altijd hoger op een
perceptie variant van een taak dan op een verbeeldings-variant (waarbij de
proefpersoon hetzelfde moet doen, maar dan op basis van zijn verbeelding in
plaats van op basis van aangeboden stimuli). Bij de continu hallucinerende
patiënt vonden we echter het tegenovergestelde op twee auditieve taken, hij
scoorde hier hoger op de verbeeldingsconditie dan op de perceptieconditie. Zoals
voorspeld was dit echter niet het geval voor twee visuele taken, de modaliteit
waarin hij niet hallucineerde. Hoofdstuk 15 betrof een uitgebreider onderzoek
onder 43 patiënten met schizofrenie. Hierbij werd een groep patiënten met
hallucinaties vergeleken met een groep patiënten zonder hallucinaties op taken
voor perceptie, verbeelding en brondiscriminatie. Patiënten werden in de
hallucinerende groep ingedeeld als zij in de week voorafgaand aan het onderzoek
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hallucinaties hadden ervaren. Deze groep verschilde niet van de controlegroep
(zonder hallucinaties) op maten voor de balans tussen perceptie en verbeelding.
Wel was er een significant verschil tussen beide groepen op een maat voor
brondiscriminatie: patiënten met hallucinaties hadden meer moeite om interne en
externe bronnen van informatie uit elkaar te houden.
Conclusie
In hoofdstuk 17 werden de belangrijkste bevindingen samengevat en de implicaties
besproken voor de theorievorming, toekomstig onderzoek en de klinische
praktijk. We vonden ondersteuning voor de notie dat hallucinatoire ervaringen
een continuüm vormen met normale psychologische processen. Met betrekking
tot de betrokken cognitieve mechanismen suggereren onze resultaten dat een
toestandsafhankelijke disbalans tussen perceptie en mentale verbeelding
verantwoordelijk zou kunnen zijn voor de verwarring tussen informatie van
interne versus externe origine, die karakteristiek is voor hallucinaties. Resultaten
van functionele neurobeeldvormingsstudies zijn consistent met deze these. De
gedragsmatige bevindingen in gezonde en psychiatrische groepen lieten echter
zien dat er geen sprake is van een stabiele dispositie tot levendige mentale
verbeelding die eventueel zou leiden tot de ervaring van hallucinaties.
Er zijn een aantal implicaties van het beschreven onderzoek voor de
klinische praktijk. Eén daarvan is dat rekening gehouden moet worden met de
geheugenstoornissen die veel patiënten met schizofrenie hebben (bepaalde
therapieën die een sterk beroep doen op deze functies zijn daardoor ongeschikt).
Voorts zijn hallucinatoire ervaringen niet per definitie pathologisch, wat niet door
alle clinici onderkend wordt. Voor diagnostische doeleinden is wellicht de aard
van de hallucinaties en de subjectieve waardering ervan belangrijker dan louter de
vraag of deze al dan niet aanwezig zijn.  Er is in toenemende mate
wetenschappelijke ondersteuning voor de effectiviteit van cognitieve
gedragstherapie in de behandeling van hallucinaties. Aangezien ons onderzoek
laat zien dat sensorische factoren een rol kunnen spelen bij het ontstaan van
hallucinaties verdient het aanbeveling dat deze therapieën zich, naast
inhoudsgerelateerde factoren, richten op het leren onderscheiden tussen de
differentiële sensorische eigenschappen van intern gegenereerde en extern
gepresenteerde perceptuele informatie. Tenslotte blijkt uit ons onderzoek dat
rTMS mogelijk een nieuwe behandelingsmethode biedt voor medicatie-resistente
hallucinaties.
Publications
Aleman, A., & De Haan, E.H.F. (1998). On redefining hallucination. American Journal
of Orthopsychiatry, 68, 656-658.
Aleman, A., Verhaar, H.J.J., De Haan, E.H.F., De Vries, W.R., Samson, M.M., Drent,
M.L., Van der Veen, E.A. & Koppeschaar, H.P.F. (1999). Insulin-like growth
factor-1 and cognitive function in healthy older men. Journal of Clinical
Endocrinology and Metabolism, 84, 471-475.
Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E. & De Haan, E.H.F. (1999). Disposition towards
hallucination and subjective versus objective vividness of imagery in normal
subjects. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 707-714.
Aleman, A., Hijman, R., De Haan, E.H.F., & Kahn, R.S. (1999). Memory impairment
in schizophrenia: a meta-analysis. American Journal of Psychiatry, 156, 1358-1366.
Aleman, A., d’ Alfonso, A.A.L., Postma, A. & De Haan, E.H.F. (1999). Involvement
of primary visual cortex in visual mental imagery: a transcranial magnetic
stimulation study. Neuroscience Research Communications, 25, 25-31.
Aleman A, Nieuwenstein M, Böcker KBE, De Haan EHF. (1999) Temporal stability
of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale for high and low scoring normal
subjects. Psychological Reports, 85, 1101-1104.
Aleman, A., De Vries, W.R., De Haan, E.H.F., Verhaar, H.J.J., Samson, M.M.,
Koppeschaar, H.P.F. (2000). Age-sensitive cognitive function, growth hormone,
and insulin-like growth factor-1 plasma levels in healthy older men.
Neuropsychobiology, 41, 73-78.
Aleman, A., De Haan, E.H.F., Verhaar, H.J.J., Samson, M.M., De Vries, W.R., &
Koppeschaar, H.P.F. (2000). Relation between cognitive and physical function in
healthy older men: a role for aerobic power? Journal of the American Geriatrics Society,
48,104-105.
Aleman, A. & De Haan, E.H.F. (2000). Non-language cognitive deficits and
hallucination in schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157, 487.
Aleman, A. & De Haan E.H.F. (2000). Antipsychotics and working memory in
schizophrenia. Science, (July 7, 2000) 289, 56-57.
Aleman, A., Nieuwenstein, M., Böcker, K.B.E., & De Haan, E.H.F. (2000). Music
training and mental imagery ability. Neuropsychologia, 38, 1664-1668.
Aleman, A., Nieuwenstein, M., Böcker, K.B.E., & De Haan, E.H.F. (2000). Mental
imagery and perception in hallucination-prone individuals. Journal of Nervous and
Mental Disease, 188, 830-836.
Aleman, A., Nieuwenstein, M., Böcker, K.B.E., De Haan, E.H.F. (2001). Multi-
dimensionality of hallucinatory predisposition: factor structure of the Launay-Slade
Hallucination Scale in a normal sample. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 287-
292.
Publications
198
Aleman, A., Verhaar, H.J.J., De Haan, E.H.F., De Vries, W.R., Samson, M.M., Bol, E.,
& Koppeschaar, H.P.F. (2001). Relationship between circulating levels of  sex
hormones and insulin-like growth factor-1, and fluid intelligence in older men.
Experimental Aging Research,  in press.
Aleman, A. (2001). Hallucinations and the cerebral hemispheres. Journal of Psychiatry &
Neuroscience, in press.
Rispens, J., Aleman, A. &  Goudena, P.P. (1997). Prevention of child sexual abuse
victimization: a meta-analysis of school programs. Child Abuse & Neglect, 21, 975-
987.
Kessels, R.P.C., Aleman, A., Verhagen, W.I.M., & Van Luijtelaar, E.L.J.M. (2000).
Cognitive functioning after whiplash injury: a meta-analysis. Journal of the
International Neuropsychological Society, 6, 271-278.
Van Dam, P.S., Aleman, A., De Vries, W.R., Deijen, J.B., Van der Veen, E.A., De
Haan, E.H.F., & Koppeschaar, H.P.F. (2000). Growth hormone, insulin-like
growth factor-1 and cognitive functions in adults. Growth Hormone and IGF Research,
10 (suppl. B) , 69-73.
Verhaar, H.J.J., Samson, M.M., Aleman, A., De Vries, W.R. , De Vreede, P.L.,
Koppeschaar, H.P.F. (2000). Relationship between indices of muscle function and
circulating anabolic hormones in healthy elderly men. Aging Male, 3, 75-80.
De Haan, E.H.F., Appels, B., Aleman, A., & Postma, A. (2000). Inter- and intramodal
encoding of auditory and visual presented material: effects on memory
performance. Psychological Record, 50, 577-586.
Van Zandvoort, M.J.E., Aleman, A., Kapelle, J., & De Haan, E.H.F. (2000). Cognitive
functioning before and after a single lacunar infarct. Cerebrovascular Diseases, 10,
478-479.
Sommer, I.E., Aleman, A., Ramsey, N.F., Bouma, A., & Kahn, R.S. (2001).
Handedness, laterality and asymmetry in schizophrenia: a review and meta-analysis.
British Journal of  Psychiatry, in press.
Aleman, A. (1996). PET-beeldvorming van cognitieve functies. Nederlands Tijdschrift
voor de Psychologie, 51, 145-153.
Aleman, A. & De Haan, E.H.F. (1999). Clozapine en cognitief functioneren. Tijdschrift
voor Psychiatrie, 41, 37-43.
Aleman, A., Nieuwenstein, M., Böcker, K.B.E., & De Haan, E.H.F. (1999).
Hallucinatoire ervaringen bij gezonde personen uit de normale populatie:
factorstructuur van de Launay-Slade Hallucinatie schaal. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de
Psychologie, 54, 241-246.
Aleman, A. & De Haan, E.H.F. (1999). Nieuwe antipsychotica verbeteren het
cognitief functioneren bij schizofrenie. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde, 143,
2336.
Aleman, A. (2000). Hallucinaties bij schizofrenie: hoe het brein zichzelf misleidt. De
Psycholoog, 35, 154-159.
Publications
199
Aleman, A. & Tuijl, C.A. van (2000). Meta-analyse, heterogeniteit en de effecten van
voorschoolse interventieprogramma’s: een kritische beschouwing. Pedagogiek, 20,
162-166.
Kessels, R.P.C. & Aleman, A. (2000). Cognitieve stoornissen bij patienten met het
whiplashsyndroom. Gedrag & Gezondheid, 28, 229-234.
Manuscripts under review, or in revision
Aleman, A. & Kahn, R.S. Effect of the atypical antipsychotic risperidone on hostility
and aggression in schizophrenia: a meta-analysis of controlled trials. Manuscript in
revision.
Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E., & De Haan, E.H.F. Self-report and behavioral indices of
auditory imagery vividness: relation with hallucinatory predisposition. Manuscript
in revision.
Nieuwenstein, M.R., Aleman, A., & De Haan, E.H.F. Relationship between
schizophrenia syndromes and neurocognitive functioning: a meta-analysis of CPT
and WCST studies. Manuscript in revision.
D’Alfonso, A.A.L., Aleman, A., Kessels, R.P.C., Schouten, E.A., Postma, A., Van der
Linden, J.A., Cahn, W., Greene, Y., De Haan, E.H.F., & Kahn, R.S. TMS over
the left auditory cortex in schizophrenia: effects on hallucinations and
neurocognition. Manuscript in revision.
Rutten, G-J., Aleman, A., Sitskoorn, M., Dautzenberg, G., & Ramsey, N.F. Activation
of striate cortex in the absence of visual stimulation: an fMRI study of
synesthesia. Manuscript in revision.
Aleman, A., Ramsey, N.F., Van Honk, J., Kessels, R.P.C., Hoogduin, J., Schutter,
D.L.G., Postma, A., Kahn, R.S., & De Haan, E.H.F. Parietal cortex mediates
visuospatial imagery: evidence from fMRI and rTMS. Manuscript submitted for
publication.
Aleman, A. & De Haan, E.H.F. Do people with better mental imagery ability make
more reality monitoring errors? Manuscript submitted for publication.
Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E., Hijman, R., Kahn, R.S., & De Haan, E.H.F.
Hallucinations in schizophrenia: imbalance between imagery and perception? A
cognitive neuropsychiatric study. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Aleman, A. & De Haan, E.H.F. Hallucinations in schizophrenia: a review of
neurocognitive theory and findings. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Van Tuijl, C., Aleman, A., Siebes, RC. What do we know about efficacy of preschool
intervention? A critical review and meta-analysis. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Kessels, R.P.C., Van Honk, J., Aleman, A., d’Alfonso, A., Schutter, D.J.L.G., Postma,
A., & De Haan, E.H.F. Transcranial magnetic stimulation in inducing cognitive
effects: online versus offline stimulation. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Publications
200
Abstracts
Aleman, A., Verhaar, H.J.J., De Haan, E.H.F., Samson, M.M., De Vries, W.R., &
Koppeschaar, H.P.F. (1998). Growth hormone and cognitive function in healthy
older men. Growth Hormone and IGF Research, 8, 329.
Aleman, A., Verhaar, H.J.J., De Haan, E.H.F., Samson, M.M., De Vries, W.R., &
Koppeschaar, H.P.F. (1998). Serum IGF-1 and DHEAS: markers of cognitive
aging? Proceedings of the 5th International Pituitary Congress, Naples, Florida, June 28-30
1998.
Aleman A, d’Alfonso AAL, Postma A, De Haan EHF (1999). TMS at the occipital
cortex interferes with visual mental imagery processing. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 11 (Suppl.), 90.
Aleman, A., Nieuwenstein, M., Böcker, K.B.E., De Haan, E.H.F. (1999). Do
subjective and objective measures of imagery vividness measure the same thing? In
Richardson J.T.E. (ed.), Proceedings of the Seventh European Workshop on Imagery and
Cognition, p. 11. Windsor: Brunel University Press.
Aleman, A., D’Alfonso, A.A.L., Jongen, A., Postma, A., & De Haan, E.H.F. (2000).
Single-pulse TMS at the Oz electrode position and at the parieto-occipital cortex
during a visual imagery task. Journal of Psychophysiology, Suppl. 1: S34.
Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E., Hijman, R., Kahn, R.S., & De Haan, E.H.F. (2000).
Modality-specific vividness of mental imagery in a hallucinating patient with
schizophrenia. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 6, 401.
Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E., Hijman, R., Kahn, R.S., & De Haan, E.H.F. (2001).
Reality monitoring and mental imagery in patients with and without hallucinations.
Psychopharmacology, in press.
Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E., Hijman, R., Kahn, R.S., & De Haan, E.H.F. (2001).
Hallucinations in schizophrenia: distortions in mental imagery or reality monitoring
failures? Schizophrenia Research, in press.
Van Zandvoort, M.J.E., Aleman, A., Kapelle, L.J., & De Haan, E.H.F. (2000).
Cognitive functioning before and after a lacunar infarct. Journal of the International
Neuropsychological Society, 6, 403.
D’Alfonso, A.A.L., Aleman, A., Kessels, R.P.C., Schouten, E.A., Postma, A., Van der
Linden, J.A., Cahn, W., Greene, Y., De Haan, E.H.F., Kahn, R.S. (2000, May). The
effects of rTMS at the left auditory cortex on hallucinations and neurocognition in
schizophrenia. Paper presented at the 3rd annual meeting of the International Society for
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (ISTS), Chicago, IL.
Krabbendam, L. & Aleman, A. (2001). Efficacy of cognitive rehabilitation in
schizophrenia: a meta-analysis of controlled studies. Psychopharmacology, in press.
Dankwoord
Bij het uitvoeren van het in dit proefschrift beschreven onderzoek heb ik de
afgelopen jaren hulp en steun ondervonden van veel mensen, die ik hartelijk
wil bedanken.
Op de eerste plaats professor Edward de Haan. Je hebt het project
van a tot z gesuperviseerd en ik ben je zeer erkentelijk voor je goede
begeleiding. Door jouw open en ontspannen stijl van leidinggeven, samen met
je nadruk op zelfstandigheid en academische vrijheid, heb ik mijn werk in een
bijzonder stimulerende onderzoeksomgeving kunnen doen. Professor René
Kahn wil ik bedanken voor de begeleiding vanuit het Universitair Medisch
Centrum, en voor de mogelijkheid om onderzoek te doen met patiënten en
gebruik te maken van de UMC-faciliteiten. Het was een leuke ervaring om een
steentje bij te mogen dragen aan het internationaal toonaangevende
schizofrenie-onderzoeksprogramma van het UMC.
Koen Böcker heeft vooral het eerste deel van het project intensief
begeleid. Koen, ik heb veel gehad aan je praktische aanwijzingen om door de
"opstartproblemen" heen te komen. Ook je commentaar op eerdere versies
van hoofdstukken van het proefschrift heb ik als waardevol ervaren. Ron
Hijman maakte me wegwijs in het (toen nog) AZU, leerde me “PANSSen”, en
vervulde een sleutelrol bij het werven van patiënten voor deelname aan het
onderzoek.
I am grateful to professor Anthony David for reading the final thesis.
Eveneens leden van de leescommissie, dank ik professor Jan Rispens en
professor Jelle Jolles voor het doornemen van het definitieve manuscript.
Nick Ramsey ben ik dank verschuldigd voor de mogelijkheid om
onderzoek te doen met functionele magnetische resonantie beeldvorming en
Hans Hoogduin niet minder voor de uren die hij opofferde om mij de
beginselen van deze kunst aan te leren.
Mijn collega's Roy Kessels, Alfredo d’Alfonso, Mark Nieuwenstein,
Jack van Honk, Dennis Schutter en Albert Postma hebben allen inhoudelijk
aan een of meer hoofdstukken bijgedragen. Roy, jou wil ik in het bijzonder
bedanken voor je collegiale hulp bij de vele aspecten van manuscript
preparatie. Andere collega's waar ik steeds op kon rekenen: Martine van
Zandvoort, Claudy Oomen, professor Frans Verstraten, Rob Markus en
Michel Schmitt. Van de fMRI-groep: Geert-Jan Rutten, Iris Sommer, Martijn
Jansma en René Mandl.
Dankwoord
202
Maureen Postma, bedankt voor je inspanningen om de financiële aspecten van
het project in goede banen te leiden.
Een speciaal woord van dank komt de deelnemers aan de
onderzoeken toe. En ook de diverse behandelaars die patiënten vroegen of ze
mee wilden doen aan mijn onderzoeken. In het bijzonder wil ik Wiepke Cahn
en Esther Caspers bedanken voor het coördineren hiervan in het UMC, en
René Keet en professor Willem Nolen voor hun hulp in het Willem Arntz
Ziekenhuis (H.C. Rümke groep). Marieke Kooman, Anke Jongen, Rachel
Brans, Jaap Nagtegaal en Mascha van 't Wout dank ik voor hun hulp bij het
testen van patiënten.
Veel administratieve bijstand kreeg ik van Ans Hörchner, Ria Konter
en Veronica Maassen (secretariaat Psychonomie) en van Susan van Hemert en
Emmy Drost (Psychiatrie). David van de Vliet hielp bij computerproblemen.
Mijn broers dank ik voor hun bereidheid om paranimf te willen zijn,
en mijn schoonouders, Beppe en Oma voor hun betrokkenheid en steun.
Daar aangekomen waar dankbaarheid niet meer in woorden uit te drukken is,
toch maar een enkele aanduiding.
Mijn ouders hebben me altijd aangemoedigd en gesteund in school en
studie, en creëerden de randvoorwaarden om mijn mogelijkheden te
ontplooien.
Finnie, jij leefde mee door dik en dun. Jouw liefde was onmisbaar.
Alline maakte de tekening op de voorkant en zorgde ervoor dat ik
ook de Nederlandse literatuur bijhield, met name van auteurs met hoge
impactscores (A.M.G. Schmidt, Dagmar Stam, e.a.). Martijn, jouw
nieuwsgierigheid en exploratiedrang zijn een dagelijkse inspiratiebron voor een
wetenschapper.
Uiteindelijk komt God, die alles maakte, onderhoudt en regeert, de
dank toe. Hem zij alle lof en eer!
Curriculum vitae
203
Curriculum vitae
André Aleman werd geboren op 20 juni 1975 in Leiden. In 1993 behaalde hij
het Atheneum diploma aan de Pieter Zandt Scholengemeenschap te Kampen.
Een jaar later behaalde hij de propedeuse Psychologie en de propedeuse
Pedagogiek aan de Universiteit Utrecht. Hij vervolgde zijn psychologiestudie
in twee richtingen: neuropsychologie en fysiologische psychologie. In 1997
voltooide hij zijn klinische stage in het algemeen psychiatrisch ziekenhuis
"Veldwijk" te Ermelo. In hetzelfde jaar studeerde hij af in beide genoemde
richtingen. In 1998 begon hij als onderzoeker-in-opleiding aan de
capaciteitsgroep Psychonomie van de Universiteit Utrecht (in samenwerking
met de afdeling Psychiatrie van het Universitair Medisch Centrum) met het
vierjarig project Hallucinaties: cognitieve functiestoornissen en fysiologische basis.
